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Spyware vendors found a way to make targeted ads even worse

The online advertising industry has found a new way to make itself even more unpopular, with one adtech outfit accused of helping spyware vendors infect people's phones without them even clicking an ad. Researchers at Citizen Lab say they've uncovered the first publicly confirmed case of a zero-click mercenary spyware attack being delivered through targeted online ads, with devices at Al Jazeera among those infected. The technique, dubbed "AdFection," turns advertising networks into a spyware delivery system. Simply opening a website or app can be enough to trigger the attack, with no suspicious links or downloads involved. Israeli adtech firm Discover-Tech is allegedly behind the operation, according to researchers at Citizen Lab, which says the company acts as a middleman between the online advertising industry and multiple spyware and hacking vendors. "We present technical evidence that the Israel-based company Discover-Tech, while purporting to be a legitimate advertising company, appears to be a front for large-scale ad espionage abuse," the researchers wrote. “In fact, it appears that serving as this bridge is Discover-Tech’s primary purpose." Discover-Tech’s Controlium platform exploits the real-time bidding system that decides which ads appear on websites and apps. Every time someone loads a page, advertisers compete for available ad space and, in the process, receive information about the user's device and location. Discover-Tech allegedly used that data to identify specific targets and serve them malicious ads. One spyware vendor linked to the operation is Candiru, the Israeli developer now known as Integrity Labs. Citizen Lab traced attacks against at least 45 devices at Al Jazeera in 2024 and 2025 to Candiru spyware delivered through ads from Discover-Tech. Discover-Tech didn't have to sneak into the advertising system, as Google and IAB Europe had listed the company as an approved vendor since 2020, apparently unaware of what it was Citizen Lab claims it was doing with that access. Citizen Lab sifted through nearly four billion ad-bidding records and found Discover-Tech ads on more than 70,000 mobile apps and 120,000 websites between March and June 2026. Some reached networks belonging to government agencies, defense organizations, and NATO. Researchers found no evidence that those organizations were infected, but they say the ads could have been used to profile devices on those networks. The researchers said the operation also covertly directed millions of devices toward servers associated with Candiru, although those connections don't necessarily indicate spyware infections. Google has since terminated Discover-Tech's access to its advertising exchanges and removed it from its approved vendor lists. IAB Europe followed suit, while Beeswax, Vungle and Eskimi also took action. Discover-Tech and Candiru did not respond to Citizen Lab's requests for comment, nor ours. The researchers argue that the findings expose serious failings in an advertising industry that allowed a company with links to commercial surveillance operators to operate inside its supposedly vetted ecosystem for years. “Discover-Tech’s mass abuse, privacy invasion, and facilitation for mercenary spyware attacks illustrates structural flaws with the online advertising system, which failed to detect or prevent the abuse documented in this report,” Citizen Lab said. For years, the worst thing about targeted advertising was that it knew far too much about you. Turns out some advertisers were interested in much more than your shopping habits. ®

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Bank of America had to bring in 1,000 contractors to patch all the bugs Mythos identified

Bank of America recruited an additional 1,000 contractors to help patch all the vulnerabilities discovered by Anthropic’s Mythos model, the CEO said on Wednesday. Brian Moynihan, chairman and CEO at BoA, said during the company’s Q3 earnings call that it spent “a couple of hundred million plus” in remediation costs related to Mythos, and the anti-money laundering (AML) orders issued this week. These costs are expected to decline over time, though, with the contractors in place to help ease the initial burden of patching a large number of flaws, an issue that shouldn’t be so pronounced in the longer term. He went on to tell CNBC that the bank brought in outside help after concerns grew over how it would quickly tackle all the work associated with Mythos’ discoveries. The same concerns were shared globally, in part due to how Anthropic marketed Mythos as an all-powerful model that threatened the status quo of cybersecurity. While it ultimately turned out to be highly effective and capable of identifying complex vulnerabilities quicker than humans, leading to the massive influx of patches, some early adopters say it was no smarter than elite researchers. Mozilla CTO Bobby Holley said in April: "So far we've found no category or complexity of vulnerability that humans can find that this model can't," after Mythos found 271 flaws in Firefox 150. "We also haven't seen any bugs that couldn't have been found by an elite human researcher." The 1,000 contractors brought in by the bank in its Q2 added to its existing 3,000 technical staff. The contractors remain at the bank for now, although their assistance won’t be needed in the longer term. Moynihan told financial analysts on the bank’s earnings call that BoA has made its tech engineering workforce around 10 percent more efficient, and that each of the circa 130 AI-related projects it has running is expected to achieve a 2x or 3x return on investment over time. In 2026 alone, the CEO expects AI projects to deliver between $250 million and $300 million in benefits – a sum he expects to shoot up to $700 million by the end of 2027. He didn't detail how. The bank has also reduced around 3,000 roles, including a 5 percent decrease in the number of managers on the payroll, although it didn't specify how much of a role AI played. Moynihan didn’t break down how much of the “couple of hundred million plus” in remediation costs were devoted to AI or Mythos, compared to costs associated with cleaning up its AML issues, both of which the CEO lumped together. BoA’s share price slid more than 8 percent on Wednesday morning after it reported a 17 percent drop in profits owing to the $1.21 billion settlement it agreed to with the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The FinCEN order relates to BoA’s failure to police national security risks, including Chinese money laundering, and a failure to report over $5 billion in suspicious activity. FinCEN’s order was issued concurrently with a $750 million penalty from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, related to Bank Secrecy Act and AML compliance deficiencies. BoA also agreed an $11.6 million settlement with the Office of Foreign Assets Control for sanctions violations, including those related to Iran, Russia, narcotics, and global terrorism. ®

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Is AI pentesting as good as a human pentester?

AI pentesting can uncover vulnerabilities missed by human testers, but it also has limitations in consistency, risk assessment, and understanding business context. Intruder compares the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and explains where AI agents can improve security testing. [...]
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X purges 13,000 accounts linked to suspected meddling ahead of US midterms

X says it has nuked more than 13,000 accounts involved in three suspected foreign influence operations targeting US political debate. In a post on Wednesday evening, the platform linked the operations to Iran, Russia, and China. It said the networks used inauthentic accounts to post and amplify political content targeting candidates and public figures across the political spectrum. The announcement comes ahead of the US midterm elections on November 3. "People come to X to talk about what's happening in the world, including the upcoming 2026 US midterms," the platform said. "Free speech is the bedrock of a functioning democracy, and we are proud that X is the global town square where these debates happen. Our job is to keep that conversation authentic, open, and safe." X did not publicly explain the evidence behind its attribution. Separately, it highlighted its Civic Integrity policy, which covers misleading information about how, when, and where to vote, as well as content intended to discourage participation. Reports submitted under "Civic Integrity" are routed into requests for Community Notes. X says it uses the crowdsourced feature alongside platform moderation and may label policy-breaking posts in critical cases. Community Notes has faced scrutiny. When the European Commission launched formal proceedings against X under the Digital Services Act in 2023, it raised questions about the feature's effectiveness for validating a post's accuracy. X's reliance on crowdsourced context follows layoffs and senior departures from its moderation teams after Musk acquired Twitter. Foreign influence campaigns aren't confined to US elections. MI5 chief Sir Ken McCallum said this week that Russia had attempted to interfere in the 2016 Brexit referendum, but cautioned against treating that as evidence it changed the result. ®

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Chi controlla l’IA negli Usa? Lo scontro tra Trump e gli Stati

Procure e legislatori statali stanno colmando il vuoto lasciato dal Congresso sulla sicurezza dell’AI negli Stati Uniti, mentre la Casa Bianca tenta di limitare le norme locali e i laboratori propongono un rallentamento volontario esposto a responsabilità civile, antitrust e pressioni politiche

L'articolo Chi controlla l’IA negli Usa? Lo scontro tra Trump e gli Stati proviene da Agenda Digitale.

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Legal Aid Agency hackers made off with records dating back to 1978

Hackers who broke into the UK's Legal Aid Agency last year stole records dating back nearly five decades, the government has admitted, revealing the breach was far more extensive than previously thought. The Legal Aid Agency said on Wednesday that around 250,000 records stolen in the April 2025 attack date from before 2007, including one going back to 1978. That's much further back than the agency previously estimated ­­– it initially said the stolen data covered legal aid applications, claims, and payments from 2007. Most of the newly identified records date from the 1990s and 2000s, with only a “fractionally small number” originating before 1990. Still, the discovery raises an awkward question about just how much historical personal information was sitting in government systems when the attackers came knocking. That wasn't the only surprise in the stolen data, as the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has also discovered that hackers accessed information from HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), including names, dates of birth, nationalities, and case reference numbers for offenders supervised by probation services between 2010 and 2017. The government says the probation records concern a relatively small number of offenders, with more than 99 percent of the affected data relating to people under supervision in 2016 and 2017. It stressed that none of the stolen probation information relates to victims of crime. The latest revelations come almost 18 months after the Legal Aid Agency disclosed that criminals had accessed and downloaded a significant amount of sensitive personal information. The agency first detected the intrusion on April 23, 2025, but officials didn't establish the scale of the compromise until May 16. The government subsequently took the LAA's online services offline, leaving lawyers struggling to access the systems they needed to submit claims and manage cases. The disruption dragged on for months, with the agency's troubled return to service in December leaving legal aid providers battling delays and ongoing technical problems. Further forensic work has now revealed that the data theft goes back much further than officials originally believed. The compromised information varies by individual but could include names, addresses, dates of birth, National Insurance numbers, financial details, and information about legal proceedings. Some records also contain details of criminal charges, pleas, convictions, and sentences. Among the older material are records relating to legal aid benefit assessments dating from 1978 to 2012, and payments made under the Very High Cost Cases scheme between 1981 and 2004. The government cautioned that the presence of historical records doesn’t mean that everyone who applied for legal aid before 2007 had their information stolen, nor does the 250,000 figure represent a confirmed number of affected individuals. Explaining why it has taken so long to pin down the extent of the theft, the MoJ said the attackers stole information spread across several complex systems, much of it unstructured, fragmented, or incomplete. "Because of our increased capability to identify data, we have developed a more complete understanding of the information compromised," the agency said. The government says it has no indication that the stolen information has been published or shared, although that offers little certainty to anyone whose personal details may now be in criminal hands. Since the attack, the MoJ says it has tightened authentication and access controls, improved security monitoring, addressed vulnerabilities and begun retiring or isolating higher-risk technology. Work to modernize its legacy systems is also underway. The question of why records stretching back to the 1970s remained accessible in the first place is one the latest update does not answer. ®

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US Air Force pilots used malware-laden USB drives to plan Afghanistan missions

Welcome, once again, to PWNED, the weekly column where we gawk at organizations that have made serious security mistakes. Normally, we’re talking about businesses or maybe the odd school that messes up, but today we’re writing about a serious IT screwup in the world’s most powerful military. Have a story about someone leaving a gaping hole in their network? Share it with us at pwned@sitpub.com. Anonymity is available upon request. Today’s tale comes from Justin Henkel, the CISO of IT monitoring and service company SolarWinds. Henkel previously worked in IT security for the Air Force and one day in the early 2000s saw a practice that just wouldn’t fly today. Before USB drives became popular, burning CDs with mission data was the modus operandi, and those discs were put in both unclassified and classified systems. “They would write a CD, and then they would take that CD and then put it in a classified system and do the remainder of the mission planning,” Henkel told us. “Then they would take that disc and then put it in the airplane.” Inside the airplane, the data on the CD would help the pilot navigate and contain information about threats they might encounter. Later, when thumb drives became a thing, pilots used them instead of discs. “They didn't really think about the overall impact of classified versus unclassified systems,” Henkel said of the pilots. “Using the same device for both, they didn’t understand that you could read and write onto a USB drive with malware. [They were] not really understanding the overall threat picture.” According to Henkel, Air Force personnel would buy their flash drives from local vendors rather than sourcing them from official military contractors. If they were in Afghanistan, those drives could literally come from a store in Kabul. And it wasn’t exactly the equivalent of Best Buy. “It was more difficult to bring a US-based computer into the nation than it was just to buy local,” he said. “So they were just going out into the local market in Kabul or whatever city that they were out [in]. And I used to do this: go out, make relationships with the local vendors. ‘Hey I need 100 USB sticks.’” Unfortunately, enemies of the US noticed and soon started selling infected USB drives to local vendors in the Middle East. Henkel knew that using a sneakernet with classified systems was a recipe for disaster. It’s just that no one would listen to him. “It was just a shock,” he told us. “I was a young 22-year-old guy, very junior in the overall rank system, trying to tell colonels and majors that what they’re doing is a violation.” In 2008, the US Department of Defense was infected by malware after somebody attached an infected USB flash drive to a laptop with access to US Central Command. The worm, dubbed Agent.BTZ, could collect information from infected computers and communicate with remote servers. A 2016 report from the FBI and DHS attributed the malware to one or more Russian groups. It took the Pentagon 14 months to scrub it from its systems. It took this attack for the Pentagon to wise up in 2008 and ban the use of USB drives, instead forcing data transfers to go through more secure systems. Eventually, in 2010, the drives were allowed again under certain circumstances. ®

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Debito operativo SaaS: il costo nascosto della velocità digitale

Nelle grandi imprese entrano in media 21 nuove applicazioni SaaS al mese, ma il portafoglio resta quasi fermo. Il ricambio continuo, le integrazioni, l’AI e i modelli a consumo spostano così il problema dal numero delle licenze al debito operativo che l’organizzazione deve governare

L'articolo Debito operativo SaaS: il costo nascosto della velocità digitale proviene da Agenda Digitale.

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Metropolitan Police's unchecked use of shoplifting platform lands force in trouble with data watchdog

The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) has reprimanded London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and issued an enforcement notice after officers used a retail crime platform without the force's approval or required data protection checks. Between March 2023 and September 2024, MPS officers registered around 500 free accounts on Auror, a platform retailers use to record crimes such as shoplifting. The force had not formally procured the service or completed the required data protection checks. Retailers such as supermarkets encouraged officers to use Auror and directed them to the platform to access CCTV footage. Auror Europe, registered in England and Wales, is a subsidiary of New Zealand-based Auror. The platform allows retailers to share incident reports, images, and CCTV footage. Retailers pay for access through a browser or mobile app, while police partners use it free of charge. The force had not completed a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) or established data-sharing agreements with Auror Europe, the ICO says. Between August and September 2024, two separate internal security reports were filed regarding officers' use of Auror. The first related to officers uploading the names of suspects they recognized from CCTV footage, and the second pertained to officers collecting CCTV footage from the platform despite no checks being made on it. Access to Auror was blocked as of September 26, 2024. The MPS data protection officer (DPO) informed the ICO of the force's use of Auror in December 2024 during discussion about a separate matter. The watchdog launched a formal probe in April 2025. The ICO found that officers unlawfully uploaded personal data relating to 179 people, including three children, to Auror. For 128, this consisted of names alone; for 49, names and dates of birth; and for two, names, dates of birth, and home addresses. The ICO said the MPS failed to ensure adequate oversight was implemented when deciding what third-party platforms officers were allowed to use – failures that persist today. It claimed the MPS is overly reliant on soft controls to prevent officers from using unapproved software, such as policy reminders and staff training, which often go unnoticed, rather than technical blocks. The ICO also said the force had failed to test whether its web controls worked: officers used Auror for more than 18 months without triggering an alert. The regulator described a repeat failure, pointing to officers' use of Clearview AI in 2021 without proper oversight. The ICO considers the failures ongoing because the force has not demonstrated that its safeguards can prevent similar incidents. The enforcement action compels the MPS to strengthen its safeguards against improper use of third-party tools and provide the ICO with periodic progress updates. David Doodson, head of investigations at the ICO, said: "This action should send a message across the policing sector, and beyond: If you are using new technology to process people's information you must do so lawfully, transparently and with appropriate governance from the outset. "Where organisations fail to protect people's information, we will take action. Our role is not only to hold organisations to account, but to drive improvements and promote the standards people have a right to expect." The MPS told The Register that following the implementation of stricter controls and a pilot scheme, officers in 14 London boroughs are once again using Auror. "Following formal approval and a pilot, the platform is now used in 14 London boroughs," a Met spokesperson said. "It helps officers identify shoplifters more quickly, enabling retailers to directly share evidence and CCTV at the point of reporting and has quadrupled positive outcomes for shoplifting." In an August 2026 announcement, the MPS said the tech, which it did not identify by name, would be rolled out beyond the 14 boroughs and was already deployed in stores such as Tesco, Boots, Greggs, and M&S. It said that instances of shoplifting reported via the platform result in a positive outcome in 29.4 percent of cases. Of the ICO's findings, the spokesperson said: "We accept the ICO's findings that our data protection arrangements at the time were insufficient in relation to individual officers using the Auror platform. "While officers were using the platform in good faith to identify and arrest shoplifters, we recognise that we had not completed the relevant security and data protection work for the platform to be used. "As soon as we became aware of this issue, we immediately suspended access to the platform and carried out a full review. We have subsequently completed the necessary legal, security, commercial and data protection checks before approving the platform for use." This reprimand and enforcement action follow a separate rebuke from the ICO in August, concerning two sensitive cases. In one, a Met officer sent unredacted legal documents to the subject of a stalking protection order, exposing the victim's new home address and contact details. The other saw an officer commit the cardinal CC-not-BCC sin, exposing the email addresses of 18 people linked to Parliament who were targeted in a honeytrap sting. ®

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Cisco make-me-root email bug exploited as a 0-day by unknown crims

Cisco “strongly” implored customers to patch yet another critical, make-me-root vulnerability in its Secure Email Gateway (SEG), one that has already been exploited in zero-day attacks. A Cisco spokesperson told The Register that the critical vuln, which received a 9.8 out of 10 CVSS rating, affects “a limited number of customers.” The bug, now tracked as CVE‑2026‑76519, allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to write files and execute commands with root privileges on the appliance’s operating system - simply by sending a malicious email. In separate Wednesday advisories, both the networking vendor and the US government warned that attackers were exploiting the latest SEG vulnerability before Cisco issued a fix. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and set a Saturday deadline for federal agencies to fix the issue. “We are aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability,” the spokesperson said, but declined to answer our questions about how many appliances had been compromised, and what attackers were doing with this access after exploiting the bug. “We strongly urge customers to upgrade to a fixed software release and follow additional recommendations and hardening guidance in our advisory,” the spokesperson said. The flaw exists in SEG’s Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) feature, and it’s due to improper handling of email attachments. An attacker could exploit the bug by sending an email with a malicious attachment, and a successful exploit would allow them to write files and execute commands as root on the compromised appliance. This vulnerability affects both physical and virtual SEG appliances running a vulnerable release of Cisco AsyncOS Software if both of the following conditions are met: The File Reputation service, which is part of Cisco AMP, is enabled and assigned to a mail policy. The Content Scanner Tools version is earlier than 25.3.0.5525. Cisco's Wednesday advisory includes steps organizations can take to determine whether File Reputation is enabled and which Content Scanner Tools version is installed - so give that a read if you are unsure. Upgrading to a fixed Cisco AsyncOS Software release will patch the security hole, and there are no workarounds. The vendor recommends any customers who are running Cisco AsyncOS Software releases earlier than v 16.5 migrate to 16.5.0-780. In its alert, Cisco said it became aware of active exploitation in October. This is the second such zero-day in SEG in as many months. In mid-September, Cisco warned customers that criminals were exploiting a similar bug in SEG, tracked as CVE-2026-76461, that also turns a malicious email into root access. In January, attackers exploited another critical AsyncOS flaw, CVE-2025-20393, to break into Cisco SEG appliances and install persistence mechanisms. That bug eventually scored a perfect 10.®

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Security researchers spent 6 days doing their Chromework, built 1B user exploit

Researchers at security startup Xbow used OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol model to help chain three zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome into an exploit capable of executing code outside the browser's sandbox on Windows machines. Xbow estimates that this could affect about one billion users worldwide. Google fixed all three, and paid the Xbow team a $250,000 bounty, its top reward for a Chrome full-chain exploit. The payout also proves a nice return on investment for the human bug hunters - Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Andres Luksenberg, Baul Lee, and Willem Pinckaers - who spent just six days during the Black Hat and DEF CON conferences and about $40,000 in token charges to discover the vulnerabilities and build the attack chain. “The number on the check is impressive, but the time it took our team, with the help of a publicly available AI model, to break in is even more impressive,” Xbow CEO and founder Oege de Moor said on Tuesday. “A three letter intelligence-agency veteran told me that his team used to spend six months trying to identify this kind of vulnerability and get total access. We did it in six days.” In a separate technical writeup about the attack chain, Dolan-Gavitt detailed the work done by humans and AI agents. Agents, using OpenAI's GPT-5.6-Sol model, searched source code, tested the team’s hypotheses, and developed proofs of concept and exploit stages, he said. Meanwhile, the AI pen-testing security startup’s researchers chose targets, provided context, challenged the agents’ results, and decided which attack components to chain. "We did apply a fair bit of our own human expertise and judgment," he wrote. Crossing two security boundaries in 3 steps Google’s Chrome browser uses several layers of security to protect users, and this includes sandboxes - barriers to contain compromised code and ensure that someone who hacks an individual website can’t take over the entire computer. This includes deploying the V8 sandbox to prevent any memory corruption flaws in the V8 JavaScript engine from impacting other memory. The V8 sandbox sits inside the operating-system process sandbox, and this nested design means that escaping V8's memory restrictions doesn't automatically grant native code execution. Even if an attacker achieves native code execution inside Chrome's renderer, the outer process sandbox restricts access to the rest of the machine. “The chain crossed both boundaries in three vulnerability stages,” abusing Chrome to run code on Windows machines, Dolan-Gavitt wrote. The attack combines a V8 compiler bug, an animated-WebP decoder bug, and a memory-safety bug in Crashpad. The first vulnerability is in Maglev, V8's mid-tier optimizing compiler, and it’s due to a reused, mutable boxed number during deoptimization. This gives attackers read and write access throughout V8's pointer-compression cage. The second stage, the animated-WebP bug, is a V8 sandbox escape. “But rather than attacking the sandbox itself we exploited a property that the V8 sandbox deliberately does not enforce and that Blink incorrectly assumed it could trust,” Dolan-Gavitt explained. “Finally, the exploit used an overflow in Crashpad to cross the final outer process boundary and achieve unsandboxed code execution on the host.” While Google patched all three security issues, and Chrome installs updates on its own, a fix only takes effect once the user relaunches the browser. If you use Chrome, make sure you are running version 152.0.7977.82 or later. The time and money spent to achieve a full chain Chrome exploit illustrate - yet again - that “the bar is significantly lower” for attackers armed with LLMs, Dolan-Gavitt wrote. “Defend accordingly.”®

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Ivanti patches Connect Secure zero-day after researchers confirm in-the-wild attacks

Ivanti customers are being urged to update Connect Secure and check for compromise after attackers exploited a newly disclosed zero-day vulnerability. On Tuesday, Ivanti released updates for Connect Secure (ICS) to fix CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass flaw discovered by Volexity. Rated 8.6 on the CVSS scale, it allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands. "We are aware of exploitation in the wild affecting a limited number of customers at the time of disclosure," the vendor said in its advisory. There are limited indicators of compromise available at present, it said, advising customers to refer to Volexity's report on the findings for more information, and to run the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool regularly. Ivanti lists affected releases in the following branches: 25.1.1.1 and earlier 25.1.2.2 and earlier 22.8R2.4 and earlier The vendor said it previously identified "a portion of this vulnerability" and patched it in July's 25.1.3.0 update, and had been working on backporting the same fix since then, however, attackers began exploiting it before that work was complete. Volexity said the attackers behind the recent intrusions were previously unknown to its researchers, but are now tracked as UTA0576. Criminal motive rather than espionage is suspected by Volexity. Based on observed post-exploitation activity, attackers appeared to be most interested in using their newfound access for credential theft, data exfiltration, log tampering, and network reconnaissance. Notably, the attackers did not deploy any malware nor execute web shells, using only the commands available to them on the ICS appliance. "Because the operation was detected and disrupted, the threat actor's ultimate objectives could not be determined," said Volexity. "However, Volexity assesses with high confidence that UTA0576's actions signaled preparation for lateral movement and a broader compromise of the victim network." The researchers also suspect that the attackers were using large language models to support their endeavors. Volexity pointed to the attackers' repeated use of the exploit channel to run commands, rather than deploying web shells, and their use of "highly specific scripts using hardcoded credentials." Ivanti disclosed one CVE, but Volexity described an attack chain involving three vulnerabilities. Tuesday's updates address the authentication bypass and remote code execution stages. The third vulnerability, which allows privilege escalation, is separate from the flaws encompassed by CVE-2026-104935. Volexity said Ivanti is aware of the additional bug and plans to publish a fix "in the coming weeks." The disclosure of the zero-day this week makes it the third year running that Ivanti has had to deal with attackers exploiting undisclosed flaws in Connect Secure. The previous ICS zero-days were disclosed in January 2025, a year after the January 2024 vulnerabilities led to exploits affecting thousands of ICS appliances. In the interim, we've also seen suspected Chinese espionage groups exploiting bugs in Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), and critical flaws in Sentry. Ivanti's run of January zero-days continued earlier this year, although those flaws affected EPMM rather than Connect Secure. ®

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OpenAI engineer charged after boardroom bug found wrapped in toilet paper

The Department of Justice has charged an OpenAI engineer with attempting to intercept oral communications after allegedly planting a recording device in an exec conference room. Investigators claim company security staff found a second device in his bag. Saudi national Abdulrahman Alfozan, 35, is described in court documents as an engineer at OpenAI who had worked there since July 2025, and has held permanent residency in the US since September 2020. He was arrested on October 9 and made his initial federal court appearance on October 13. He is accused of installing, on or around September 28, 2026, a Seeed XIAO ESP32-S3 Sense recording device via a USB port in a TV located in OpenAI's executive conference room. According to the complaint, staff discovered the device concealed in toilet paper on September 30. OpenAI said it used its models to analyze the device. According to the complaint, it may have been modified to prevent data transfer between the recorder and the TV. The contents of the bug's microSD card may also have been encrypted, as the company could not retrieve any of the data stored on the card after making a forensic image of it. CCTV footage placed him near the room on several dates, although prosecutors say Alfozan had no authority to access or participate in meetings held in the executive conference room, which is often reserved for the highest-level discussions. Officials did not state whether the device was able to capture anything of importance, but said the room typically plays host to non-public and secret technical meetings, as well as those with government representatives. OpenAI did not have CCTV covering the executive conference room at the time when the secret device was planted, but the company subsequently installed a camera. Court documents [PDF] include an image taken on October 5 from a camera situated behind the TV into which the DoJ claims the recording device was installed, allegedly showing Alfozan checking on it. Investigators examined Alfozan's devices, according to the complaint, which alleges that between around August 17 and September 16, 2026, Alfozan used a productivity agent to inquire about company building addresses, meeting rooms, room capacities and calendars, and external-partner meeting venues. The complaint also describes an AI chatbot account associated with his spouse that shared installation identifiers, logged IP usage, and user-path references with Alfozan's account. Between September 24 and 30, it submitted prompts about building and modifying an audio-recording device. The prompts allegedly included questions related to recording reliability, how to add browser access and controls, how to develop a second unit with speech-triggered recording, and more. On October 5, the day Alfozan was allegedly recorded looking behind the executive conference room TV, company representatives say he left a bag unattended in the office's printer room. Security staff inspected the bag, finding a wallet, an ID card, and a second Seeed-manufactured recording device, before Alfozan reported the bag missing, according to the DoJ. He collected the bag the following day from the company's Lost and Found, and later claimed in a written report that several items were missing, including a credit card, around $500 in cash, two AirPods, one set of headphones, sunglasses, and a power bank. Alfozan was charged with an attempt to intercept oral communications, an offense that carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. "According to the complaint unsealed today, Abdulrahman Alfozan allegedly concealed a covert recording device inside his employer's executive conference room to secretly capture sensitive communications about the company's super intelligence technology," said FBI director Kash Patel. "Protecting American SI innovation is essential to safeguarding our nation's economic strength and national security, and the FBI views that mission as one of our highest counterintelligence priorities." "At this time, we have no indications of this individual inappropriately accessing or exfiltrating model weights, source code, or customer data," OpenAI said in a statement. "The employee was terminated." "We take protecting our technology, data, and people seriously, and as a matter of national importance. Our security program is designed to protect against a wide range of threat actors, from insider risks to cybercriminals to nation states, and this case is an example of how AI can help address these sophisticated security threats." ®

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Claude submitted fake murder tip to Philly police during summertime testing

An Anthropic AI model submitted a fabricated tip about an unsolved homicide through an online form run by the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). The tip, filed July 18 through PhillyUnsolvedMurders[.]com by “someone who might have information about the case,” went straight into the inbox’s spam folder. Anthropic discovered it on September 28, notified the PPD on October 7, and sent representatives to the police HQ the following day. Anthropic told the police the AI submitted the tip during a test exercise that involved interacting with randomly selected websites. The PPD said its findings are so far consistent with Anthropic's account. Because the tip was flagged as spam, it never reached the department's Real-Time Crime Center. The PPD said officers vet all submissions, automated or otherwise, before forwarding them to investigators, and that this process safeguards against abuse of the tip system. It added that this does not “diminish the seriousness” of an AI submitting fabricated information. “The city of Philadelphia takes this incident very seriously,” the PPD said. “The company must strengthen its safeguards to prevent similar incidents from impacting city systems without the city’s knowledge. The two-month delay in detecting and reporting the incident to the city is unacceptable.” It added: “The department and the [Cherelle] Parker administration will continue to closely monitor this incident, and will provide more information to the public as soon as it becomes available. In addition to our investigation into this incident, the Parker administration will explore all necessary regulatory protections going forward locally along with our state and federal partners.” On October 9, Anthropic published a report on this and other AI errors. The report covered four categories of AI failures, including vulnerability exploits, access to restricted data, bypassing fetch tool limits with URL shorteners, and submitting false information via web forms. Anthropic declined to name any of the affected organizations, other than the PPD after the department went public. Some cases involved local, state, and federal US government websites, though the AI company didn't say which of the four categories they fell under. The PPD did not name the model responsible, but Anthropic said Claude Haiku 4.5 was tasked with generating and performing example tasks on randomly selected web pages, and hinted at the model not being prompted specifically enough. “Claude was instructed never to log in, create accounts, enter personal data, make purchases, or submit anything destructive, but the instructions did not rule out form submissions,” Anthropic's report stated. The fake tip read: “I may have information regarding this case. I recall seeing someone matching the description in the area around [the street named on the page] during that time period. Please contact me if this information is relevant.” Anthropic said the incident was less severe than the cyberattacks over the summer. The report said: “Claude appears to have only been producing example content for the task, rather than trying to mislead anyone to achieve a goal.” By contrast, the "dishonesty" displayed over the summer was “sustained over hours” and supported continued attacks, the Claude maker said. Anthropic said it will keep reporting these failures when it detects them, and will continue fine-tuning behavioral and alignment training. The 3,095-word report contained no apology.®

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Cyberattacks crank French supermarket refrigeration systems up to 50°C

Cyberattacks on supermarket refrigeration systems reportedly pushed temperatures as high as 50°C (122°F), affecting hundreds of stores in France and forcing retailers to discard food. Major supermarkets such as Carrefour, Coopérative U, Intermarché, Monoprix, and more were hit by the attacks, which spoiled perishable food and left stores without fresh produce. The affected equipment includes cold-storage units used to hold food before it reaches supermarket shelves. The criminals behind the attack raised temperatures to unsafe levels, spoiling food and in some cases starting fires. Some affected retailers used refrigeration controllers produced by Danish company Danfoss. Authorities have not identified the entry point or confirmed exploitation of the vulnerabilities previously disclosed by Claroty and patched in August 2025, although the manufacturer said affected stores were running outdated firmware. Experts say the previously identified vulnerabilities were easily scriptable and relied on a unique but predictable authentication method. Claroty found a hidden authentication mechanism in the AK-SM 800A platform that accepted a code generated from the device's current date, bypassing the configured administrator password. Anyone who reproduced the algorithm could generate a valid daily code and gain administrative access. "It's a zero-skill thing to pull off, I wrote the bash script while having a shit," said security pro Kevin Beaumont. The research demonstrated how compromised controllers could expose refrigeration systems to physical disruption, although the vulnerabilities' role in this week's attacks remains unconfirmed. Danfoss told reporters this week that the French supermarkets affected by the attacks "were running outdated firmware" and that the company has consistently advocated for keeping systems updated. The Register asked Danfoss if it would confirm whether the previously disclosed bugs were exploited to execute the attacks, and whether the same bug was also abused in August to compromise US military commissary refrigerators, which led to food losses. CERT-FR published an alert reporting numerous compromises of Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers, which were not mentioned in Claroty's original reporting nor in Danfoss's advisories at the time. The authority advised disconnecting or restricting network access. For suspected compromises, it recommended a factory reset, security patches, credential rotation, account checks, and full reconfiguration. For those wondering why fridges even need to be reachable via the internet, the main reason is that it allows central engineering teams to troubleshoot issues remotely, according to Claroty's researchers. "Industrial control systems such as refrigeration controllers are often assumed to be on safely isolated networks. However, our research found many of these devices are directly exposed to the public internet," said Amir Preminger, CTO at Claroty. "While this convenience significantly reduces maintenance costs by allowing engineers to troubleshoot issues remotely, it also lowers the barrier to entry for attackers. "Organizations must take proactive measures to ensure that management interfaces are not insecurely connected to the internet, and ensure that access to administrative services is restricted to trusted management networks or secured through VPNs and other appropriate network segmentation controls." Intermarché owner Groupement Les Mousquetaires said around 150 of its supermarkets were affected by the attacks, while Carrefour confirmed around 80 impacted stores. Monoprix said roughly 5 percent of its 490 stores were experiencing the same issues, and Coopérative U CEO Dominique Schelcher said 80 of the company’s 2,000 stores were hit, adding that the attack on the food sector was “unacceptable.” “Targeting equipment essential to the preservation of fresh products is an attack on the French food supply chain,” he said. “It is unprecedented, extremely serious, and unacceptable. We remain fully mobilized.” However, in a separate twist, Schelcher told French radio station RTL on Tuesday that Coopérative U is not a customer of Danfoss. The Register contacted Coopérative U for more information about what caused the attacks at its stores. Shodan searches for internet-facing Danfoss controller interfaces indicated that more than 4,500 endpoints were exposed as of Monday, with more than half of those located in France. Ahold Delhaize, a major grocery retailer in the Netherlands, announced on the same day that it was experiencing a "security issue." No link to the refrigeration attacks in France has been established. The end result is similar, however, as the company's grocery brands are reporting stock issues. Several of the group's brands have taken their websites offline and posted notices about the "cybersecurity incident." Stores remain open, but affected brands have reported disruption to websites, apps, customer services, and online deliveries. The disruption hit the company's distribution systems, although these are now being restored. Updates posted to social media on Tuesday told shoppers that staff were once again able to use digital shelf labels but stock levels may vary across stores, and long-life items were likely to be more abundant than fresh fruit and vegetables. The retailer previously suffered a cyberattack in November 2024 that disrupted its US operations. ®

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'123456' password linked to Denmark data breach affecting 8.8M people

A person claiming responsibility for the breach of Denmark's Central Register of Persons (CPR) says they gained access through an IT company's account protected by the password "123456." The person told Danish news outlet Politiken they had no intention of selling or leaking the data. The newspaper reported that at least three company accounts, including an administrator account, used the same password. Denmark's CPR administration confirmed a breach affecting the information belonging to 8.8 million people on October 5, adding that a Danish company's legal access to the CPR system was abused. It did not name Funen-based Pays ApS as the company in question, but managing director Sophie Laursen confirmed on October 9 that it's access had been exploited. Pays' website has been taken offline, and the business has not responded to The Register's request for more information about the password claims. Pays had authorized access to the CPR system to provide services such as validating business customers' records. The Danish government says information relating to 8.8 million people was accessed. The register contains approximately 11 million records, including those of deceased people and people who have moved abroad. The government did not respond to questions about the alleged password failings. According to documents obtained by broadcaster TV 2, the attacker gained access to the CPR system on September 10 and ran the 14 million automated searches between then and September 20. The intrusion was detected on October 2, 12 days after the last reported searches. Mikkel Leihardt, director of the government's higher education and science ministry, told reporters at a press conference that the attack was discovered after a department staffer picked up an invoice indicating unusually high activity from Pays. The Danish data protection authority, Datatilsynet, was notified on October 4, and the government disclosed the attack the following day. ®

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Cyberattack Hits Hundreds of Supermarket Refrigeration Systems in France

The attack targeted a Danish software system in more than 400 supermarkets, forcing some shops to throw out frozen produce. The attackers have not been identified.

© Fred Tanneau/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Empty shelves at an Intermarché supermarket in Névez, France, on Monday, following a cyberattack that caused refrigerators to defrost.
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Vulnerabilità Bricksforge WordPress e come proteggere il tuo sito

Vulnerabilità Bricksforge WordPress e come proteggere il tuo sito

Una vulnerabilità critica in Bricksforge per WordPress sta esponendo migliaia di siti a un rischio elevatissimo: l'esecuzione di codice da remoto (RCE). Questa falla di sicurezza, identificata come CVE-2024-25137, ha ricevuto il massimo punteggio di gravità, un CVSS di 10.0.

Cosa significa? Un malintenzionato potrebbe prendere il controllo completo del tuo sito web senza nemmeno doversi autenticare.

Vediamo insieme di cosa si tratta e, soprattutto, come puoi difenderti.

Cos'è Bricksforge in WordPress e perché questa vulnerabilità è così pericolosa?

Bricksforge è un popolare add-on per Bricks Builder, uno strumento molto amato per la creazione di siti WordPress. Aggiunge funzionalità avanzate come form complessi, animazioni e gestione di dati dinamici. Il cuore del problema risiede proprio nella gestione del processo di upload dei file tramite i suoi moduli di contatto. La pericolosità di questa falla è estrema.

Un utente non autenticato può sfruttarla per caricare un file PHP malevolo sul tuo server e poi eseguirlo. Da quel momento, le possibilità per l'attaccante sono infinite:

  • Installare una web shell per avere accesso persistente al sito.
  • Modificare i contenuti delle tue pagine o rubare dati sensibili.
  • Reindirizzare i tuoi visitatori verso siti di phishing o malware.
  • Utilizzare il tuo server per lanciare altri attacchi.

In parole semplici, è come lasciare la porta di casa non solo aperta, ma con un invito scritto per i ladri.

Come funziona l'attacco in dettaglio

Per capire come proteggersi, è utile comprendere il meccanismo dell'attacco e conoscere gli attacchi simili avvenuti in passato. Gli hacker hanno scoperto un modo per aggirare i controlli di sicurezza del plugin.

Il processo di upload ingannato

L'attacco si svolge in due fasi. Inizialmente, l'hacker carica un file che si presenta come un'immagine innocua, ad esempio un file .gif. Il plugin esegue un primo controllo sul tipo di file (MIME type) e, riconoscendolo come immagine, lo accetta e lo salva in una cartella temporanea.

Il problema sorge nella seconda fase. L'hacker invia una richiesta di sottomissione del modulo creata ad hoc. In questa richiesta, specifica il percorso del file "immagine" appena caricato, ma indica una destinazione finale con estensione .php. Il plugin, fidandosi delle informazioni fornite, sposta il contenuto del file (che include codice PHP malevolo) nella nuova posizione con la nuova estensione. A questo punto, all'hacker basta visitare l'URL del file per eseguire il codice e compromettere il sito.

L'automazione degli attacchi

Le analisi dei ricercatori di sicurezza, come Patchstack, mostrano che questi tentativi di attacco sono altamente automatizzati. Sono stati registrati exploit provenienti da decine di indirizzi IP diversi, spesso a pochi secondi di distanza l'uno dall'altro. Questo indica una campagna diffusa che mira a colpire il maggior numero possibile di siti vulnerabili.

Stai usando Bricksforge in WordPress? Ecco come proteggerti da questa vulnerabilità

Se utilizzi Bricksforge nel tuo sito in WordPress, la tua priorità assoluta è agire immediatamente contro questa vulnerabilità. Non attendere di notare comportamenti anomali sul tuo sito, perché a quel punto potrebbe essere già troppo tardi.

Aggiornamento immediato: la prima linea di difesa

La soluzione è semplice e diretta: aggiornare il plugin. Gli sviluppatori hanno già rilasciato le patch correttive.

La falla di sicurezza riguarda tutte le versioni di Bricksforge fino alla 3.1.8.9 inclusa. Aggiorna immediatamente alla versione 3.1.8.10 o successiva.

Il team ha rilasciato anche una correzione per i Pro Forms nella versione 4.0.1. Si raccomanda l'aggiornamento anche se non usi moduli con campi di upload. Non rimandare questo passaggio. È il modo più efficace per chiudere la porta agli aggressori.

Verifica e pulizia del sito: cosa cercare

Se temi che il tuo sito sia già stato compromesso o vuoi fare un controllo di sicurezza, ecco alcuni passaggi da seguire:

  • Ispeziona i log del server: cerca richieste sospette, in particolare verso /wp-json/bricksforge/v1/form_submit.
  • Controlla le cartelle di upload: esamina attentamente la cartella /wp-content/uploads/bricksforge/tmp/ e altre directory di upload alla ricerca di file PHP inaspettati o file con nomi strani.
  • Scansiona il tuo sito: utilizza un plugin di sicurezza affidabile per eseguire una scansione completa alla ricerca di malware e file sospetti.

La vulnerabilità di Bricksforge in WordPress nel contesto globale

Questo incidente non è un caso isolato. Sottolinea ancora una volta un punto cruciale nella gestione di un sito WordPress: la gestione delle vulnerabilità.

I plugin, per quanto utili, possono diventare punti deboli se non vengono mantenuti aggiornati. Le falle di sicurezza legate all'upload di file sono comuni e pericolose perché offrono una via d'accesso diretta al server.

La lezione è chiara: mantieni sempre il core di WordPress, i temi e i plugin aggiornati all'ultima versione. La sicurezza informatica non è un'attività da fare una tantum, ma un processo continuo di vigilanza e manutenzione.

L'articolo Vulnerabilità Bricksforge WordPress e come proteggere il tuo sito proviene da sicurezza.net.

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Ukrainian drone strikes on Yandex datacenters knock cloud and payments offline

Yandex engineers are working to restore services after Ukraine launched drone strikes on three of its five Russian datacenters. The strikes began overnight on October 7-8, "seriously damaging" Yandex's Sasovo datacenter and leading to a total shutdown. Ukrainian drones struck again on the morning of October 9, targeting the company's Kaluga datacenter, resulting in part of its infrastructure being taken offline. Dima Pirogov, head of Yandex's fintech division, confirmed via Telegram on Sunday morning that a third strike targeted the company's Vladimir site, which supports Yandex Pay. A day later, services remain offline, although Pirogov said users' money is safe. "I'm very sorry I can't tell you yet that everything is working again," the exec wrote. "The team continues to restore services and is checking every step. When it comes to your money, it's important to us not just to restore Yandex Pay as quickly as possible, but also to ensure that everything is working reliably. "I understand that you're not waiting for words, but for access to your money. And I understand how hard it is to wait when you can't use it. We can't give you a precise timeline for the restoration yet, but we promise: we won't stop until the service is back online." Yandex Pay is the company's digital payments service. Users can make online and in-store purchases, pay in installments, and split bills with friends and family. It's also integrated into online shopping experiences. It is comparable to Apple Pay or Google Pay, while Yandex more broadly offers services similar to Google's. Yandex said engineers are prioritizing the most-used services, and reported that access to the Alice AI assistant, Mail, Maps, Search, and Taxi is being restored, but other features remain offline. The company's status page lists widespread outages across Yandex Cloud, its public cloud platform, following the attacks. Updates from the maintenance team describe partial availability despite the outage indicators. They suggest that some customers may be able to access certain features, such as Yandex Cloud Console and API, but availability remains inconsistent across the platform. In its most recent update, the company said: "The Yandex Cloud platform is still operating in a limited mode. Our specialists continue restoration work around the clock. The technical support team receives an increased number of requests, so the response time can be increased. "Our recommendations continue to be relevant. We recommend using alternative sites for hosting and reserving resources." Internet monitoring organization Netblocks reported that Yandex Cloud's network connectivity was at 30 percent of normal levels on October 11. Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky said the drone attacks were a response to Russia's own, which had targeted datacenters in Kyiv. The BBC reported that in September, Russian drone strikes targeted a business center in the capital city, killing four people and damaging a datacenter, which in turn resulted in around 100,000 households losing internet access. The attacks led to other knock-on effects, such as public transport boards not displaying information in Lutsk. Kyiv's attack on the Vladimir site on Sunday morning came hours after controversial comments from US president Donald Trump, who accused Zelensky of wanting "to make problems for the world" by continuing to attack Russian oil refineries. Trump went on to say that it was time for Ukraine to elect a new president after Zelensky said measures should not be taken that allow Russia to generate more revenue to fund its war. Zelensky was referring to a deal between Trump and Putin to release diesel from Russia to the US and the rest of the world. Later that day, the US president claimed Russia and Ukraine had agreed to an "energy ceasefire" to halt attacks on each other's energy infrastructure. Kyiv said it was unaware of the agreement before Trump announced it on his social media platform, but was willing to halt attacks on Russian energy infrastructure if Moscow reciprocated. Russia launched a missile attack on a Ukrainian power plant hours later. ®

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Malware preinstallato in Android: il tuo nuovo telefono è già infetto?

Malware preinstallato in Android: il tuo nuovo telefono è già infetto?

Il rischio di un malware preinstallato in Android è una minaccia sempre più concreta e purtroppo sottovalutata. Immagina di acquistare uno smartphone nuovo, scartarlo con entusiasmo e scoprire che è già compromesso, ancora prima di installare la tua prima app. Sembra uno scenario da film, ma è esattamente ciò che accade con minacce come il recente "Midnight Mimosa". Si tratta di una scoperta allarmante che mette in discussione la sicurezza dei dispositivi fin dal loro primo avvio.

Ma come è possibile una cosa del genere? E, soprattutto, come puoi proteggerti da un nemico che si nasconde dove non penseresti mai di guardare? Scopriamolo insieme.

Cos'è "Midnight Mimosa" e come funziona?

"Midnight Mimosa" non è una semplice app malevola che scarichi per errore. È molto peggio. Si tratta di un codice dannoso inserito direttamente nel firmware del telefono, ovvero nel software di base che governa il dispositivo. Questo significa che il malware è già presente e in attesa non appena accendi lo smartphone per la prima volta.

Una volta attivo, questo tipo di software può compiere diverse azioni a tua insaputa:

  • Installare altre app indesiderate come adware o spyware.
  • Mostrare pubblicità invasive e continue.
  • Raccogliere i tuoi dati personali per inviarli a server remoti.
  • Prendere il controllo di alcune funzioni del dispositivo.

La sua natura preinstallata lo rende estremamente pericoloso, perché aggira tutte le comuni difese, inclusi i controlli di sicurezza del Google Play Store.

Il malware preinstallato in Android: dov'è la falla?

Forse ti stai chiedendo come un malware possa finire su un telefono nuovo. La risposta è tanto semplice quanto preoccupante: la compromissione avviene lungo la catena di produzione.

Per ridurre i costi, i produttori di dispositivi low-cost si affidano talvolta a fornitori terzi per il software. È in questa fase che dei malintenzionati possono inserire il codice dannoso nel firmware. Questo meccanismo rende la minaccia quasi invisibile.

Non è colpa tua: non hai cliccato su link sospetti né scaricato file strani. Il pericolo era già integrato nel dispositivo che hai acquistato in buona fede.

Come riconoscere un malware preinstallato in Android

Identificare un malware che si nasconde così in profondità è difficile, ma non impossibile. Esistono alcuni campanelli d'allarme che dovrebbero farti sospettare.

Presta attenzione se il tuo nuovo dispositivo manifesta questi comportamenti anomali:

  • Consumo anomalo della batteria: la batteria si scarica molto più velocemente del previsto senza un motivo apparente.
  • Rallentamenti improvvisi: il telefono appare lento e poco reattivo fin dai primi utilizzi.
  • App sconosciute: trovi applicazioni installate che sei sicuro di non aver mai scaricato.
  • Pubblicità invasiva: annunci pubblicitari compaiono all'improvviso, anche fuori dalle app.
  • Traffico dati inspiegabile: il consumo di dati mobili è più alto del normale, segno di comunicazioni in background.

Come difendersi da questa minaccia silenziosa

Proteggersi completamente è complesso, ma puoi adottare alcune strategie per ridurre drasticamente il rischio. La prevenzione, come sempre, è l'arma più efficace.

Scegli marchi affidabili

I grandi produttori come Samsung, Google o Xiaomi hanno controlli di sicurezza molto più rigorosi. Il rischio è più alto su dispositivi ultra-economici o di marche sconosciute, spesso acquistati da canali non ufficiali.

Affidarsi a un brand noto è il primo passo per una maggiore tranquillità.

Aggiorna sempre il sistema operativo

Non appena ricevi una notifica di aggiornamento, installala. Gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza rilasciati da Google e dai produttori contengono spesso patch che neutralizzano queste vulnerabilità. Un dispositivo non aggiornato è un dispositivo molto più esposto ai rischi.

Sicurezza contro il malware preinstallato in Android

Anche se un antivirus non può rimuovere il malware dal firmware, può bloccarne le azioni successive. Una buona app di sicurezza identifica e blocca le app dannose che il malware tenta di installare, fornendo un livello di protezione aggiuntivo che fa la differenza.

Se sospetti un'infezione, il reset di fabbrica potrebbe non bastare. La soluzione più efficace è installare una ROM pulita e ufficiale, una procedura però consigliata solo agli utenti più esperti. Per tutti gli altri, contattare l'assistenza del produttore è la scelta più saggia.

L'articolo Malware preinstallato in Android: il tuo nuovo telefono è già infetto? proviene da sicurezza.net.

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ShinyHunters Extorted Boeing Spin-off Prior to Arrests

A teenager from Amman, Jordan suspected of leading the prolific data theft and extortion group ShinyHunters has been detained and is reportedly cooperating with the FBI to identify other members of the hacking gang. KrebsOnSecurity has learned that the suspect, who uses the hacker handle “Rey,” was detained as ShinyHunters was in the process of extorting a business unit recently divested by the global aerospace company Boeing, which manufactures the fleet of planes used by the employer of Rey’s father — Royal Jordanian Airlines.

The logo for Jeppesen ForeFlight, a business unit divested last year by the aerospace firm Boeing.

On October 3, Reuters cited three unnamed sources saying a suspected ShinyHunters member in Amman named Saif Al-din Khader was detained by Jordanian authorities and was cooperating with the FBI. KrebsOnSecurity identified Rey as Khader in a November 2025 profile, in which the young man admitted working with multiple ransomware groups.

Rey was featured again in a September 28 exclusive about the Dutch police arresting 24-year-old convicted cybercriminal Pepijn van der Stap on suspicion of aiding in data thefts and extortions by ShinyHunters. The story noted that immediately following the Dutchman’s arrest on the evening of September 15, Rey assumed control over the ShinyHunters brand and boasted publicly about stealing highly sensitive data from the FBI and extorting the ransomware group Cl0p.

Rey taunted both the FBI and Cl0p with memes posted to his longtime account on Twitter/X, while simultaneously including images of the avatar used by Van Der Stap’s former hacker alias “Umbreon” in an apparent attempt to frame the Dutchman for both hacks.

A taunting meme uploaded to Twitter/X by Rey on Sept. 22. A giant sized version of the Pokemon character Umbreon can be seen in the bottom left.

As noted in our September 28 report, ShinyHunters gained access to the FBI site and other victims by exploiting a vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273) in PeopleSoft, a software-as-a-service platform from the tech giant Oracle that is broadly used by companies to manage hiring and human resources, benefits and payroll. Oracle quickly issued a fix for CVE-2026-35273, which ShinyHunters first began exploiting as a zero-day in June, and at the time Mandiant released web application firewall rules intended for organizations that couldn’t apply the security update quickly enough.

ShinyHunters told BleepingComputer in June that the original goal behind exploiting the PeopleSoft vulnerability was to breach the FBI’s own PeopleSoft database, but the hackers said those attacks were unsuccessful for some reason. In recent weeks, however, ShinyHunters turned to a well-known URL-encoding trick to bypass Mandiant’s suggested web application firewall rules.

In a report released Sept. 25, security experts at Mandiant and the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) confirmed that ShinyHunters had mass-exploited the PeopleSoft vulnerability to steal data from dozens of systems across a range of industries, including higher education, technology, healthcare, agriculture, transportation and government.

Reuters reported October 5 that the FBI has removed a contractor at Accenture over their failure to patch the FBI recruitment website hacked by ShinyHunters, which exposed sensitive data on more than 5,000 FBI personnel, including each’s person’s unit and specialization, as well as medical and psychiatric records.

‘REY’ MEANS KING, AS IN ROYAL

According to two sources familiar with the ShinyHunters investigation, a navigation and digital aviation unit recently divested by the global aerospace company Boeing was among the victims that ShinyHunters was in the process of extorting when Rey was apprehended by Jordanian authorities.

Those sources said the FBI’s investigation into ShinyHunters gained renewed urgency with the group’s attempted extortion of the former Boeing unit, which allegedly included the theft of sensitive information that sources said could pose operational safety and security risks.

In a brief statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, Boeing acknowledged the extortion attempts by ShinyHunters, and said the incident concerned data stolen from Jeppesen ForeFlight, a subsidiary that Boeing sold in November 2025 to the private equity firm Thoma Bravo for $10.55 billion.

“We are aware of claims by a threat actor regarding data allegedly associated with Boeing and our former subsidiary Jeppesen ForeFlight,” a Boeing spokesperson shared. “We are actively reviewing the matter with the Jeppesen ForeFlight team.”

A spokesperson for Jeppesen ForeFlight shared a written statement in response to questions, saying the company has seen no impact on their end. “Based on our investigation to date into this claim and proactive security posture, there was no impact to our operations or products.”

Rey’s alleged involvement in attempting to extort the former Boeing unit is noteworthy because there is strong evidence that his father works for Royal Jordanian Airlines, which is mostly controlled by the Jordanian government and operates its long-haul fleet on passenger planes built by Boeing. Rey claimed on Telegram in early 2025 that his father was an airline pilot, although that could not be independently confirmed.

However, as noted in our November 2025 profile of Rey, his family’s shared computer was at one point compromised by password-stealing malware, and the data collected by that malware clearly shows Rey’s father used the same credentials to log in at multiple online portals for Royal Jordanian Airlines employees.

Royal Jordanian Airlines has not yet responded to a request for comment. In advance of our September 28 story, KrebsOnSecurity once again emailed Rey’s father to seek comment and update him on his son’s alleged activities. Neither of the Khaders have responded. But just hours after that request was sent, Rey began deleting his various social media accounts, including the Twitter/X account he previously used to taunt the FBI, Cl0p, and other ShinyHunters victims.

Rey may have nixed many of his social media profiles, but his cybersecurity blog on GitHub somehow escaped the purge, and it shows that Rey was fixated on the leaders of the Cl0p ransomware group. In March 2026, Rey’s blog featured a lengthy post that identified two Russian men as the core developers and hackers behind Cl0p.

Rey’s blog on GitHub. This post doxes two Russian men as the core operators behind Cl0p, one of the oldest and most established ransomware groups still in operation today.

MURDER FOR HIRE?

Meanwhile, news outlets in the Netherlands reported explosive new allegations leveled at Van der Stap, whose supposed personal transformation from convicted to reformed hacker has been widely covered in the tech news media. The Dutch daily RTL reported on Sept. 29 that investigators suspect Van der Stap tried to orchestrate at least two murders. According to RTL, the murders were allegedly to be committed abroad, and there are indications Van der Stap gave the order for these attacks.

Van der Stap was released from prison after serving the better part of a four year sentence for data theft and extortion activity that prosecutors said netted between €1.5 million and €2.7 million. In an interview with KrebsOnSecurity on September 9, Van der Stap described his new role as “offensive security lead” at the Dutch cybersecurity company Neo Security, saying the job involved probing client networks for security vulnerabilities.

Neo Security’s owner Benjamin Korper told Reuters he has hired an outside firm to investigate whether Van der Stap had hacked Neo Security or its customers, but that so far investigators have found no evidence he acted against his employer or clients. Korper said Dutch forensic investigators visited his office on September 15, the night Van der ⁠Stap was arrested in a dramatic police raid that reportedly involved flash bang grenades.

A screenshot of a Sept 16 story by the Dutch news outlet at5.nl, describing a police raid on Van Der Stap’s residence that reportedly used flash-bang grenades.

Prior to his first arrest in 2023, Van der Stap was working as a software engineer at the Amsterdam-based cybersecurity startup Hadrian, while volunteering at the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD) — even as he was hacking into and extorting a number of large organizations.

When asked in a recent interview why anyone should believe the word of a self-described “reformed” cybercriminal who had so casually deceived countless friends, co-workers and journalists for years, Van der Stap replied that his work spoke for itself and there was nothing he could say that would convince his worst critics.

“You can throw a bunch of nice words at someone, but you can’t convince them if they don’t want to be convinced,” Van der Stap told KrebsOnSecurity on Sept. 9. “I’m doing what I can to repay victims, and that’s all I can do. If someone doesn’t want to believe me, then that’s on them.”

FRANCHISING AND BURNING A BRAND

Cybercriminals aligned with ShinyHunters have been responsible for dozens of data breaches involving billions of stolen records, and breaches claimed by the group stretch back to at least 2019. But experts say the people recently operating behind the ShinyHunters name are not the same core members that populated the group in its early days, most of whom are French citizens who have been arrested (if not also imprisoned) on at least one prior occasion for alleged cybercrime activity.

More to the point, ShinyHunters has become something of a franchise. Think the Dread Pirate Roberts character in the 1980s cult movie classic “The Princess Bride,” only succession by death is replaced with succession by arrest, and there can be multiple simultaneous Dread Pirate Robertses. Sources close to the investigation say the FBI is focusing on a remaining handful of cybercriminal freelancers or affiliates who have been feeding the group stolen credentials to various software-as-a-service (SaaS) platforms used by major companies in exchange for a cut of any data ransoms later paid by victims.

In the days after the news broke of Van der Stap’s arrest, a cybercrime-focused chat server on Telegram that was allegedly operated by Rey erupted with hot takes, with most participants heaping ridicule on the teenage hacker after he publicly backed down from threats against the FBI and Cl0p, and again when the ShinyHunters’s darknet website suddenly went offline. Several commentators accused Rey of resurrecting the ShinyHunters brand after its core members were rounded up in France, and making a mockery of the group’s name and reputation ever since.

“He bought the old forum PGP key and used it to make new Breachforum websites and Telegram channels larping as ShinyHunters to ransom companies and then sell the used data or resell his forum when he goes broke,” one member recounted.

A relatively new Telegram channel called “The Battle” has been doxing and needling Rey and other alleged ShinyHunters members for several weeks, and it has gained a considerable readership among the cybercrime communities operating on Telegram. One of the coordinators of that harassment campaign repeatedly portrayed Rey as clueless greenhorn who sought to ride the coattails of a cybercriminal brand that has long enjoyed a reputation for ruthlessly selling or publishing data stolen from victim companies who refuse to give in to extortion demands.

“Rey (Saif Al-Din Khader) made a serious mistake when he started pretending to be a member of ShinyHunters,” wrote the administrators of The Battle server on Telegram. “That group had already been dismantled, with many of its members either arrested or imprisoned, yet Rey still chose to use its name while carrying out his crimes. We’re aware of claims that [Rey] caused over $200 million in damages and helped around 5–6 friend groups in the community make money by using Shiny Hunters group aliases to negotiate deals for a 25–30% cut over the past few months.”

In an interview with The Register, ShinyHunters claimed they hacked the FBI to counter the agency’s narrative in a May 2026 alert that advised victims against paying a ransom to the group, which came off looking unprofessional and capricious in the FBI’s advisory.

A flash notice on ShinyHunters released by the FBI on May 15, 2026.

The public notice warned the group has been known to pursue a number of different victim harassment strategies, from sending threatening text messages and phone calls to victims and their family members to in some cases swatting victims. The FBI warned ShinyHunters members “may also falsely claim to have sensitive or compromising information, including embarrassing photographs or videos of victims, which frequently do not exist.”

The hackers told The Register their attack on the FBI “demonstrated our technical capabilities and directly refuted the misinformation disseminated by the FBI, journalists, and industry researchers.” At the same time, the group’s leaders seemed to acknowledge that the FBI’s warning materially harmed their prospects for convincing victims to pay, saying “this was fundamentally a public relations and marketing initiative for our business.”

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Anthropic Claude e cyberdifesa: svolta nella sicurezza informatica

Anthropic Claude e cyberdifesa: svolta nella sicurezza informatica

Il rapporto tra Anthropic Claude e la cyberdifesa entra in una fase del tutto nuova. Anthropic ha infatti annunciato un'importante espansione del suo Cyber Verification Program, un'iniziativa che apre le porte dei suoi modelli di intelligenza artificiale più avanzati ai professionisti del settore.

Ma cosa significa per il futuro della lotta contro le minacce digitali? È un passo coraggioso per potenziare chi ci difende, gestendo al contempo il rischio che questi stessi strumenti possano essere usati in modo malevolo.

Il dilemma è noto: gli strumenti di IA che aiutano un difensore a trovare una falla di sicurezza sono spesso gli stessi che potrebbero aiutare un aggressore a sfruttarla. La soluzione di Anthropic è un programma di accesso verificato, che offre ai professionisti modelli come Claude 3 Opus e Claude 3.5 Sonnet con meno restrizioni, in base al loro ruolo e alle loro autorizzazioni. Scopriamo insieme come funziona.

Cos'è il Cyber Verification Program di Anthropic?

Pensa a questo programma come a una chiave speciale. Mentre i modelli Claude accessibili al pubblico mantengono rigide barriere per prevenire abusi, il Cyber Verification Program (CVP) fornisce una "chiave" a team e ricercatori verificati. Questa chiave sblocca capacità avanzate, consentendo loro di usare l'IA per compiti di sicurezza offensiva e difensiva in modo controllato.

L'obiettivo è semplice ma ambizioso: dare ai "buoni" gli strumenti migliori per anticipare, individuare e neutralizzare le minacce. Il programma unifica iniziative precedenti, come il Progetto Glasswing, creando un percorso di accesso strutturato e basato su permessi specifici.

In altre parole, non tutti avranno lo stesso livello di accesso, che dipende dal tipo di lavoro svolto tramite un sistema a tre livelli progettato per bilanciare potenzialità e sicurezza.

Test simili sono giù stati messi in atto, come utilizzare Claude Opus 5 per trovare falle in OpenAI, e correggerle.

I tre livelli di accesso a Claude di Anthropic per la cyberdifesa

Anthropic ha definito tre "tier" di accesso, ognuno con permessi e controlli specifici. Questa suddivisione è fondamentale per garantire che la potenza dell'IA sia usata in modo responsabile.

1. Defense access (accesso difensivo)

È il livello base, pensato per chi lavora in prima linea nella difesa digitale. Include team di sicurezza aziendali, centri operativi di sicurezza (SOC), analisti di malware, università ed enti governativi.

Le attività permesse sono strettamente difensive: analisi di vulnerabilità, incident response e reverse engineering.

Anche i ricercatori indipendenti con una comprovata storia di segnalazioni possono qualificarsi, rendendo lo strumento ampiamente accessibile a chi protegge le infrastrutture.

2. Red team access (accesso per red team)

Questo livello è destinato a chi simula gli attacchi per testare le difese, i cosiddetti red team. Include team interni, agenzie governative e società di penetration testing.

Oltre alle capacità difensive, permette di condurre test di penetrazione autorizzati. Tuttavia, restano attivi dei controlli per bloccare azioni estremamente pericolose, come l'implementazione di ransomware o attacchi a sistemi fisici critici.

3. Specialized access (accesso specializzato)

Siamo al vertice della piramide. Questo livello, con le minori restrizioni possibili, è riservato a un gruppo ristretto di organizzazioni autorizzate a testare le infrastrutture più critiche. Parliamo di reti elettriche, sistemi di controllo del traffico aereo e reti di telecomunicazioni.

L'approvazione per questo livello è molto rigorosa e viene gestita in collaborazione con il governo statunitense.

I risultati dei primi test di cyberdifesa con Claude di Anthropic

Ma funziona davvero? Anthropic ha messo alla prova il suo modello Claude 3.5 Sonnet con CyScenarioBench, un benchmark che misura la capacità di eseguire operazioni cyber complesse.

I risultati sono stati eloquenti:

  • Accesso pubblico: ogni tentativo di operazione malevola è stato bloccato al primo prompt.
  • Defense access: il 92% dei tentativi è stato bloccato, mentre una piccola parte è andata a buon fine.
  • Red team access: nessun blocco iniziale, con un tasso di successo del 68% nelle operazioni, quasi identico a quello del modello senza barriere di sicurezza.

Questi dati, sebbene interni, dimostrano l'efficacia del sistema a livelli. Inoltre, i partner del programma hanno già identificato oltre 129.000 vulnerabilità verificate tra aprile e luglio 2026, un dato che testimonia il potenziale di questa tecnologia per la sicurezza proattiva.

Una nuova era con Anthropic Claude nella cyberdifesa?

L'iniziativa di Anthropic segna un passo deciso verso l'integrazione dell'IA avanzata nelle operazioni di cyberdifesa. Fornendo un accesso controllato e stratificato, l'azienda cerca di risolvere il dilemma del doppio uso, potenziando i difensori senza armare gli avversari. Le organizzazioni possono richiedere l'accesso tramite la piattaforma Claude, Google Cloud Vertex AI e Microsoft Foundry.

La strada è ancora lunga, ma questo approccio pragmatico e basato sulla fiducia potrebbe diventare un modello per l'intero settore.

Stiamo forse assistendo alla nascita di una nuova generazione di difese, dove l'IA non è solo uno strumento, ma un vero e proprio alleato strategico? Solo il tempo potrà dirlo.

L'articolo Anthropic Claude e cyberdifesa: svolta nella sicurezza informatica proviene da sicurezza.net.

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Dutch Police Arrest ‘Reformed’ Hacker in Shiny Hunters Investigation

Authorities in the Netherlands have arrested a 24-year-old convicted cybercriminal on suspicion of aiding in data thefts and extortions by the prolific hacker group ShinyHunters. In the days immediately following the suspect’s arrest, remaining ShinyHunters members dramatically escalated their attacks, stealing highly sensitive data from the FBI and extorting the Russian ransomware group Cl0p.

According to three sources familiar with the matter, the Dutch man arrested by authorities this month is Pepijn van der Stap, a convicted cybercriminal from Almere and Lelystad in the Netherlands. Van der Stap was previously convicted in 2023 in connection with a string of data thefts and extortions that prosecutors said earned between €1.5 million and €2.7 million.

At his trial in late 2023, van der Stap admitted that he lived a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde existence, secretly using the hacker handle “Umbreon” to extort victims and post their data on English language hacking communities like the now-defunct RaidForums and Breached. By day, however, van der Stap was working as a software engineer at the Amsterdam-based cybersecurity startup Hadrian, while volunteering at the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD), a nonprofit security research group.

Pepijn van der Stap’s alter ego “Umbreon” selling a database on RaidForums, offering information on 2.3 million people from The Netherlands in September 2021. This user’s avatar is a depiction of the Pokemon character Umbreon. Image: KELA.

Van der Stap confessed to his data theft and extortion activity, and was sentenced to four years in prison (one of which was suspended). During his trial, van der Stap opted to remain in custody for a time rather than at home, saying he could not find better treatment on the outside for his ongoing psychological issues, which he claimed included PTSD related to childhood trauma. He was released from prison in December 2025.

In an interview with KrebsOnSecurity on September 9, 2026, Van der Stap cast himself as a reformed hacker who was trying to turn his life around and make a positive contribution to society. Van der Stap is currently employed as offensive security lead at the Dutch company Neo Security, which did not respond to requests for comment.

Van der Stap said he was still dealing with civil lawsuits and restitution related to his previous cybercrime victims, and that he was trying his best to make amends. But not long after that interview, the Dutch hacker abruptly stopped replying to messages. Efforts by others close to him also repeatedly failed to elicit a response for the past two weeks.

The LinkedIn profile for Pepijn van der Stap.

According to two sources with knowledge of the matter, Van der Stap was arrested by Dutch authorities on or around September 16, and has been held in custody for questioning since. One source said a colleague of theirs personally witnessed Dutch authorities carting items out of Van der Stap’s residence.

Authorities in the Netherlands have been asking the public for help in identifying the voice in a recorded telephone call from February 2026 in which a native Dutch-speaking ShinyHunters member social engineered their way into Odido, the nation’s largest mobile telecommunications provider. In that intrusion, ShinyHunters tricked an Odido employee into logging in at a spoofed website, and then used that access to steal data on more than 6.2 million Dutch people.

Responding to Dutch news media, ShinyHunters confirmed that the suspect in the audio clip is indeed a member of the hacker collective.

“Our team member has our full support – emotionally, mentally, and financially,” the hackers said. “Everything has been arranged, including a criminal defense lawyer. We do not look down on our staff and members; we take excellent care of them,” reads a statement ShinyHunters shared with NL Times. It remains unclear if the Dutch police have matched the Odido caller to a confirmed real-life identity. The Dutch police unit handling the Odido incident did not respond to requests for comment.

The group also lashed out at the authorities in the Netherlands. “The Dutch police will need all the luck in the world – and everyone’s prayers – if they want to catch him before we carry out another large-scale data theft in the Netherlands,” the ShinyHunters statement said. “Frankly, the Dutch police are a big joke; they are incapable of doing anything. Incompetent. Irrelevant. Unimportant. Useless.”

FBI, CL0P HACKS

Just days after sources say Van der Stap was detained by Dutch authorities, ShinyHunters claimed credit for an unusually brazen breach at the FBI’s job application site apply.fbijobs.gov. According to reporting from 404 Media, the data stolen from the FBI site includes Social Security numbers and personal information on more than 5,000 officials.

404 Media and Reuters reported the FBI data included each person’s job title or team, such as special agent, threat intake examiner, major cybercrimes unit, and those investigating cyber threats from foreign state-backed actors. Reuters examined documents shared by ShinyHunters and found they included sensitive psychiatric and medical files of FBI staff. The FBI issued a brief statement confirming the hack.

ShinyHunters said it gained access to the FBI site and other victims by exploiting a recently patched vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273) in PeopleSoft, a software-as-a-service platform from the software giant Oracle that is broadly used by companies to manage hiring and human resources, benefits and payroll. Oracle quickly issued a fix for the Peoplesoft vulnerability that ShinyHunters reportedly began exploiting as a zero-day in June, and at the time Mandiant released web application firewall rules intended for organizations who couldn’t apply the security update quickly enough.

But on Friday, BleepingComputer reported that ShinyHunters used a URL-encoding trick to bypass Mandiant’s suggested web application firewall rules designed to mitigate the threat from the PeopleSoft flaw. In a report released Sept. 25, security experts at Mandiant and the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) confirmed that ShinyHunters had mass-exploited the PeopleSoft vulnerability to steal data from dozens of systems across a range of industries, including higher education, technology, healthcare, agriculture, transportation and government.

Van der Stap’s former hacker alias Umbreon was hidden in plain sight throughout the imagery ShinyHunters used to spread news about the FBI hack: The defacement image that ShinyHunters left behind on the hacked FBI jobs site included an ASCII art design featuring the Pokemon character Umbreon. The message at the top read, “This site has been seized by ShinyHunters. rooting your systems since ’19 ;)” The image appears identical to a defacement message ShinyHunters used in their 2020 hack of the English-language cybercrime community Hackforums.

The defacement message left by ShinyHunters on the FBI jobs site included an ASCII art rendition of the Pokemon character Umbreon. Image: Bleeping Computer.

Multiple sources close to the ShinyHunters investigation said the group’s recent risky attacks against the FBI and one of Russia’s most venerated ransomware groups amounted to a major pivot away from the more measured tenor of the hacking gang’s operations. Those sources said the sudden shift came about after ShinyHunters was taken over by a teenage cybercriminal from Amman, Jordan who goes by the nickname Rey and operates as part of a cybercrime group called ScatteredLapsussHunters (SLSH), which experts say is an amalgamation of three hacking groups — Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$ and ShinyHunters.

Those sources said Rey had an ongoing beef with the Dutch hacker over control of the ShinyHunters brand and data, and that the inclusion of the oversized Umbreon Pokemon image in the FBI jobs site defacement was likely an attempt by Rey to pin the hack on the Dutchman.

Rey was first publicly identified by the cybersecurity firm KELA in March 2025. In advance of our November 2025 profile of Rey, KrebsOnSecurity messaged Rey’s father and asked for permission to interview his teenage son. Rey’s dad merely forwarded the message to his son, who admitted to participating in ransomware attacks and said he was trying to extricate himself from the SLSH hacker group.

BLAMING UMBREON

Immediately after news of the FBI jobs site hack was picked up in the media, Rey’s main account on Twitter/X (Ryan Moran/@rmoskovy) was taunting the Cl0p ransomware group and the FBI, crudely depicting them as the twin towers in New York being struck by planes labeled “cl0p drama” and “fbi breach claim.” In the foreground of the city is the giant Pokemon figure of Umbreon.

A taunting meme uploaded to Twitter/X by Rey’s now-defunct account on Sept. 22. A giant float-sized version of the Pokemon character Umbreon can be seen in the bottom left.

On Sept. 24, KrebsOnSecurity again contacted Rey’s dad, asking to interview him and his son for a story on Rey’s apparent ascendency as the head of ShinyHunters. Just hours after that request, Rey deleted his longtime Twitter/X account. Meanwhile, Rey’s dad, who works for the Royal Jordanian Airlines, has failed to respond to a half-dozen emailed requests for comment about his son’s alleged activities.

Where does the bad blood between SLSH and ShinyHunters come from? According to a story in Wired this month, ShinyHunters and SLSH members briefly partnered earlier this year to help better monetize important stolen credentials collected by TeamPCP, an upstart group that was having great success compromising global code supply chains with malicious software but hadn’t been able to profit much from their stolen data (two alleged leaders of TeamPCP were arrested last month in Australia, and in an interview the TeamPCP leader claimed they made just $20,000).

The Wired story noted how Mandiant had infiltrated TeamPCP and was secretly responsible for having the crime group’s stolen credentials burned so quickly: Mandiant was secretly feeding those credentials to the major cloud providers like Amazon and Microsoft, who quickly invalidated the stolen keys. Meanwhile, the formerly cooperating hacker groups began to blame one another for causing the credentials to become worthless.

Wired’s Andy Greenberg reported that a few weeks after partnering with TeamPCP, “ShinyHunters went rogue, carrying out its own extortions with TeamPCP’s credentials but without giving the supply-chain hackers their cut.”

Mandiant researcher Austin Larsen told KrebsOnSecurity earlier this month that ShinyHunters has been enjoying a successful extortion spree so far this year, and is on track to pull in nearly $100 million in extortion payments from cybercrime victims in 2026.

Van der Stap claims he was never motivated by money and that his earlier hacker activity was driven by a desire to have the world’s most complete collection of stolen databases. Speaking with reporters from Bloomberg in 2024, Van der Stap said that singular focus in turn fueled his desire to carry out cyberattacks.

“The hacking was very easy for me, and it wasn’t a compulsion,” he told Bloomberg. “My habit was collecting. Collecting data, organizing data, downloading data, creating folders.”

DIVD, the nonprofit security research group where Van der Stap previously served as a volunteer, disclosed on LinkedIn last week that the organization was dealing with an internal cybersecurity incident that appears to have involved the malicious use of artificial intelligence. DIVD has released few details about that incident, but a spokesperson for the nonprofit told KrebsOnSecurity it does not appear related to ShinyHunters, nor are there any signs the matter involves the work of a previous volunteer.

Update: 3:44 p.m. ET: Corrected Van der Stap’s age, which is 24 (not 23).

Update, 4:54 p.m. ET: The Dutch police have confirmed the arrest of a 24-year-old in connection with the ShinyHunters investigation. In a statement on Twitter/X, the Dutch police said the man will appear on Tuesday, September 29 before the chambers of the Rotterdam District Court, and that it will provide more information tomorrow.

Sept. 29, 9:42 a.m. ET: The Dutch news outlet RTL reports that investigators suspect Van der Stap tried to orchestrate at least two murders. RTL reported the two murders were allegedly to be committed abroad, and that there are indications the suspect gave the order for this.

The FBI released a short video message on the ShinyHunters investigation from Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division, who thanked Dutch law enforcement partners for their assistance and urged remaining ShinyHunters members to turn themselves in.

“Arrests have a way of changing who is willing to talk, and seized infrastructure has a way of showing us who’s left,” Leatherman said. “The longer you stay in this, the more we learn about you. You know how to find us, and we know how to find you. I suggest you reach out to us while the choice is still yours.”

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Bitdefender crea una VPN per gli agenti AI

Forse in pochi ci avevano pensato, ma dal momento che gli agenti AI navigano sul Web per raccogliere informazioni e compiere operazioni per conto degli utenti, potrebbe essere una buona idea mascherarne le attività per evitare di fornire contesti non voluti a siti web e servizi di cui non sappiamo granché. Bitdefender ha infatti presentato […]

L'articolo Bitdefender crea una VPN per gli agenti AI proviene da Securityinfo.it.

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No Hat 2026, a Bergamo l’hacking incontra AI, cyber-spionaggio e droni

Il 10 ottobre torna la conferenza internazionale dedicata alla cybersecurity e all’ethical hacking. Tra i temi dell’ottava edizione, vulnerabilità negli AI coding assistant, attacchi alle infrastrutture di rete, malware, anonimato e compromissione dei sistemi autonomi L’intelligenza artificiale che sta cambiando anche il lavoro di chi cerca vulnerabilità e sviluppa nuove tecniche di attacco è uno […]

L'articolo No Hat 2026, a Bergamo l’hacking incontra AI, cyber-spionaggio e droni proviene da Securityinfo.it.

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Two Alleged ‘TeamPCP’ Hackers Arrested in Australia

Authorities in Australia have arrested two men believed to be members of TeamPCP, a prolific cybercrime and data extortion group blamed for perpetrating the longest running spree of software supply chain attacks ever.

In a statement released today, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) said two men from Western Australia, aged 21 and 23, were arrested in connection with a “sophisticated cybercrime syndicate that allegedly created malicious open-source software to rob thousands of global businesses.”

The AFP did not name the defendants, but KrebsOnSecurity learned the 21-year-old suspect’s real identity in June, and has been communicating with him ever since. This story includes interviews with TeamPCP’s self-described spokesperson, and examines clues left behind by the TeamPCP leader that likely led to his undoing.

TeamPCP vaulted onto the cybercrime scene in late 2025, embedding malicious code in hundreds of open source software tools and extorting victims for profit. Members of the group made headlines by compromising corporate cloud environments using a self-propagating worm dubbed Shai-Hulud, which added malicious code to open source programs maintained by developers whose credentials at public code repositories like GitHub or NPM were phished or stolen.

Writing for Wired, journalist Andy Greenberg described TeamPCP’s core tactic as a kind of cyclical exploitation of software developers.

“The hackers gain access to a network where an open source tool commonly used by coders is being developed,” Greenberg wrote in May. “The hackers plant malware in the tool that ends up on other software developers’ machines, including some who are writing other tools intended to be used by coders. The malware allows TeamPCP’s hackers to steal credentials that let them publish malicious versions of those software development tools, too. The cycle repeats, and TeamPCP’s collection of breached networks grows.”

TeamPCP also has practiced something akin to cyclical recruitment. In May, the source code for the third iteration of Shai-Hulud was published online, and TeamPCP soon after launched a contest offering $1,000 in virtual currency to whichever participant could conduct the largest supply chain operation using the worm’s code. According to the contest rules, participants were scored based on the number of weekly and monthly downloads of packages they compromised — directly incentivizing them to target the most popular code libraries.

A screenshot of a message from TeamPCP’s Telegram account, announcing the supply chain hacking contest. Image: dataminr.com.

“TeamPCP has stated the competition is a recruiting opportunity and they intend to purchase all meaningful access harvested from participants’ campaigns,” the security firm Dataminr wrote. “The $1,000 XMR (Monero) prize is a recruitment floor and has been dismissed by the actor as ‘just like participation trophy,’ adding ‘if you find something good you will be paid way more,’ confirming the contest’s true function as talent identification and malicious access acquisition at scale.”

In March, TeamPCP executed a supply chain attack targeting AI infrastructure by compromising the code for LiteLLM, an open source AI gateway that connects users to more than 100 different large language models. A recent analysis by the security firm CloudSEK found TeamPCPs attack on LiteLLM harvested cloud service keys and other secrets from more than 2,500 organizations, including many of the world’s top technology companies.

In May, TeamPCP claimed credit for compromising at least 3,800 code repositories at the Microsoft-owned GitHub, after a GitHub developer installed a code extension that was compromised by TeamPCP’s malware.

MEET THE CYBERCATS

Security experts say TeamPCP is less of a hacker group than an amalgamation of threat actors from multiple cybercriminal gangs who sometimes work together toward similar goals.

“It is not a structured criminal crew with a single operator,” said Austin Larsen, a principal threat analyst with the Google Threat Intelligence Group. “It is a peer community of individually-skilled actors, with one clear center of gravity.”

That center of gravity is George Prepakis, an accomplished security researcher and self-described exploit developer who operates the Twitter/X profile @kernelstub. Earlier this year, @kernelstub tweeted a public invite link to a Matrix chat server he created and dubbed “Cybercats,” and TeamPCP and several other cybercrime entities have been using this server to communicate daily for the past several months.

A screenshot of the Matrix chat server “Cybercats,” whose members used hacker handles associated with multiple distinct cybercrime groups that have occasionally collaborated on a series of supply chain and data ransom attacks over the past nine months.

Kernelstub, like other administrators in the Cybercats chat, has been using his Twitter/X profile name as his handle in these Matrix communications, frequently tweeting references to other members and to conversations taking place in the Cybercats chat. In a number of cases, the corresponding X accounts for members of the Cybercats chat taunted cybercrime victims publicly before the incidents were reported in the news media.

The Cybercats administrator listed at the top of the screenshot above — “Boxturtle” — is a close associate of TeamPCP who has been tweeting about the group’s conquests under the name @xpl0itrsturtle. This handle corresponds to a data breach broker active on Breachforums and Darkforums who has been selling data stolen in a wave of recent breaches at automobile manufacturers, including BMW Group, Audi, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, Volvo and Toyota, as well as data allegedly taken from Snapchat and SportRadar.

The data leak site for the extortion group or handle “xpl0itrs.”

The Cybercats administrator “SeesawSec” in the screenshot above is the alias of whoever is behind the cybercrime group known as Fulcrumsec, which recently claimed credit for data extortion attacks against the pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk, the data broker LexisNexis, and Avnet, a Fortune 500 distributor of electronic components.

The data leak site of Fulcrum Security, a.k.a. Fulcrumsec.

The Cybercats administrator “@pcpcasper” also has been using a similar name on X to discuss TeamPCP’s attacks and victims. This person has an extensive message history on Telegram, where their messages and shared videos show @pcpcasper is an active and vocal member of the National Socialist Network, a neo-Nazi political organization based in Australia.

At one point in these chats, @pcpcasper shared videos and images of what they claimed was their cat, and several of those videos place this user in Western Australia. One source close to the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity that @pcpcasper was one of the two arrested, a claim supported by messages that @kernelstub posted online this morning.

The Cybercats member roster pictured above also features an administrator with the username “T,” which is short for the now-banned Twitter/X profile @pcpcats, the account operated by the self-described TeamPCP spokesperson who was arrested today. As we’ll see in a moment, @pcpcats also is from Western Australia.

By the time @kernelstub tweeted a public invite link to the Cybercats Matrix server, T/@pcpcats was posting only infrequently to the group chat, with other members often inquiring as to his whereabouts and well-being. The group’s collective concern related to @pcpcats’s tendency to blame his increasingly extended absences on the use of hallucinogens and other narcotics that kept him awake for days on end, but also caused him to crash in bed for several days after the highs wore off.

WHO IS THE TEAMPCP LEADER?

The Cybercats member @pcpcats has used multiple nicknames on the cybercrime forums, including EllisD25/LSD on Darkforums, BulkDMT on Breachstars, and Express on Breachforums. These accounts are linked because they all advertised the same Tox ID and/or Session ID as instant message contact handles in their cybercrime forum posts. BulkDMT was also known on the forums as DMT Host, which was a virtual private server (VPS) hosting service that was peddled on Darkforums and Breachstars.

DMT Host/EllisD25, posting on the English-language cybercrime community DarkForums in September 2025. Image: ke-la.com.

According to the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, Express registered on Breachforums using the email address shitstickpp@gmail.com. Intel 471 finds Express posted on Breachforums across a two-month period in 2025 using four different Internet addresses located in South Africa. On July 30, 2025, Express announced on Breachforums they were selling access to 14 gigabytes of data stolen from South Africa’s State Information Technology Agency.

The threat intelligence platform Flashpoint recorded more than a year’s worth of messages from the TeamPCP leader’s alter ego on Telegram — Persy_PCP —  who claimed they split their life living between two countries [full disclosure: Flashpoint is an advertiser on this blog]. “I have these [files] as well, problem is these are in another country,” Persy_PCP explained to another user inquiring about a stolen data set in November 2025.

Later that month, Persy_PCP complained, “My whole country is racist and they want people like me dead.” Flashpoint records show BulkDMT shared in September 2025 that “this country is going to fucking starve when they take the farmers land,” a likely reference to white landowners in South Africa who claim to be targeted by an ongoing genocide campaign.

This tracks with public reporting on TeamPCP. Cyberscoop reported in June that Google had traced TeamPCP’s residential and mobile Internet address connections to South Africa, “indicating the primary operator was located there during at least some of its attacks.”

BulkDMT also shared on the group chat at Breachforums that they were recovering from an addiction to methamphetamine. “My life is kinda fucked rn [right now], but that’s fine and there isn’t really a point in pouring so much emotional energy into that fact, my parents had money but I unfortunately got really addicted to some things so I don’t get to benefit from that. As long as I continue to survive, stay sober, and move closer towards my goals that’s enough drive and meaning.”

The identity threat protection company SpyCloud finds shitstickpp@gmail.com shows up in the registration of an account called ChristmasSnow on the cybercrime community Raidforums in 2022. Nearly all of the Internet addresses used to access that account came from ISPs in Perth, Australia, SpyCloud found.

KrebsOnSecurity looked up all of those Perth IP addresses in passive DNS records maintained by DomainTools.com, and found one of them — 211.27.196.111 — for several years was used as a private file server by a family in Perth with the last name of Thomson. Those records show at least three hosts — ithomson.direct.quickconnect.to (a remote Synology server), kthomson0061.direct.quickconnect.to, and joshuawthomson39.myqnapcloud.com (a QNAP network storage device) — persisted at that address between 2022 and 2025.

Searching on “joshuathomson39” in the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence reveals an account at the freight forwarding company kwe.com created in the name of Joshua Thomson from Perth, Australia. The open source intelligence platform Epieos finds the phone number attached to that kwe.com account was used to register a Facebook profile for Josh Thomson, which says his family includes a brother named Ruben, his father Ian, and his mom Cindy.

That Facebook profile also says Josh and his family are originally from Pietermaritzburg, in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, but currently living in Cottesloe, a beach-side suburb of Perth. A search in DomainTools for Ian Thomson and Australia unearthed five domains by the same registrant, including securecomputing.au, thomson.org.au, and thomsonfamily.net.au. Ian Thomson is a dentist in Cottesloe, and a biography says he graduated from The University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Constella finds a joshua@thomson.org.au registered a number of accounts online, but Josh doesn’t seem to have much of a connection to dodgy cybercrime forums. His brother Ruben, on the other hand, has quite the presence on these communities, dating back to at least 2018. Constella reports ruben@thomson.org.au frequently reused the password “joshuathomson1,” and Constella further finds that password was used by just a handful of accounts, including yolosolo17@gmail.com and surfinup8@gmail.com.

According to Intel 471, surfinup8@gmail.com was used to register the user Yolosolo17 on the crime forum Altenen in 2018, and that user account was registered from the Perth address 110.141.230.15. On Altenen, Yolosolo17 advertised free web proxies, as well as the domain rubenthomson.com, which was at one point used to sell steeply discounted iPhones. DomainTools says rubenthomson.com was hosted at 110.141.230.15 and registered to surfinup8@gmail.com.

A cached copy of the domain rubenthomson.com from 2017 shows a login page underneath a banded stack of money. Image: archive.org.

SpyCloud reports 10.141.230.15 was used by the email address sheepstealing@gmail.com on Raidforums and surfinup8@gmail.com on Nulled, and that the same IP was used by the email addresses ian@thomsonfamily.net.au, jasper@yakuza.cc, and rubenthomson1@gmail.com. SpyCloud also shows that sheepstealing Gmail address is tied to the accounts Sheep420, YoloSolo117 and Yakuza.cc on Raidforums, and to the account “Sheep Stealing” on Hackforums. Intel 471 says sheepstealing@gmail.com was used to register the account DingoFlour on Breachforums in October 2023, as well Sheepx on Altenen.

Epieos reports that ruben@securecomputing.au is tied to an Airbnb account for Ruben, who described himself as a Web developer who went to school at the University of Western Australia and was living outside the country. “Hey, I’m Ruben, my friends call me Ellis. I’m a Perth creative who occasionally books rooms when visiting family and for photography.”

Epieos also finds sheepstealing@gmail.com registered an upwork.com profile under the name Ruben, who said his main skills are setting up secure server hosting solutions and PHP full-stack Web development.

“I’m familiar with Linux, working with relational databases (SQL),” the Upwork profile reads. “I also script in Python mainly for writing social media bots.”

The Upwork profile for Ruben Thomson in Cottesloe, Australia.

Epieos further discovered sheepstealing@gmail.com is connected to a Microsoft account for Ruben Thomson, and to a now-defunct GitHub account called XmasSnow/XmasSnowisBack that scammed people on the forums in 2022 by claiming to sell exclusive exploits for recently-released software patches (recall that shitstickpp@gmail.com was used to register a forum account named ChristmasSnow).

This same sheepstealing email address registered a Twitter/X account in 2026 called “Gone Fishing” that lists its location as South Africa. That Gmail account also left several reviews for businesses listed on Google Maps over the past seven years, but all of those establishments are located on the west coast of Australia.

Business reviews in Western Australia left by the Google account sheepstealing at gmail.com.

The people search service Pipl finds a 21-year-old Ruben Thomson in Western Australia who has a phone number ending in 979. A lookup on that number at Epieos reveals it is connected to a TikTok account under the name Ellis, and to a PayPal account in the name of Ruben Thomson.

Finally, a search on the name Ruben Thomson from Cottesloe at the Australian government’s record of registered businesses finds he has incorporated or served as an official in multiple companies created since 2024, including Secure Computing Solutions, Tensor Industries, and another entity ironically named OPSEC Express. Recall that Express was BulkDMT’s nickname on Breachforums.

Australian companies connected to Ruben Thomson. Image: abr.business.gov.au.

It’s ironic because OPSEC is short for the term “operational security,” which refers to techniques and behaviors used to obfuscate and compartmentalize one’s real-life identity online, and using your cybercrime handle as part of your own company name is very much the antithesis of that practice.

There is at least one other major opsec failure by Ruben that exposed a link to TeamPCP. In June 2025, someone using the name Ruben Thomson registered on HackerOne, a popular “bug bounty” program that seeks to reward and recognize researchers who agree to work with affected software vendors to help fix the flaws before publishing about their findings. What was Ruben Thomson’s chosen HackerOne username? Deadcatx3, a nickname that has been flagged by multiple security firms as an alias used by TeamPCP.

The HackerOne profile for “Ruben Thomson” uses the nickname Deadcatx3, which multiple security firms have concluded is an alias used by TeamPCP. Image credit: flare.io.

INTERVIEW WITH ELLIS

In early July 2026, not long after having discovered clues about Ellis’s real life identity, KrebsOnSecurity interviewed the TeamPCP leader via Signal, where he was remarkably open about his activities and personal struggles [for the sake of simplicity, the TeamPCP spokesperson will be referred to from here on as Ellis].

Ellis claims he stopped doing cybercrime for TeamPCP in March 2026 — just before the attacks that compromised LiteLLM — and that at least one other individual has taken over the group’s leadership since then. Ellis shared that a year earlier he had just completed the latest in a series of detox and sobriety programs, and was two months sober when he reconnected with some old friends from the malware development scene.

“One year ago I needed help monetizing some [GitHub credentials], I was two months sober and needed a distraction and something to keep busy as well as people to speak to,” Ellis said. “I had largely disconnected from my old circle, they had become very toxic and I needed to get away from the substances. Previously I had done some mass exploitation campaigns and grew up doing [malware development] and [capture the flag] contests. There were some friends who were also vending but had stopped a while, and one of them introduced me to some chats where I posted access for sale.”

Prior to that, Ellis said, he was homeless and hopping between “some very unstable places.”

“Blackhatting is fun,” he said. “There are actual rewards and incentives to learn and you grow with your team. Without qualifications, no employer will even take the time to hear you out.”

Ellis claims he’s earned a grand total of about $20,000 for his activities with TeamPCP, and that it was never about the money or fame for him. Asked whether his experiences with TeamPCP might prepare him for gainful employment in a legitimate IT job, Ellis said he doubted it.

“I am nowhere close to a skill level where I am comfortable, and this would take maybe half a decade of further experience,” he said. “I no longer have to choose between rent and food for that I’m grateful and so are the team members.”

Ellis expressed no remorse over his cybercrime activities, and said he was grateful for the friendships and relationships built throughout his engagement with TeamPCP. The young hacker also seemed resigned to his fate, and told KrebsOnSecurity that he’ll accept the consequences if he’s ever arrested.

“If I’ve already been found out then its out of my control, I’ll make peace with that,” he said. “Honestly, I think someone like me needs a lot of help that prison just can’t provide. If I had the funds to study different parts of the field and closer guidance, this would have turned out differently. But that’s a pipe dream and we both know this.”

It is clear from reading Ellis’s posts to the group’s Matrix server chats that his struggles with sobriety are ongoing. On Thursday, June 25, Ellis told @kernelstub he was about to “trip” with his “homie.”

“What kind,” @kernelstub inquired.

“Ketty and some DMT,” Ellis replied, referring to the dissociative anesthetic ketamine and dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a powerful psychedelic compound that is found naturally in some plants but is also synthetically produced in underground lab environments. “There’s a little 2cb so we might throw that in the mix,” he continued, referring to another psychedelic compound by its chemical shorthand.

Roughly two weeks before his arrest, Ellis told KrebsOnSecurity he was ready to leave his life of crime behind and was prepared to turn himself in, but that in the meantime he was making plans to tie up loose ends.

Less than 24 hours later, the TeamPCP leader posted an image on Telegram showing a yellowish powdered substance in a baggie and on a scale, possibly synthetic DMT. The image shows the powder being weighed next to a series of small vape cartridges, two of which are open on the table in front of the photographer.

An image posted by the TeamPCP leader to Telegram, advertising his acquisition of some type of psychoactive substance, most likely a synthetic version of the powerful hallucinogen known as DMT.

The two defendants were arrested Wednesday morning. The AFP said the men face a combined 14 cybercrime offenses and are scheduled to appear in Perth Magistrates Court today.

Charlie Eriksen is a security researcher at Aikido Security who has closely followed TeamPCP’s cybercrime campaigns. Eriksen said TeamPCP are a good example of a new kind of threat actor that does not fit neatly into the usual categories.

“They are not a state actor, not quite organized cybercrime, and not purely ideological,” he said. “Their motivations seem to mix money, disruption, attention, and ideology.”

Eriksen said that historically there has always been a meaningful gap between reading about an attack technique and being able to reliably turn it into an operational campaign, but that large language models (LLMs) and artificial intelligence increasingly are helping threat actors to bypass that knowledge gap.

“You had to understand the research, adapt the code, troubleshoot it, build infrastructure around it, and then repeat that process across different targets,” he said. “LLMs have compressed that gap significantly.”

According to Eriksen, this creates an environment where threat actors suddenly have the ability to operate at significant scale without having developed the operational discipline that traditionally accompanies that level of capability. Put another way, it sets the stage for cybercriminals who are capable enough to cause significant damage, but not necessarily careful enough to understand or care about the consequences.

“They can be noisy, they can make mistakes,” he said. “They can leave evidence everywhere. They can take risks that a professional criminal group or intelligence service would consider completely unacceptable. But that does not necessarily make them less dangerous. In some ways, it can make them more dangerous.”

In a recent blog post, Eriksen called TeamPCP’s Shai-Hulud worm the “best thing to happen to supply chain security,” because it forced GitHub and other public coding platforms to erect new security safeguards.

In direct response to TeamPCP’s broad success at pushing poisoned versions of popular software packages, GitHub in late July introduced a three-day “cooldown” mechanism for Dependabot, the platform’s tool for auto-fetching newly shipped updates for any package dependencies. Cooldown periods are designed to help buy time for security tools and package maintainers to identify and remove any compromised versions. Other coding ecosystems like Python and various JavaScript platforms also added support for cooldown periods this year amid growing calls from security experts about the need for more widespread adoption of the safety feature.

Eriksen said TeamPCP’s legacy is that they achieved in the span of a few months what the supply chain security community has been unable to do for years.

“They managed to wake up Microsoft to the fact that they had become negligent in terms of security,” Eriksen said. “By compromising GitHub and stealing their source code, they humiliated Microsoft into action, making them finally act on what we had been asking them to do and take seriously for a while now.”

Update, 10:08 a.m. ET: A story this morning from ABC News in Australia confirms Ruben Ian Thomson of Cottesloe was one of the two arrested. The 23-year-old suspect thought to be @pcpcasper, Michael Gaebler, also was arrested in Perth. ABC News reports that Thomson was denied bail (Mr. Gaebler’s attorney reportedly did not request bail for his client), and that both men will be held in custody until their next court appearance on September 18.

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Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges in Open Source Software: What you need to know

by Ashwin Ramaswami

June 2022 saw the publication of Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges in Open Source Software, a joint research initiative launched by the Open Source Security Foundation in collaboration with Linux Foundation Research and Snyk. The research dives into security concerns in the open source ecosystem. If you haven’t read it, this article will give you the report’s who, what, and why, summarizing its key takeaways so that it can be relevant to you or your organization.

Who is the report for?

This report is for everyone whose work touches open source software. Whether you’re a user of open source, an OSS developer, or part of an OSS-related institution or foundation, you can benefit from a better understanding of the state of security in the ecosystem.

Open source consumers and users: It’s very likely that you rely on open source software as dependencies if you develop software. And if you do, one important consideration is the security of the software supply chain. Security incidents such as log4shell have shown how open source supply chain security touches nearly every industry. Even industries and organizations that have traditionally not focused on open source software now realize the importance of ensuring their OSS dependencies are secure. Understanding the state of OSS security can help you to manage your dependencies intelligently, choose them wisely, and keep them up to date.

Open source developers and maintainers: People and organizations that develop or maintain open source software need to ensure they use best practices and policies for security. For example, it can be valuable for large organizations to have open source security policies. Moreover, many OSS developers also use other open source software as dependencies, making understanding the OSS security landscape even more valuable. Developers have a unique role to play in leading the creation of high-quality code and the respective governance frameworks and best practices around it.

Institutions: Institutions such as open source foundations, funders, and policymaking groups can benefit from this report by understanding and implementing the key findings of the research and their respective roles in improving the current state of the OSS ecosystem. Funding and support can only go to the right areas if priorities are informed by the problems the community is facing now, which the research assists in identifying.

What are the major takeaways?

The data from this report was collected by conducting a worldwide survey of:

  • Individuals who contribute to, use, or administer OSS;
  • Maintainers, core contributors, and occasional contributors to OSS;
  • Developers of proprietary software who use OSS; and
  • Individuals with a strong focus on software supply chain security

The survey also included data collected from several major package ecosystems by using Snyk Open Source, a static code analysis (SCA) tool free to use for individuals and open source maintainers.

Here are the major takeaways and recommendations from the report:

  • Too many organizations are not prepared to address OSS security needs: At least 34% of organizations did not have an OSS security policy in place, suggesting these organizations may not be prepared to address OSS security needs.
  • Small organizations must prioritize developing an OSS security policy: Small organizations are significantly less likely to have an OSS security policy. Such organizations should prioritize developing this policy and having a CISO and OSPO (Open Source Program Office).
  • Using additional security tools is a leading way to improve OSS security: Security tooling is available for open source security across the software development lifecycle. Moreover, organizations with an OSS security policy have a higher frequency of security tool use than those without an OSS security policy.
  • Collaborate with vendors to create more intelligent security tools: Organizations consider that one of the most important ways to improve OSS security across the supply chain is adding greater intelligence to existing software security tools, making it easier to integrate OSS security into existing workflows and build systems.
  • Implementing best practices for secure software development is the other leading way to improve OSS security: Understanding best practices for secure software development, through courses such as the OpenSSF’s Secure Software Development Fundamentals Courses, has been identified repeatedly as a leading way to improve OSS supply chain security.
  • Use automation to reduce your attack surface: Infrastructure as Code (IaC) tools and scanners allow automating CI/CD activities to eliminate threat vectors around manual deployments.
  • Consumers of open source software should give back to the communities that support them: The use of open source software has often been a one-way street where users see significant benefits with minimal cost or investment. For larger open source projects to meet user expectations, organizations must give back and close the loop by financially supporting OSS projects they use.

Why is this important now?

Open source software is a boon: its collaborative and open nature has allowed society to benefit from various innovative, reliable, and free software tools. However, these benefits only last when users contribute back to open source software and when users and developers exercise due diligence around security. While the most successful open source projects have gotten such support, other projects have not – even as open source use has continued to be more ubiquitous.

Thus, it is more important than ever to be aware of the problems and issues everyone faces in the OSS ecosystem. Some organizations and open source maintainers have strong policies and procedures for handling these issues. But, as this report shows, other organizations are just facing these issues now.

Finally, we’ve seen the risks of not maintaining proper security practices around OSS dependencies. Failure to update open source dependencies has led to costs as high as $425 million. Given these risks, a little investment in strong security practices and awareness around open source – as outlined in the report’s recommendations – can go a long way.

We suggest you read the report – then see how you or your organization can take the next step to keep yourself secure!

The post Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges in Open Source Software: What you need to know appeared first on Linux Foundation.

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