Nearly half (49.8%) of organisations have confirmed or suspected that an AI agent took an unintended, unexpected or unauthorised action in the past year, according to new research from Salt Security.

The findings, published in the company’s State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report, highlight growing concerns around the security of autonomous AI systems as enterprises increasingly integrate agents into everyday operations.

Based on a survey of more than 380 security and technology professionals, alongside Salt Labs production telemetry from hundreds of customer environments, the research suggests that AI adoption is outpacing organisations’ ability to monitor, govern and contain agent activity.

Among respondents who reported confirmed or suspected unintended agent actions, more than half experienced an unauthorised external API call or transaction, while over 40% reported an agent modifying or deleting data.

The research also found that AI agents are now firmly embedded in enterprise environments, with 86.4% of respondents reporting at least one operating within their organisation and 59.5% running more than ten. Furthermore, 76.8% reported agents capable of chaining actions across other agents, tools and APIs, creating complex sequences that may not have been anticipated by individual teams.

Despite this widespread adoption, visibility remains limited. Just 12.5% of organisations can consistently trace an agent’s complete journey, from its initial instruction through the tools and APIs it accesses to the final outcome. More than 60% would require hours or days of manual investigation to reconstruct an agent’s activity from the previous day.

The ability to respond to unexpected behaviour is similarly concerning. Only 17.5% of respondents said their organisation could automatically stop an AI agent behaving unexpectedly in production. For the majority, intervention remains a manual process, potentially requiring an application to be taken offline.

“The data shows a gap that is already producing real operational consequences,” said Roey Eliyahu, CEO of Salt Security. “Organisations are deploying agents and granting them access to enterprise data, APIs, and services before they can trace what those agents are doing or stop them automatically when something goes wrong.”

Shadow AI Infrastructure and AI-Generated Code Raise Further Concerns

The report also identified emerging risks associated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) infrastructure, which enables AI systems to interact with external tools and data sources.

Nearly a third (32.9%) of respondents reported discovering an unauthorised, shadow or misconfigured MCP server in the past year, while 54.3% had either confirmed or suspected encountering one.

Salt Labs’ own telemetry revealed that MCP-related infrastructure was detected in 21.6% of customer environments in August 2026, compared with 16.7% in January, representing a relative increase of approximately 30%.

Meanwhile, AI-generated code is introducing additional application security challenges. Some 83.5% of respondents estimated that AI-generated or AI-assisted code contributed to at least some of their application security findings.

However, just 6.8% reported resolving these issues directly within coding assistants at the point of generation, leaving vulnerabilities to be identified during subsequent code reviews, testing or after deployment.

Recent Manus Vulnerability Highlights Agentic AI Risks

The findings follow recent research from Salt Labs, which demonstrated how a single malicious email could be used to hijack the Manus agentic AI platform and potentially access a user’s connected email, cloud storage and code repository accounts.

The attack did not require a stolen password or the victim to click a malicious link. Although the platform’s guardrails detected the malicious activity, they were unable to prevent the code from executing.

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and has since been remediated.

According to Salt Security, the incident demonstrates how traditional detection mechanisms may struggle to keep pace with autonomous systems capable of executing multiple actions before human intervention is possible.

“The Manus research and this survey data are two views of the same problem,” said Yaniv Balmas, Head of Research at Salt Security.

“In the field, we showed how an agent can be weaponised through a single malicious email, how the guardrail detected the attack at exactly the right moment, and still could not stop the code from running. The survey quantifies how widespread that architecture is.”

The findings underline the need for organisations to strengthen visibility into agent activity, establish appropriate governance controls and develop automated containment capabilities as AI agents gain greater autonomy and access to critical enterprise systems.

The full State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report includes sector-specific findings, recommendations for CISOs and further analysis of Salt Labs production telemetry.

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Huntress researchers have uncovered an SEO-poisoning campaign that harvests SSL VPN credentials through a lookalike WatchGuard download page, then hands victims the real, validly signed installer from WatchGuard’s own CDN, leaving endpoint tools with nothing to detect.

The activity, detailed by the Huntress SOC on 13 October, centres on watchguard-vpn[.]net, a lookalike domain posing as a download page for WatchGuard’s Mobile VPN with SSL client. Unlike earlier waves of the campaign, which relied on trojanised installers, this iteration strips the malware out entirely.

A typo and a search result

The incident Huntress investigated began on 7 October, when an administrator at a managed service provider searched Bing for “watchguard vpn sll download”. Eight seconds later they had clicked through to the fake site via a standard Bing result redirect, which Huntress says points to SEO poisoning rather than malvertising.

Two bites at the password

Clicking any download option on the site opens a pop-up asking for the VPN server address, username and password, the same three values the legitimate client requests. The logic sits in roughly 150 lines of unobfuscated JavaScript (popup.js), which posts the entries as JSON to a separate collection domain, watchguard-ssl[.]online.

The first submission is always rejected with an “incorrect data” message, prompting victims to retype carefully or try a different password. That gives the operators a second, likely more accurate, set of credentials, along with the server address they need to log in.

The payload is the real thing

After the second submission, the script triggers a download of WatchGuard’s genuine Mobile VPN with SSL installer (version 12.11.5) direct from cdn.watchguard.com. Huntress verified the file’s Authenticode signature from WatchGuard Technologies and confirmed the binary had not been altered.

With no trojanised MSI or sideloaded DLL in the chain, there is nothing for EDR to flag, and the victim gets exactly the install they expected. Detection was thin across the board: as of 8 October only seven VirusTotal vendors flagged the lure domain and two flagged the collector.

Old domain, new backend

WatchGuard’s Secplicity team first reported watchguard-vpn[.]net in January as part of a wider credential-harvesting campaign spoofing WatchGuard, F5, Fortinet, SonicWall and Sophos clients, though at that point the domain had no working backend. Microsoft later attributed related activity to Storm-2561, a financially motivated actor active since May 2025. WHOIS data shows the domain was registered again on 22 August, with the collector domain following on 14 September. Huntress says it cannot establish whether the same operators controlled both registrations.

In the case investigated, Huntress flagged the activity 21 seconds after the site loaded, and browser history suggests the user did not complete both rounds. The domain was offline as of 13 October, and Huntress has shared infrastructure details with WatchGuard.

Recommendations

• Reset passwords for any account entered on the site and treat the associated VPN endpoint as known to the attacker.
• Enforce MFA on SSL VPN access.
• Monitor for VPN logins from hosting providers, unfamiliar ASNs or new countries.
• Block watchguard-vpn[.]net, watchguard-ssl[.]online, 80.249.132[.]140 and 158.94.209[.]19.
• Publish and bookmark official download links such as software.watchguard.com.

Full research: https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-watchguard-vpn-credential-phishing

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Certes has received Frost & Sullivan’s 2026 Global Enabling Technology Leadership Recognition in post-quantum cryptography (PQC), following an independent evaluation of vendors in the market.

The recognition centres on a problem most security teams are now facing: migrating embedded cryptography across legacy applications, cloud environments and critical infrastructure will take years, but “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks mean data intercepted today could be exposed once sufficiently powerful quantum computers arrive. Frost & Sullivan notes that the risk is greatest for data with long regulatory, legal or commercial lifespans, and that protecting it needs to run in parallel with the longer migration effort rather than wait for it to finish.

Separating cryptography from the stack

At the heart of Certes’ platform is its Cryptographic Abstraction Layer (CAL), which sits between applications and infrastructure and lifts cryptographic protection out of the underlying technology stack. Rather than waiting for each vendor to ship a quantum-safe update and then managing disruptive upgrades, security teams can manage cryptographic change centrally and apply it to data flowing between systems.

The platform comprises the Certes Enforcement Point (CEP), which encrypts and decrypts within the data path, and the Certes Policy Manager (CPM), which manages policies and cryptographic controls centrally. Frost & Sullivan singled out its policy-specific key architecture as a key differentiator: each policy-controlled application or data flow can have its own key material, separate rotation schedules and customer-controlled key components. This is combined with quantum-based random number generation and customer-owned keys to support data sovereignty.

Certes’ patented Layer 4 payload protection encrypts the payload while preserving original network headers, so routing, QoS, monitoring, SD-WAN and flow visibility tools continue to work without applications being rewritten or networks re-architected. Deployment options span physical appliances, virtual machines on VMware ESXi, KVM, Red Hat and Nutanix AHV, and Windows and Linux client agents. Version 7 extends enforcement closer to workloads and users through expanded agent and cloud deployment options, reducing unprotected segments in the data’s journey.

Beyond quantum

The report also highlights uses beyond PQC migration. Cryptographic segmentation can separate IT and OT environments and limit lateral movement in flat networks, while a virtual air gap capability can dynamically isolate critical applications, data flows and backups during an active attack while preserving recovery. Certes’ encryption can also stop sensitive data being exposed to internal or external LLMs, giving organisations tighter governance over AI adoption.

Ozgun Pelit, Senior Industry Analyst at Frost & Sullivan, said: “Certes stands out in the emerging post-quantum security market through its focus on protecting data independently of the applications and infrastructure around it. Its combination of cryptographic abstraction, crypto-agility and centralized policy enforcement provides organisations with a practical way to reduce near-term quantum risk while navigating what will inevitably be a complex, multi-year migration.”

Paul German, CEO at Certes, said: “The next cryptographic revolution could arrive before many organizations have finished implementing the last one. Post-quantum cryptography is only the beginning. As AI and quantum technologies advance, cryptographic change will accelerate, and organisations cannot afford to rebuild their applications, networks and security infrastructure every time it happens.”

He added: “In a world where cryptography must constantly evolve, the ability to change it without changing everything else isn’t a luxury. It’s a necessity.”

The full Frost & Sullivan report is available HERE

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