Forescout’s Vedere Labs has identified a previously undocumented malware delivery platform being used in ClickFix campaigns, alongside new delivery techniques associated with malware loaders linked to Vice Society ransomware activity.

The findings, published in two research blogs, examine what happens after victims fall for ClickFix lures. These attacks trick users into copying and running malicious commands, often under the pretence of fixing a technical problem or completing a verification step.

The investigations reveal how attackers deliver different malware families, conceal malicious files and establish access that could support further compromise.

ROMULUS serves multiple malware loaders

During an incident investigation, Forescout researchers discovered a server hosting a panel called ROMULUS. Further analysis identified six IP addresses exposing the same authentication interface and revealed a platform capable of delivering multiple malware loaders.

One of those addresses had previously been identified by Huntress in a campaign that abused ChatGPT’s Custom GPTs to direct victims towards pages hosting ClickFix lures. Forescout independently observed the same malware package being delivered from another ROMULUS server.

Researchers analysed two delivery routes. One used a trojanised installer containing legitimate Stardock software to load malicious code. The other delivered LegionLoader, a malware loader active since 2019, through a series of encrypted archives.

In the LegionLoader route, an archive smaller than 1 MB expanded into an executable exceeding 880 MB. Most of the executable’s size came from artificial padding, which can push files beyond security scanners’ upload limits or sandbox analysis thresholds.

A ROMULUS statistics page also displayed installation and execution counts, a timeline and a breakdown by country, potentially allowing operators to monitor campaign performance.

Forescout said the platform’s operators remain unknown. Researchers could not determine whether ROMULUS is a private tool, a commercial criminal service, an affiliate framework or software shared between operators.

Loader investigation reveals possible connection

The second blog examines Lorem Ipsum and Axolotl, two malware loaders whose relationship had not previously been documented in public research.

The investigation followed a September incident in which attackers used ClickFix to deploy Lorem Ipsum Loader and a Python tunnel client. Forescout contained the incident before ransomware was deployed, although researchers believe ransomware delivery was the attackers’ intended goal.

The tradecraft has previously been attributed to Vice Society, a cybercriminal group associated with several ransomware families, including Rhysida.

Researchers analysed five Lorem Ipsum samples from the incident and 39 Axolotl samples. They identified an additional Lorem Ipsum delivery method using MSI installers and multi-stage PowerShell, as well as three Axolotl variants using different host programs.

The analysis also found overlapping infrastructure and similarities in the loaders’ command-and-control communications. Although their code is distinct, Forescout said the findings suggest Lorem Ipsum may be a later iteration of Axolotl. Researchers could not establish that relationship conclusively.

Forescout recommends monitoring suspicious PowerShell activity, silent installer execution and unexpected DLL loading, alongside educating users about ClickFix and related lures that direct victims to Windows Terminal or PowerShell.

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Nearly half (49.8%) of organisations have confirmed or suspected that an AI agent took an unintended, unexpected or unauthorised action in the past year, according to new research from Salt Security.

The findings, published in the company’s State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report, highlight growing concerns around the security of autonomous AI systems as enterprises increasingly integrate agents into everyday operations.

Based on a survey of more than 380 security and technology professionals, alongside Salt Labs production telemetry from hundreds of customer environments, the research suggests that AI adoption is outpacing organisations’ ability to monitor, govern and contain agent activity.

Among respondents who reported confirmed or suspected unintended agent actions, more than half experienced an unauthorised external API call or transaction, while over 40% reported an agent modifying or deleting data.

The research also found that AI agents are now firmly embedded in enterprise environments, with 86.4% of respondents reporting at least one operating within their organisation and 59.5% running more than ten. Furthermore, 76.8% reported agents capable of chaining actions across other agents, tools and APIs, creating complex sequences that may not have been anticipated by individual teams.

Despite this widespread adoption, visibility remains limited. Just 12.5% of organisations can consistently trace an agent’s complete journey, from its initial instruction through the tools and APIs it accesses to the final outcome. More than 60% would require hours or days of manual investigation to reconstruct an agent’s activity from the previous day.

The ability to respond to unexpected behaviour is similarly concerning. Only 17.5% of respondents said their organisation could automatically stop an AI agent behaving unexpectedly in production. For the majority, intervention remains a manual process, potentially requiring an application to be taken offline.

“The data shows a gap that is already producing real operational consequences,” said Roey Eliyahu, CEO of Salt Security. “Organisations are deploying agents and granting them access to enterprise data, APIs, and services before they can trace what those agents are doing or stop them automatically when something goes wrong.”

Shadow AI Infrastructure and AI-Generated Code Raise Further Concerns

The report also identified emerging risks associated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) infrastructure, which enables AI systems to interact with external tools and data sources.

Nearly a third (32.9%) of respondents reported discovering an unauthorised, shadow or misconfigured MCP server in the past year, while 54.3% had either confirmed or suspected encountering one.

Salt Labs’ own telemetry revealed that MCP-related infrastructure was detected in 21.6% of customer environments in August 2026, compared with 16.7% in January, representing a relative increase of approximately 30%.

Meanwhile, AI-generated code is introducing additional application security challenges. Some 83.5% of respondents estimated that AI-generated or AI-assisted code contributed to at least some of their application security findings.

However, just 6.8% reported resolving these issues directly within coding assistants at the point of generation, leaving vulnerabilities to be identified during subsequent code reviews, testing or after deployment.

Recent Manus Vulnerability Highlights Agentic AI Risks

The findings follow recent research from Salt Labs, which demonstrated how a single malicious email could be used to hijack the Manus agentic AI platform and potentially access a user’s connected email, cloud storage and code repository accounts.

The attack did not require a stolen password or the victim to click a malicious link. Although the platform’s guardrails detected the malicious activity, they were unable to prevent the code from executing.

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and has since been remediated.

According to Salt Security, the incident demonstrates how traditional detection mechanisms may struggle to keep pace with autonomous systems capable of executing multiple actions before human intervention is possible.

“The Manus research and this survey data are two views of the same problem,” said Yaniv Balmas, Head of Research at Salt Security.

“In the field, we showed how an agent can be weaponised through a single malicious email, how the guardrail detected the attack at exactly the right moment, and still could not stop the code from running. The survey quantifies how widespread that architecture is.”

The findings underline the need for organisations to strengthen visibility into agent activity, establish appropriate governance controls and develop automated containment capabilities as AI agents gain greater autonomy and access to critical enterprise systems.

The full State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report includes sector-specific findings, recommendations for CISOs and further analysis of Salt Labs production telemetry.

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Huntress researchers have uncovered an SEO-poisoning campaign that harvests SSL VPN credentials through a lookalike WatchGuard download page, then hands victims the real, validly signed installer from WatchGuard’s own CDN, leaving endpoint tools with nothing to detect.

The activity, detailed by the Huntress SOC on 13 October, centres on watchguard-vpn[.]net, a lookalike domain posing as a download page for WatchGuard’s Mobile VPN with SSL client. Unlike earlier waves of the campaign, which relied on trojanised installers, this iteration strips the malware out entirely.

A typo and a search result

The incident Huntress investigated began on 7 October, when an administrator at a managed service provider searched Bing for “watchguard vpn sll download”. Eight seconds later they had clicked through to the fake site via a standard Bing result redirect, which Huntress says points to SEO poisoning rather than malvertising.

Two bites at the password

Clicking any download option on the site opens a pop-up asking for the VPN server address, username and password, the same three values the legitimate client requests. The logic sits in roughly 150 lines of unobfuscated JavaScript (popup.js), which posts the entries as JSON to a separate collection domain, watchguard-ssl[.]online.

The first submission is always rejected with an “incorrect data” message, prompting victims to retype carefully or try a different password. That gives the operators a second, likely more accurate, set of credentials, along with the server address they need to log in.

The payload is the real thing

After the second submission, the script triggers a download of WatchGuard’s genuine Mobile VPN with SSL installer (version 12.11.5) direct from cdn.watchguard.com. Huntress verified the file’s Authenticode signature from WatchGuard Technologies and confirmed the binary had not been altered.

With no trojanised MSI or sideloaded DLL in the chain, there is nothing for EDR to flag, and the victim gets exactly the install they expected. Detection was thin across the board: as of 8 October only seven VirusTotal vendors flagged the lure domain and two flagged the collector.

Old domain, new backend

WatchGuard’s Secplicity team first reported watchguard-vpn[.]net in January as part of a wider credential-harvesting campaign spoofing WatchGuard, F5, Fortinet, SonicWall and Sophos clients, though at that point the domain had no working backend. Microsoft later attributed related activity to Storm-2561, a financially motivated actor active since May 2025. WHOIS data shows the domain was registered again on 22 August, with the collector domain following on 14 September. Huntress says it cannot establish whether the same operators controlled both registrations.

In the case investigated, Huntress flagged the activity 21 seconds after the site loaded, and browser history suggests the user did not complete both rounds. The domain was offline as of 13 October, and Huntress has shared infrastructure details with WatchGuard.

Recommendations

• Reset passwords for any account entered on the site and treat the associated VPN endpoint as known to the attacker.
• Enforce MFA on SSL VPN access.
• Monitor for VPN logins from hosting providers, unfamiliar ASNs or new countries.
• Block watchguard-vpn[.]net, watchguard-ssl[.]online, 80.249.132[.]140 and 158.94.209[.]19.
• Publish and bookmark official download links such as software.watchguard.com.

Full research: https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-watchguard-vpn-credential-phishing

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Certes has received Frost & Sullivan’s 2026 Global Enabling Technology Leadership Recognition in post-quantum cryptography (PQC), following an independent evaluation of vendors in the market.

The recognition centres on a problem most security teams are now facing: migrating embedded cryptography across legacy applications, cloud environments and critical infrastructure will take years, but “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks mean data intercepted today could be exposed once sufficiently powerful quantum computers arrive. Frost & Sullivan notes that the risk is greatest for data with long regulatory, legal or commercial lifespans, and that protecting it needs to run in parallel with the longer migration effort rather than wait for it to finish.

Separating cryptography from the stack

At the heart of Certes’ platform is its Cryptographic Abstraction Layer (CAL), which sits between applications and infrastructure and lifts cryptographic protection out of the underlying technology stack. Rather than waiting for each vendor to ship a quantum-safe update and then managing disruptive upgrades, security teams can manage cryptographic change centrally and apply it to data flowing between systems.

The platform comprises the Certes Enforcement Point (CEP), which encrypts and decrypts within the data path, and the Certes Policy Manager (CPM), which manages policies and cryptographic controls centrally. Frost & Sullivan singled out its policy-specific key architecture as a key differentiator: each policy-controlled application or data flow can have its own key material, separate rotation schedules and customer-controlled key components. This is combined with quantum-based random number generation and customer-owned keys to support data sovereignty.

Certes’ patented Layer 4 payload protection encrypts the payload while preserving original network headers, so routing, QoS, monitoring, SD-WAN and flow visibility tools continue to work without applications being rewritten or networks re-architected. Deployment options span physical appliances, virtual machines on VMware ESXi, KVM, Red Hat and Nutanix AHV, and Windows and Linux client agents. Version 7 extends enforcement closer to workloads and users through expanded agent and cloud deployment options, reducing unprotected segments in the data’s journey.

Beyond quantum

The report also highlights uses beyond PQC migration. Cryptographic segmentation can separate IT and OT environments and limit lateral movement in flat networks, while a virtual air gap capability can dynamically isolate critical applications, data flows and backups during an active attack while preserving recovery. Certes’ encryption can also stop sensitive data being exposed to internal or external LLMs, giving organisations tighter governance over AI adoption.

Ozgun Pelit, Senior Industry Analyst at Frost & Sullivan, said: “Certes stands out in the emerging post-quantum security market through its focus on protecting data independently of the applications and infrastructure around it. Its combination of cryptographic abstraction, crypto-agility and centralized policy enforcement provides organisations with a practical way to reduce near-term quantum risk while navigating what will inevitably be a complex, multi-year migration.”

Paul German, CEO at Certes, said: “The next cryptographic revolution could arrive before many organizations have finished implementing the last one. Post-quantum cryptography is only the beginning. As AI and quantum technologies advance, cryptographic change will accelerate, and organisations cannot afford to rebuild their applications, networks and security infrastructure every time it happens.”

He added: “In a world where cryptography must constantly evolve, the ability to change it without changing everything else isn’t a luxury. It’s a necessity.”

The full Frost & Sullivan report is available HERE

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Check Point Research has disclosed two high-risk vulnerabilities in LiteLLM, the open-source gateway that sits between enterprise applications and AI providers such as OpenAI, Anthropic and Google. The flaws could allow a user with minimal privileges to take full control of the gateway, read sensitive files, execute arbitrary code and harvest the API keys an organisation uses to access its AI providers.

LiteLLM is downloaded around 97 million times a month and has more than 59,000 stars on GitHub. Both issues, tracked as CVE-2026-35029 and CVE-2026-59823, are fixed in version 1.83.9.

One endpoint, three attack paths

The more serious flaw, CVE-2026-35029, is a missing authorisation check on LiteLLM’s /config/update endpoint, which controls the proxy’s runtime configuration. Unlike other administrative endpoints, it did not verify that the caller held the PROXY_ADMIN role.

Compounding this, any user who logs in through the LiteLLM dashboard is issued a session token tied to a special “litellm-dashboard” team, and those tokens are checked against a looser list of permitted UI routes. That list includes “/config”. Because the check uses simple prefix matching, requests to /config/update were allowed for any logged-in user, whatever their role.

Testing against LiteLLM version 1.77.7, the researchers showed the flaw could be used to:

• Read arbitrary files, by injecting an environment variable that sets the path of the dashboard logo and pointing it at sensitive files such as /etc/passwd
• Take over the built-in admin account, by overwriting the UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD variables and logging in with attacker-chosen credentials
• Execute remote code, by registering a “pass-through endpoint” that loads a Python module from an attacker-controlled S3 or GCS bucket, which LiteLLM then downloads and runs

Stealing keys without touching the provider

The second flaw, CVE-2026-59823, is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) issue in LiteLLM’s “Clientside LLM Credentials” feature. By passing a user_config parameter to the /chat/completions endpoint, an authenticated user could create a router pointing at their own server. Requests, along with the provider API keys attached to them, would then be sent to the attacker rather than to the AI provider.

Check Point notes that this code path sidestepped restrictions LiteLLM already placed on client-supplied api_base and api_key parameters.

The researchers also found that password hashes were exposed to low-privileged users and were stored without salting, using a single hash iteration. These issues duplicated an existing advisory, GHSA-69×8-hrgq-fjj8.

Old bugs, bigger blast radius

Check Point is clear that none of these are new classes of “AI” vulnerability. Missing authorisation checks, SSRF and unsafe dynamic module loading are all well understood. What raises the stakes is where they sit. An LLM gateway stores provider keys, manages user permissions and routes every prompt and response, making it a single point of compromise for an organisation’s AI estate. And because LiteLLM is embedded in many other AI platforms and internal tools, some organisations may be running it without realising.

“The industry’s focus has largely been on securing AI models, but this research highlights an equally important reality: AI infrastructure is becoming a new critical layer of enterprise security,” said Mateo Rojas-Carulla, Head of Research, AI Agent Security at Check Point Software Technologies. “As organisations increasingly rely on gateways such as LiteLLM to connect applications, users and AI services, these platforms become attractive targets because they sit at the centre of trust.”

“For LiteLLM users, the immediate priority is patching and reviewing access controls, but the broader lesson extends beyond a single product,” he added. “Attackers will naturally target the layer that gives them the greatest access with the least resistance.”

What defenders should do

Check Point recommends that organisations:

• Upgrade to LiteLLM 1.83.9 or later across every deployment, including instances embedded in other tools
• Audit gateway user accounts and remove any that are not needed
• Rotate AI provider API keys if there is any sign of unauthorised access before patching
• Test that limited roles are enforced in practice, not just on paper
• Bring LLM gateways into scope for regular security assessments

The vulnerabilities were reported to LiteLLM’s maintainers through a coordinated disclosure process that began in October 2025.

Full technical write-up: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/when-llm-gateways-go-wrong-findings-from-litellm/

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A coordinated attack on the operational technology (OT) behind supermarket refrigeration has hit hundreds of stores across France, in what security experts are calling one of the clearest examples yet of cyber sabotage with physical consequences.

Retailers confirmed the attack on Monday 12 October, with disruption reportedly beginning on Sunday night. Intermarché and its Netto brand said at least 300 shops were affected, Coopérative U more than 100 and Carrefour 80, with Monoprix, E.Leclerc and Auchan also reporting impacted stores. According to BFM TV, attackers remotely forced refrigeration units into continuous defrost cycles, driving temperatures up to 50°C. Paris prosecutors said the attack also caused fires.

“This incident is not surprising. A supermarket refrigerator is no longer just an electrical appliance. It is a computerized system connected to a network, enabling remote monitoring and control. While this connectivity allows refrigeration systems to be managed efficiently, it also exposes them to cyber security risks, particularly when operational equipment runs for years on outdated software, without regular security updates, and with management interfaces accessible from the internet,” said Oded Vanunu, Head of Vulnerability Research at Check Point.

Unpatched, internet-facing and end of life

The affected equipment has been traced to refrigeration management systems from Danish manufacturer Danfoss. A source close to Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said France’s National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) had identified a vulnerability in Danfoss software, and the agency has been ordered to investigate.

Danfoss said most of the compromised units were “legacy” products that no longer receive software or security updates, singling out its AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 controllers, and noted that an affected version of the AK-SM800 was running outdated firmware. The company said it had long advised customers to upgrade or replace these models.

Known vulnerabilities in the control software date back to 2023, some rated critical, with patches available. In August, OT security firm Claroty published research describing flaws in Danfoss systems that could allow attackers to bypass authentication. Reports suggest attackers may have used the Shodan search engine to locate exposed devices, some of which are connected via 3G cards for remote monitoring.

“One of the significant aspects of this incident is that the attackers did not necessarily need sophisticated cyber capabilities. Refrigeration systems have legitimate operational functions, such as defrost cycles, and when an unauthorized party gains access to the system, those same functions can be exploited to disrupt operations. Unlike attacks aimed at stealing data or encrypting files, the impact here is on the physical operation of the equipment itself, with direct consequences such as food inventory losses and potential safety hazards.” Vanunu continued.

“In previous research conducted by Check Point on smart devices, including LG products, we demonstrated how a vulnerability in a centralised management platform could allow attackers to gain control of connected devices. However, in the current incident, it is still unclear exactly how the attackers gained access to the systems.”

OT in the crosshairs

No group has claimed responsibility, and there is no evidence of a ransom demand or data theft. The Paris prosecutor’s cybercrime unit has opened an investigation into what it described as a “large-scale” attack on connected refrigerators at several major food retailers, while ANSSI is coordinating with European counterparts. Sekoia analyst Felix Aime said stores in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium were also affected.

“The refrigeration systems in supermarkets are operational technology. Building management controls, HVAC, cold chain infrastructure. These are the same category of systems that the security industry has been warning about as the next frontier for sabotage attacks, and they’ve now been weaponised against food retail infrastructure in one of Europe’s largest economies,” said Muhammad Yahya Patel, vCISO and cybersecurity advisor for EMEA at Huntress.

ANSSI had already listed sabotage of industrial control systems among the main threats facing France in its most recent threat report.

“Heating fridges to 50 degrees for six hours is not data theft; it is physical sabotage executed through software, and that is the lesson for every sector. Refrigeration controllers, building systems and point-of-sale equipment are now connected and remotely managed, often through a handful of suppliers, so one weak link scales to hundreds of stores overnight,” said Samuel Hassine, CEO and co-founder of Filigran.

“The problem extends beyond a single refrigeration system or an isolated security vulnerability. Operational equipment is often designed to remain in service for 15 years or more, while cyber threats and technologies evolve at a much faster pace. In addition, the same controllers and management systems are deployed across retail chains worldwide, meaning that a compromise affecting widely used technology could potentially impact a large number of locations,” added Check Point’s Vanunu.

Counting the cost

Intermarché chief executive Thierry Cotillard told BFM TV that losses could run to “tens of millions of euros nationwide in a single day”, while Coopérative U’s Dominique Schelcher said larger stores could each lose up to €180,000–200,000 in stock. France’s retail federation, the FCD, has called on Danfoss to provide “full transparency”.

“The immediate financial consequences are significant and visible. Failures at the stores means total write-off of perishable stock across every affected location simultaneously. The operational disruption compounds quickly. Staff cannot trade normally without functioning refrigeration. Products cannot be restocked until systems are restored and verified safe. The food retail sector across Europe should be treating this as a signal that they are being actively targeted,” Huntress’ Patel warned.

“The cyberattack on French supermarkets is a stark reminder that cyber threats extend far beyond stolen data and financial losses. Hackers reportedly manipulated refrigeration systems, raising temperatures to 50°C, causing fires and forcing retailers to dispose of large quantities of food. With hundreds of stores affected, the incident highlights how vulnerabilities in connected systems can have serious real-world consequences, disrupting operations, damaging equipment and potentially putting public safety at risk,” said Jamie Akhtar, CEO and Co-founder of CyberSmart.

Mitigation: find the exposure first

Experts agree that defenders’ first priority should be identifying which OT assets are reachable from the internet, and who holds remote access to them.

“To reduce these risks, the first step is to identify which controllers and management interfaces are directly exposed to the internet and eliminate any unnecessary exposure. It is also important to keep systems updated, replace default passwords, restrict remote access, and enable multi-factor authentication wherever supported. Separating operational control networks from other networks and monitoring unusual changes in system behaviour are also essential measures. These recommendations apply not only to refrigeration systems, but also to HVAC, building management systems, and other operational infrastructure.” said Vanunu.

“It also demonstrates how increasingly interconnected technology can create new opportunities for cybercriminals. For businesses, this reinforces the importance of securing all connected devices and systems, not just traditional IT infrastructure. Organisations should prioritise regular software and firmware updates, strong access controls, multi-factor authentication where supported and network segmentation to prevent attackers moving between systems. Regular security assessments and employee cybersecurity awareness training are also essential for identifying vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Ultimately, businesses must recognise that cybersecurity is no longer just about protecting data, but also about safeguarding physical operations, customers and business continuity.” said CyberSmart’s Akhtar.

Filigran’s Hassine urged security leaders to put the issue in front of the board: “Boards should ask three questions this week. Which connected equipment could cause physical or financial damage if someone changed a setting, and who can reach it from outside. Which third parties hold remote access, and how that access is monitored and segmented. And has anyone tested that the response works, from detection to switching to manual operation. Resilience in retail now means knowing your exposure before an attacker maps it for you.”

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