Yam Store: The Phishing Network Behind a Billion Messages
Nearly half (49.8%) of organisations have confirmed or suspected that an AI agent took an unintended, unexpected or unauthorised action in the past year, according to new research from Salt Security.
The findings, published in the company’s State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report, highlight growing concerns around the security of autonomous AI systems as enterprises increasingly integrate agents into everyday operations.
Based on a survey of more than 380 security and technology professionals, alongside Salt Labs production telemetry from hundreds of customer environments, the research suggests that AI adoption is outpacing organisations’ ability to monitor, govern and contain agent activity.
Among respondents who reported confirmed or suspected unintended agent actions, more than half experienced an unauthorised external API call or transaction, while over 40% reported an agent modifying or deleting data.
The research also found that AI agents are now firmly embedded in enterprise environments, with 86.4% of respondents reporting at least one operating within their organisation and 59.5% running more than ten. Furthermore, 76.8% reported agents capable of chaining actions across other agents, tools and APIs, creating complex sequences that may not have been anticipated by individual teams.
Despite this widespread adoption, visibility remains limited. Just 12.5% of organisations can consistently trace an agent’s complete journey, from its initial instruction through the tools and APIs it accesses to the final outcome. More than 60% would require hours or days of manual investigation to reconstruct an agent’s activity from the previous day.
The ability to respond to unexpected behaviour is similarly concerning. Only 17.5% of respondents said their organisation could automatically stop an AI agent behaving unexpectedly in production. For the majority, intervention remains a manual process, potentially requiring an application to be taken offline.
“The data shows a gap that is already producing real operational consequences,” said Roey Eliyahu, CEO of Salt Security. “Organisations are deploying agents and granting them access to enterprise data, APIs, and services before they can trace what those agents are doing or stop them automatically when something goes wrong.”
The report also identified emerging risks associated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) infrastructure, which enables AI systems to interact with external tools and data sources.
Nearly a third (32.9%) of respondents reported discovering an unauthorised, shadow or misconfigured MCP server in the past year, while 54.3% had either confirmed or suspected encountering one.
Salt Labs’ own telemetry revealed that MCP-related infrastructure was detected in 21.6% of customer environments in August 2026, compared with 16.7% in January, representing a relative increase of approximately 30%.
Meanwhile, AI-generated code is introducing additional application security challenges. Some 83.5% of respondents estimated that AI-generated or AI-assisted code contributed to at least some of their application security findings.
However, just 6.8% reported resolving these issues directly within coding assistants at the point of generation, leaving vulnerabilities to be identified during subsequent code reviews, testing or after deployment.
The findings follow recent research from Salt Labs, which demonstrated how a single malicious email could be used to hijack the Manus agentic AI platform and potentially access a user’s connected email, cloud storage and code repository accounts.
The attack did not require a stolen password or the victim to click a malicious link. Although the platform’s guardrails detected the malicious activity, they were unable to prevent the code from executing.
The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and has since been remediated.
According to Salt Security, the incident demonstrates how traditional detection mechanisms may struggle to keep pace with autonomous systems capable of executing multiple actions before human intervention is possible.
“The Manus research and this survey data are two views of the same problem,” said Yaniv Balmas, Head of Research at Salt Security.
“In the field, we showed how an agent can be weaponised through a single malicious email, how the guardrail detected the attack at exactly the right moment, and still could not stop the code from running. The survey quantifies how widespread that architecture is.”
The findings underline the need for organisations to strengthen visibility into agent activity, establish appropriate governance controls and develop automated containment capabilities as AI agents gain greater autonomy and access to critical enterprise systems.
The full State of Agentic AI and API Security 2H 2026 report includes sector-specific findings, recommendations for CISOs and further analysis of Salt Labs production telemetry.
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Huntress researchers have uncovered an SEO-poisoning campaign that harvests SSL VPN credentials through a lookalike WatchGuard download page, then hands victims the real, validly signed installer from WatchGuard’s own CDN, leaving endpoint tools with nothing to detect.
The activity, detailed by the Huntress SOC on 13 October, centres on watchguard-vpn[.]net, a lookalike domain posing as a download page for WatchGuard’s Mobile VPN with SSL client. Unlike earlier waves of the campaign, which relied on trojanised installers, this iteration strips the malware out entirely.
The incident Huntress investigated began on 7 October, when an administrator at a managed service provider searched Bing for “watchguard vpn sll download”. Eight seconds later they had clicked through to the fake site via a standard Bing result redirect, which Huntress says points to SEO poisoning rather than malvertising.
Clicking any download option on the site opens a pop-up asking for the VPN server address, username and password, the same three values the legitimate client requests. The logic sits in roughly 150 lines of unobfuscated JavaScript (popup.js), which posts the entries as JSON to a separate collection domain, watchguard-ssl[.]online.
The first submission is always rejected with an “incorrect data” message, prompting victims to retype carefully or try a different password. That gives the operators a second, likely more accurate, set of credentials, along with the server address they need to log in.
After the second submission, the script triggers a download of WatchGuard’s genuine Mobile VPN with SSL installer (version 12.11.5) direct from cdn.watchguard.com. Huntress verified the file’s Authenticode signature from WatchGuard Technologies and confirmed the binary had not been altered.
With no trojanised MSI or sideloaded DLL in the chain, there is nothing for EDR to flag, and the victim gets exactly the install they expected. Detection was thin across the board: as of 8 October only seven VirusTotal vendors flagged the lure domain and two flagged the collector.
WatchGuard’s Secplicity team first reported watchguard-vpn[.]net in January as part of a wider credential-harvesting campaign spoofing WatchGuard, F5, Fortinet, SonicWall and Sophos clients, though at that point the domain had no working backend. Microsoft later attributed related activity to Storm-2561, a financially motivated actor active since May 2025. WHOIS data shows the domain was registered again on 22 August, with the collector domain following on 14 September. Huntress says it cannot establish whether the same operators controlled both registrations.
In the case investigated, Huntress flagged the activity 21 seconds after the site loaded, and browser history suggests the user did not complete both rounds. The domain was offline as of 13 October, and Huntress has shared infrastructure details with WatchGuard.
Full research: https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-watchguard-vpn-credential-phishing
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Zero trust has become one of the most overused terms in security marketing, often applied to products that simply add another layer of network segmentation. This piece looks at what zero trust actually specifies according to its foundational standard, the implementation order that works in practice, and why identity is the dependency most organizations underestimate.
Zero trust gets used loosely enough that it has largely lost precision as a term, applied to everything from a VPN replacement to a full architectural rebuild. That imprecision is a real problem for organizations trying to evaluate vendor claims, since two products both marketed as zero trust solutions can address entirely different parts of the actual model.
Organizations working through this evaluation often look at established regional providers as part of their planning. Among them, cybersecurity solutions in Dubai offer a starting point for comparing how different providers translate the zero trust framework into an actual implementation roadmap, which varies considerably depending on an organization’s existing infrastructure.
At its core, the specification requires continuous verification of every access request, whether it originates inside or outside the traditional network perimeter, and it removes the assumption that anything on the internal network is inherently trustworthy simply by virtue of its location.
| Zero trust component | What it actually requires |
| Identity verification | Every access request authenticated, not just the initial network entry |
| Least privilege access | Access scoped to the minimum needed for a specific task |
| Micro segmentation | Network divided so lateral movement is contained, not just perimeter defended |
| Continuous monitoring | Access patterns evaluated ongoing, not just at login |
That table names the components. The harder part, and the part most vendor pitches skip, is the order in which an organization actually implements them.
Organizations that attempt zero trust as a single, comprehensive rollout tend to stall, since the scope quickly exceeds what any team can execute without disrupting normal operations. Organizations that succeed tend to sequence the work, starting with identity infrastructure before touching network segmentation.
That sequencing is not arbitrary. Identity is the hard dependency underneath every other component of the model. Microsegmentation without solid identity verification just creates smaller trusted zones rather than removing the underlying trust assumption. Continuous monitoring without reliable identity data produces noise rather than usable signal. Getting identity right first is what makes everything built on top of it actually function as intended.
IT Security Guru’s coverage of automated tools in SaaS penetration testing touches a related sequencing question from a different angle: the growing reliance on automation to keep pace with continuous verification demands, which is exactly the kind of tooling that becomes necessary once an organization’s zero trust model matures past the identity foundation stage.
Organizations that skip the identity-first ordering often end up with what looks like a zero trust deployment on paper but functions as a rebranded VLAN structure underneath, technically segmented but still relying on implicit trust once a user or device gets past the initial checkpoint.
Rather than relying on vendor definitions, it helps to work from the actual specification. NIST Special Publication 800-207 lays out the zero trust architecture in detail, defining the core logical components and the tenets that distinguish a genuine implementation from marketing language attached to conventional network security.
The standard makes it clear that zero trust is a set of principles guiding architecture decisions, not a single product or technology you can buy and deploy wholesale. That framing alone rules out a large share of what gets marketed under the term, since a genuine implementation touches identity management, policy enforcement, and monitoring together rather than any one of them in isolation.
A few honest checks separate genuine progress toward zero trust from a relabeled version of existing network security. Evaluate access decisions per request based on current context, not grant broad access once a user authenticates at the start of a session. Policy enforcement should apply consistently, whether a request originates inside or outside the traditional network boundary. Monitoring should also detect anomalous access patterns after the fact, not just block unauthorized access at the point of entry.
An organization that cannot clearly explain how it makes access decisions on a per-request basis is likely still operating on the old trust model, whatever the marketing materials on its security stack claim.
It is a security model that requires continuous verification of every access request, regardless of whether it originates inside or outside the traditional network perimeter, removing the assumption that internal network location implies trustworthiness.
Identity verification is the dependency the rest of the model relies on. Segmentation and monitoring without reliable identity data produce smaller trusted zones or noisy alerts, rather than genuinely removing implicit trust.
Access decisions should be evaluated per request based on current context, not granted broadly after initial login, and policy enforcement should apply consistently regardless of where a request originates.
No. NIST’s foundational specification describes it as a set of architectural principles, not a single purchasable technology. A genuine implementation brings together identity, policy enforcement, and monitoring rather than relying on any one component alone.
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Vega, the pioneer of Agentic Cyber Defense, today announced the appointment of Scott Simkin as Chief Marketing Officer. Simkin joins as Vega II unleashes the best model trained for cyber defense to transform every alert, across all data sources, into a conclusive verdict at the speed of the attack. The platform keeps every lesson and gets faster with every fight, so defenders can finally outpace adversarial AI.
“Once a generation, a company changes how security gets done. For Cyber Defense in the age of AI, that company is Vega,” said Shay Sandler, co-founder and CEO of Vega. “Scott built the stories and execution engine behind the two biggest names in security operations. Now he will help Vega define the post-SIEM era. There is no one I would rather have leading this charge.”
Simkin is one of the industry’s best-known storytellers, having twice helped define a category and drive growth at massive scale. At Palo Alto Networks, he served as Vice President of Marketing for the end-to-end Cortex platform, one of the fastest-growing portfolios spanning security operations, cloud security, and Unit 42 services, with annual revenue approaching $2 billion. Earlier, he helped pioneer the XDR category, which has since replaced EDR as the standard for modern endpoint security. At CrowdStrike, he led product marketing, technical marketing, portfolio positioning, and campaigns across the full Falcon platform. He also launched Falcon Next-Gen SIEM, which CrowdStrike says now exceeds $600 million in annual recurring revenue. Two years after founding, Vega already defends some of the world’s largest banks, healthcare providers, and Fortune 200 enterprises, and Simkin joins to turn that momentum into dominant market leadership.
“For three years, CISOs have asked me the same question about AI in their SOC: isn’t this just an iteration on the SIEM? They were right, and Vega is the answer,” said Simkin. “AI across all your data, in place, without moving or ingesting it. Better outcomes, faster, at a lower total cost. That’s Vega, and no one else comes close. I’m grateful for a career at the companies that built this market, and I’ve never been more certain about where Cyber Defense is going. Vega has the technology and the people this moment demands. There was only one choice.”
Experience Vega II at Cyber Defense at the Frontier on Oct. 21, 2026, at 8 a.m. PT / 11 a.m. ET / 4 p.m. BST.
Read the blog · Register for the virtual summit · Get a demo today
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Certes has received Frost & Sullivan’s 2026 Global Enabling Technology Leadership Recognition in post-quantum cryptography (PQC), following an independent evaluation of vendors in the market.
The recognition centres on a problem most security teams are now facing: migrating embedded cryptography across legacy applications, cloud environments and critical infrastructure will take years, but “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks mean data intercepted today could be exposed once sufficiently powerful quantum computers arrive. Frost & Sullivan notes that the risk is greatest for data with long regulatory, legal or commercial lifespans, and that protecting it needs to run in parallel with the longer migration effort rather than wait for it to finish.
At the heart of Certes’ platform is its Cryptographic Abstraction Layer (CAL), which sits between applications and infrastructure and lifts cryptographic protection out of the underlying technology stack. Rather than waiting for each vendor to ship a quantum-safe update and then managing disruptive upgrades, security teams can manage cryptographic change centrally and apply it to data flowing between systems.
The platform comprises the Certes Enforcement Point (CEP), which encrypts and decrypts within the data path, and the Certes Policy Manager (CPM), which manages policies and cryptographic controls centrally. Frost & Sullivan singled out its policy-specific key architecture as a key differentiator: each policy-controlled application or data flow can have its own key material, separate rotation schedules and customer-controlled key components. This is combined with quantum-based random number generation and customer-owned keys to support data sovereignty.
Certes’ patented Layer 4 payload protection encrypts the payload while preserving original network headers, so routing, QoS, monitoring, SD-WAN and flow visibility tools continue to work without applications being rewritten or networks re-architected. Deployment options span physical appliances, virtual machines on VMware ESXi, KVM, Red Hat and Nutanix AHV, and Windows and Linux client agents. Version 7 extends enforcement closer to workloads and users through expanded agent and cloud deployment options, reducing unprotected segments in the data’s journey.
The report also highlights uses beyond PQC migration. Cryptographic segmentation can separate IT and OT environments and limit lateral movement in flat networks, while a virtual air gap capability can dynamically isolate critical applications, data flows and backups during an active attack while preserving recovery. Certes’ encryption can also stop sensitive data being exposed to internal or external LLMs, giving organisations tighter governance over AI adoption.
Ozgun Pelit, Senior Industry Analyst at Frost & Sullivan, said: “Certes stands out in the emerging post-quantum security market through its focus on protecting data independently of the applications and infrastructure around it. Its combination of cryptographic abstraction, crypto-agility and centralized policy enforcement provides organisations with a practical way to reduce near-term quantum risk while navigating what will inevitably be a complex, multi-year migration.”
Paul German, CEO at Certes, said: “The next cryptographic revolution could arrive before many organizations have finished implementing the last one. Post-quantum cryptography is only the beginning. As AI and quantum technologies advance, cryptographic change will accelerate, and organisations cannot afford to rebuild their applications, networks and security infrastructure every time it happens.”
He added: “In a world where cryptography must constantly evolve, the ability to change it without changing everything else isn’t a luxury. It’s a necessity.”
The full Frost & Sullivan report is available HERE
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Receiving a transaction notification is only the first step. Production software still has to decide whether that event is safe to turn into application state.
A WebSocket callback can arrive in milliseconds. What happens afterward is harder. The XRP Price may be the public-facing metric most people associate with the asset, but developers integrating the XRP Ledger have a different concern. A long-running service has to detect transactions, determine whether their outcomes are final, and update local application state without acting twice or acting too soon.
A WebSocket connection can save an application from constantly polling for new activity. On a Linux service, that means keeping the connection open and listening for the XRP Ledger events the application cares about.
The XRP Ledger’s subscribe documentation explains how applications can listen for ledger activity, transactions, and account-related events. The transactions stream reports transactions associated with closed ledgers. The transactions_proposed stream goes further and can include proposed activity that never reaches a validated ledger.
That makes an incoming notification useful, but not necessarily authoritative. A service that treats every notification as an instruction to change business state can act before the ledger has established a final result.
For a payment service, the event is where processing begins.
Transaction notifications can include a validated field. When validated is true, the transaction has been included in a validated ledger and its outcome is final.
A service might see a payment involving an account tied to an order and immediately tell a fulfillment system to release the product. If that payment came from proposed activity and has not reached a validated ledger, the application has acted before it knows the final outcome.
Validation is only the first check. Transaction metadata also includes TransactionResult. A transaction can be final without producing the successful result the application expected, so inclusion in a validated ledger should not be treated as proof that a payment succeeded.
For payments, delivered_amount is the field that shows what actually reached the destination. That can matter when the amount requested and the amount ultimately delivered are not identical.
Before an order changes state, the service needs to know whether the transaction is final, whether it succeeded, and what value actually arrived.
In Booz Allen’s isolated OT lab, AI models met every objective across eight scenarios and reached an industrial control network from a perimeter compromise in just over 16 minutes.
The post AI Agents Navigate Unfamiliar OT Systems and Move Equipment in Minutes, Booz Allen Finds appeared first on SecurityWeek.
ABB previously published an advisory warning about possible probing of a dynovaPRO vulnerability.
The post ICS Patch Tuesday: Siemens Issues 17 Advisories, Rockwell Fixes ArmorBlock Takeover Flaw appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The United Kingdom has issued economic sanctions against Cryptomus, a chameleonic cryptocurrency platform that experts say serves as a major conduit for payments related to ransomware, narcotics, darknet markets, fraud and cybercrime services that are helping Russia circumvent existing financial restrictions.

Heleket’s support agent on Telegram claims, despite all evidence to the contrary, that it is not affiliated with Cryptomus. Image: Richard Sanders.
On October 8, the U.K. issued sanctions (PDF) against Cryptomus — previously known as Certa Payments and Xeltox Enterprises — for processing payments that benefit the Russian government and its financial institutions. The sanctions freeze any Cryptomus assets at U.K. banks, and bar British companies from offering it any business, virtual or otherwise. Also targeted in these sanctions were the virtual payment platforms VexPay, TokenSpot, and the Tsunami Payments service.
As explained in our December 2024 investigation, “How Cryptocurrency Turns to Cash in Russian Banks,” Cryptomus has been a key payment processor for dozens of Russian cryptocurrency exchanges and websites hawking cybercrime services. The company has changed its name several times since emerging in 2022, most recently to “Heleket” last year after Canada levied a record CAD $176 million fine against the platform for anti-money laundering violations.
The blockchain data-crunching firm Chainalysis said the U.K. sanctions target the broader infrastructure supporting Russia’s wartime economy.
“Cryptomus and Heleket have emerged as major payment hubs for illicit activity,” Chainalysis wrote in an October 8 blog post. “Together, these services received more illicit funds across tracked categories than the mixers in our dataset and the number of illicit counterparties surged to more than 900 in a single month in late 2025.”

The Cryptomus support bot on Telegram, responding on Oct. 8 to an inquiry by saying the platform was suddenly unable to process transactions.
In April 2026, the blockchain analysis firm TRM Labs found Cryptomus had processed more than $7 billion in transactions since its inception in 2022, including transactions associated with child sexual abuse material vendors, terrorist financing networks, and human trafficking operations.
TRM noted that Cryptomus’s transaction volume cratered after the platform instituted new “know your customer” or KYC rules, and that the cryptocurrency platform responded to the Canadian fines by launching Heleket as a parallel service that continued to offer no-KYC payment processing.
Richard Sanders is a blockchain analyst and investigator who spent months mapping out Cryptomus’s payment infrastructure and transacting with its customers. Sanders said the U.K. sanctions on Cryptomus are important because Canada’s sanctions against the platform were ultimately unenforceable and uncollectible.
“A fine doesn’t stop a cryptocurrency payment processor from processing payments,” Sanders wrote on LinkedIn. “Sanctions kill the operation. The distinction matters.”
As our 2024 investigation noted, Cryptomus shared a Vancouver address with dozens of other foreign currency dealers and money transfer businesses — none of which appeared to be physically located there. Following the CAD $176 million fine for alleged money laundering violations, Cryptomus appealed the penalty, launched Heleket as a parallel service, and kept on processing large volumes of sketchy transactions, Sanders said.
Sanders said the sanctions also are notable because they are the first known instance of a “Five Eyes” country (referring to the Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S.) sanctioning a cryptocurrency operation incorporated in another Five Eyes jurisdiction.
Where do entities like Cryptomus and Heleket derive their authority to offer international financial services? The answer appears to involve fake financial institutions overseen by a phony regulatory body positioned in a country that is not widely recognized as a sovereign nation.
Our 2024 investigation found the sole shareholder of Cryptomus’s parent company Certa Payments was a 25-year-old Ukrainian woman who also headed several other firms, including the WS Management and Advisory Corporation, which bills itself as the regulatory body that exclusively oversees licenses for cryptocurrency, foreign exchange and online gaming businesses incorporated in the disputed region in northwest Africa known as the Western Sahara.
That entity’s website — crasadr.com — says it assists applicants with bank setup and formation, online gaming licenses, and the creation and licensing of foreign exchange brokers. One of Certa Payments’ former sites — certa[.]website — also shared a server with 12 other domains, including rasd-state[.]ws, a website for the Central Reserve Authority of the Western Sahara.

The website crasadr dot com, the official website of the Central Reserve Authority of Western Sahara, which lists the entities awarded licenses for cryptocurrencies, gaming and foreign exchange services.
The cybersecurity startup plans to expand engineering and go-to-market teams in the US and UK.
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This summit is laser-focused on the next generation of Zero Trust and Identity security, moving beyond theory to deliver actionable strategies.
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Backed by a federal court order, Microsoft and Health-ISAC seized domains powering YAM Store, CoGUI, and Iron Man.
The post Microsoft Disrupts Chinese-Language Phishing Market Behind 1B+ Messages appeared first on SecurityWeek.

They were victims, not abusers. That’s what they told police officers, attorneys, visitors and anyone else who would listen. It didn’t matter. The women were all taken to a sprawling immigration detention center in the woods of west Michigan and handed thin jumpsuits — red, to mark them as a high security risk.
Inside the North Lake Processing Center, they talked about the men whose calls to police landed them there. The boyfriends or husbands who threatened to get them deported and cut them off from their children. The men, or sometimes women, who hit them, pulled their hair or choked them, bruising their throats.
They didn’t know where to go for help before, but now, in the confines of a cold cellblock in a former prison, the women helped one another. If one spoke to somebody on the outside who could connect them with advice, legal aid or money for the commissary, she’d pass around a tablet used for calls so others could tell their stories.
Migladys Bermudez, an immigration attorney in southeast Michigan, remembers a call in May from a Peruvian woman detained at North Lake. Her name was Pilar, and she’d heard about Bermudez from a fellow detainee who had been a client. Pilar told Bermudez about the boyfriend she tried to escape before her arrest, when she used makeup to cover the marks she said he left on her face. But he had accused her of being the abuser, resulting in her arrest.
Pilar handed the tablet to a Cuban woman named Leya. Over the echoes of the other detainees’ chatter, she described how her boyfriend insulted her, isolated her and gave her a black eye. Then, after grabbing him by the arm during an argument, she was the one behind bars, separated from their nursing daughter. On video calls, the girl didn’t seem to recognize her mother anymore. She stopped calling her “Mamá.”
Bermudez was taken aback. All three women in that chain — the former client, Pilar and Leya — said they were trying to get out of abusive relationships when they were arrested by local police on domestic violence allegations. In all three cases, the charges were dropped or never filed at all. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained the first woman during a routine check-in a few months after her charges were dropped. The others were handed over to ICE by local officials.
It’s long been intimidating for immigrants who suffered abuse to call 911, regardless of who was in the White House. They knew — and their abusers knew — that their immigration status made them vulnerable. But previous administrations treated victims as just that, people who needed help, not as targets for deportation. Bipartisan coalitions in Congress have long supported the Violence Against Women Act, which creates a pathway toward legal status for immigrants who are victims of domestic violence or other serious crimes.
Now, under President Donald Trump, all bets are off. On inauguration day, his administration rescinded guidelines that largely prevented immigration agents from making arrests at sensitive locations — including domestic violence shelters and hospitals. About a week later, the administration eliminated key protections granted to VAWA applicants and other crime victims. For the first time in decades, immigration authorities could disregard those protections and more freely arrest, detain and deport immigrant victims.
Life became more harrowing in other ways for immigrants who were victims of domestic violence. Federal immigration agents made arrests outside specialized domestic violence courts. And the administration persuaded more and more local police and jails to carry out the president’s mass deportation campaign, sweeping still more immigrants into custody.
Even communities without these so-called 287(g) agreements are helping the government round people up. In west Michigan’s Kent County, where Pilar and Leya were arrested, the county jail turned over more immigrants to ICE in the first six months of 2026 than it did during the entire Biden administration.
Advocates across the country say they’re seeing signs of an alarming increase in the numbers of domestic violence victims who are detained and deported. And many immigrants are staying in abusive relationships, fearful of calling for help or even stepping outside their homes.
“It’s just probably the most dangerous time for immigrant women right now who are victims of domestic violence,” said Bermudez, who took on Leya’s immigration case.
The arrest and detention of domestic violence victims is, in part, an unanticipated consequence of an effort meant to keep them safe. In much of the country, law enforcement officers are encouraged — or even required — to make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a domestic violence assault has taken place. Sometimes victims are mistaken as the abuser and taken into custody. Then, if they’re immigrants, they can be turned over to ICE — even if they were never criminally charged.
There’s no comprehensive way to track how often this happens or how many domestic violence victims have been detained by ICE or deported. But ProPublica spoke with a half-dozen alleged victims who were locked up together in a single facility, North Lake, and reviewed police records about others who were there, too. Their stories offer a picture of why Congress created programs like VAWA in the first place, and what’s at stake when those guardrails are taken away.
A coalition of immigrant survivors and advocates have sued the Trump administration, saying changes to how immigrant victims are treated not only undermined public safety, but also broke promises enshrined in federal law and policy.
“We were seeing our clients be more scared, be systematically targeted, be arrested, and deported very quickly,” said Kathleen Rivas, supervising attorney of the survivors team at Public Counsel, a law firm that’s involved in the litigation.
In May, a federal judge ordered the government to restore protections while the case played out. The Trump administration has appealed the order.
White House spokesperson Lauren Bis said in a statement that ICE is targeting the “worst of the worst.” The real story, she added, is the “American women whose lives have been taken by illegal alien criminals.” A spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security said in a statement that “we will never apologize for deporting illegal aliens, because that’s how we save lives.”
But Leya, Pilar and other immigrants we interviewed have no criminal records. And advocates said communities are less safe now because immigrants are afraid to call police when their partners hurt them. This gives more ammunition to the threats of their abusers, said Casey Carter Swegman, director of public policy at the Tahirih Justice Center, a national nonprofit that advocates for immigrant survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault and human trafficking.
“Certainly more immigrant survivors are feeling like the violence and abuse they experience behind the closed door is somehow more tolerable than the violence and abuse they could experience if they tried to leave,” she said.

The first time her boyfriend’s fist slammed into her face was in July 2025, Leya recalled. They were living in Florida with his relatives. Only a month before, Leya gave birth to their daughter.
One night, she said, he heard her laugh in the kitchen with his mother and a man his mother was dating. Leya’s boyfriend flew into a jealous rage, she said, and punched her a few feet from their sleeping baby.
Leya called 911 but hung up when the operator answered. She was afraid of what might happen. She was 26; her boyfriend was a decade her senior. Leya, a recent immigrant from Cuba, had applied for status and was in active immigration proceedings. She said he was a permanent resident, with permission to work in the U.S. and better command of English. She felt trapped.
Sheriff’s deputies arrived and spoke with Leya and her boyfriend. They took photos of her puffy and bruised face, with the white of her left eye bright red. Her boyfriend said the injury occurred during an “argument,” according to the report, but he didn’t specify how. He was arrested on suspicion of domestic battery.
Leya said her boyfriend’s mother threw her out that night. Unsure of where to go, she and her daughter moved in with another one of his relatives. Pursuing a criminal case felt daunting. She said his relatives urged her to drop the charges and reconcile with him. Eventually, she asked prosecutors to drop the charge because the battery took place in “a moment of impulse that he feels very sorry for,” records show. Her boyfriend didn’t enter a plea before the case was dismissed.
Like other immigrants interviewed for this story, Leya asked not to be fully identified because of her pending immigration case, and because she worries about repercussions for her and her daughter.
She and Pilar also asked that ProPublica not interview their alleged abusers because they’re afraid the men will interfere with their cases, hurt them or take away their children. To report their stories and get their partners’ perspective, we reviewed records from law enforcement, immigration court proceedings and habeas corpus petitions seeking their release from detention. We also interviewed attorneys, family and others who interacted with them.
Soon after the Florida arrest, Leya and her boyfriend moved to the city of Wyoming, Michigan, a suburb of Grand Rapids that’s a magnet for immigrants who come for jobs in manufacturing and food processing. The unpretentious city is dotted with temporary staffing agencies, money-wiring businesses and Mexican restaurants.
Leya said their relationship worsened. Her boyfriend pushed her, pulled her hair and broke her phone, she said. He made her delete her social media accounts and isolated her from friends and family. They fought about money and talked about breaking up. One night in April, during an argument, he called the police.
“I’m having problems with my wife,” he said in Spanish, according to a recording of the call. The operator asked if there had been any violence. “No, no, no. None,” he said. “Just a discussion.”
He told officers who came to their apartment complex that Leya got angry because he had talked to an ex-girlfriend, according to body camera footage and a police report. When he tried to leave, he said, Leya pushed him and grabbed his arm. Then she attempted to hang up his phone when he dialed 911.
He said he wasn’t injured, though he accused her of hitting him several times a few days earlier.
Officers interviewed his brother, who mentioned the arrest in Florida, according to bodycam footage. “They had a cycle of problems where she called the police for abuse and he was detained for three days,” he said in Spanish. “My brother is trying to avoid having that happen again.”
The police report doesn’t mention the earlier arrest.
Footage of the interview with Leya was redacted due to state privacy laws, in part because she was interviewed inside their residence, unlike her boyfriend, who was interviewed outside. According to the police report, she “minimized” the argument and said there was no physical contact. She acknowledged trying to hang up the phone.
In an interview with ProPublica, Leya said they argued when she learned he sent money to his ex-girlfriend, who is the mother of his son. At the same time, she said, he had told her he couldn’t afford to buy diapers for their daughter. She said she has never hit him.
Officers arrested Leya on suspicion of domestic assault and interfering with a 911 call. They didn’t arrest her boyfriend or seek charges against him. Leya said she didn’t tell officers she was a victim of abuse because she thought she’d be able to tell a judge.
She never got a chance.

The Wyoming Police Department’s written policy encourages officers to make an arrest in incidents involving domestic violence “when there is reasonable cause to believe an assault was committed.”
Arrests demonstrate that “violence in the home is recognized as a serious crime,” according to Michigan’s law enforcement training manual on domestic violence. This approach is common across the country. Twenty-four states require an arrest when there’s probable cause of a domestic assault.
But domestic violence scenes can be chaotic, with both partners accusing each other of being the aggressor. It can be difficult for officers to understand what happened, said Erin Ross, a former domestic violence prosecutor who works at the national nonprofit Vera Institute of Justice. Sometimes, the wrong person ends up in handcuffs.
“The complexity of DV situations can thus lead to survivors being criminalized by the very system meant to protect them,” Ross and her co-authors wrote in a 2025 report about the effects of arrests on domestic violence survivors.
The Vera report doesn’t touch on immigration. But Ross and a dozen other domestic violence advocates across the country told ProPublica that immigrants who don’t speak English or understand their rights are, under the Trump administration, especially vulnerable to an arrest that can have irreversible consequences.
ProPublica reviewed hundreds of habeas corpus petitions filed nationwide since January 2025, in which immigrants challenged their ICE detention on constitutional grounds. We found dozens of petitioners who were arrested on suspicion of domestic violence and turned over to ICE, even though they were never charged or their charges were dropped. Using jail and police records from Florida and Michigan, as well as news reports, we identified even more cases.
In their petitions, several immigrants said that officers mistook them for the aggressor. The underlying arrest records show that officers often had to make close calls in messy cases where it was unclear who was the victim and who was the aggressor. Either way, under Trump, there’s little grace for immigrants.
In one case in Florida, a state where sheriff’s offices cooperate with immigration authorities, a deputy came upon a Venezuelan couple arguing in the street in November 2025. In his report, the deputy said the woman pulled at her husband’s pants, necklace and arm, leaving marks on his body. The woman said her husband had taken her keys and phone. She didn’t want to be left stranded, she said, so she ran after him.
She was charged with misdemeanor battery; her husband wasn’t charged. The woman was turned over to ICE while the case was pending. Prosecutors later dropped charges. The sheriff’s report didn’t mention any allegations of prior domestic violence, but the woman later said that, during their marriage, her husband had beaten her and threatened to kill her. In her habeas corpus petition, she said she was “afraid to report the abuse to the police.”
The woman was released in May, but during the five months she was incarcerated, her husband took their daughters out of state, her attorney told ProPublica. She still hasn’t seen the girls in person.
For Leya, it was a shock to find herself handcuffed, sitting in the back of a police cruiser, headed toward the Kent County jail. She was silent during the 15-minute ride, unable to make sense of what had just happened: “I had suffered from domestic violence,” she said. “But the one who ended up in trouble was me.”
The next day, a detective asked the prosecutor’s office to file charges against her. Prosecutors declined to do so, saying there was insufficient evidence, there were no injuries and Leya hadn’t successfully interfered with the phone call.
Still, she wasn’t released.
Leya had no criminal history, apart from this arrest, according to a DHS record. But her fingerprints had been run against state and federal databases, flagging ICE officials who could match them with her prints from when she arrived in the U.S. In addition, Leya said, a jail official asked about her status, and she told him she was waiting for an immigration court hearing.
ICE issued a detainer, essentially asking the jail to hold Leya until agents could pick her up. Kent County officials honored their request. A day later, Leya was at the detention center in the woods.

She cried in despair over her daughter. They’d never been separated. The 80 miles between Wyoming and North Lake seemed infinite. Her breasts ached from the drying milk. Leya wondered whether she’d be deported and if their separation would be permanent.
From a narrow window in her cell, she saw people outside holding signs, protesting ICE. She could hear their chants in English. Though she had trouble understanding them, she felt comforted by the care of strangers.
Inside, she familiarized herself with the routines. She spent most of her time in a large, open room with other women in red. Cameras eyed them as they talked about their children and upcoming court dates. They shared contact information for relatives in their home countries in case one of them got deported and had nowhere to go. To pass the hours, they watched telenovelas, played rounds of Uno and pieced together jigsaw puzzles of forests and farms.
Leya grew close to a few women from Latin America and Eastern Europe who said they, too, had been in abusive relationships. Several had called police for help, records show. A Honduran woman said her partner tried to choke her. A Dominican woman said her husband, a U.S. citizen, hit her, pulled her hair and chased her with a stick.
Then there was Pilar, Leya’s first cellmate. The asylum seeker from Peru had also been arrested on suspicion of domestic violence in the city of Wyoming.
Pilar, her boyfriend and her teenage daughter called 911 five times in the 15 months before her arrest, records show. On one occasion, Pilar’s daughter said she worried that the boyfriend would hurt her mom; according to bodycam footage, Pilar assured officers that everything was fine. On another, the man said he experienced mental abuse and wanted to find a shelter. On yet another, Pilar said she just wanted him to leave.
None of these calls ended in an arrest. Officers ensured that the boyfriend had another place to stay when he sought help, and they told Pilar to call back if he tried to return and hurt her, according to the footage. They advised the couple to go to civil court for future disputes over money and property.
In an interview with ProPublica from North Lake, Pilar, 48, said that her boyfriend took financial advantage of her and physically assaulted her. And in her habeas corpus petition, she described the relationship as one of “physical, mental, psychological, economic abuse.” Her sister took a photo of the bruises around Pilar’s neck and feared the worst. “I would tell her to leave that man,” she said.
Pilar said she was ashamed to go to her job at a food-processing plant with bruises on her face. She wondered what her co-workers would think. She distanced herself from relatives and friends. Pilar said she never told the police the full story because she worried about the possible repercussions — not for herself, but for her boyfriend. She didn’t want him to be deported. Despite everything, she loved him and felt he loved her.
One night in October 2025, her boyfriend drove up to their apartment complex in a rental car. The couple argued in the parking lot. He called 911.
“I need police,” he said over and over in English.
Pilar called moments later: “This man is leaving my house and he’s not giving me my keys,” she screamed in Spanish. “This man has hurt me. He has scratched my whole arm.”
When officers arrived, they separated the couple. The boyfriend said that Pilar slapped his head, grabbed his shirt and tried to pull him out of the car while he was in the driver’s seat, according to bodycam footage and the police report. One side of his T-shirt was torn. He said he never assaulted Pilar and any injuries were her own fault. “I’ve never hit her,” he said in Spanish.
He told officers that he’d become a U.S. permanent resident two months earlier and that Pilar was jealous. “She is making this up because she knows she can get papers,” he said.
Pilar insisted she was the victim. She showed officers the scratch marks on her arm and said her boyfriend was to blame. She begged them to make him return the apartment keys, according to bodycam footage and a police report. “I’ve been trying to kick him out for a while and he won’t leave, and he doesn’t want to help pay the rent,” she said in Spanish.
An officer asked how her boyfriend’s shirt got ripped. Pilar said she grabbed onto him when he started driving away in order to avoid being dragged by the car. The officer asked her several more times about the ripped shirt. Pilar told him she wanted to speak to a lawyer.
In their report, police noted that the boyfriend had called 911 first. His shirt was ripped. Pilar’s wasn’t. If the boyfriend had thrown her down, the officer wrote, then her shirt should have been ripped because he was “much taller and heavier (around 80lbs more).”
Her boyfriend wasn’t arrested. Pilar was.
Wyoming Public Safety Chief Kip Snyder declined to speak about the arrests of Pilar or Leya. In an email to ProPublica, he said officers don’t “participate in enforcing federal immigration laws. We encourage trust and cooperation with all residents and aim to ensure that everyone feels safe reporting crimes or seeking assistance.”
Shortly after Pilar’s arrest, a police detective asked the prosecutor’s office to file domestic violence charges against both her and her boyfriend.
Prosecutors declined to file any charges, citing insufficient evidence. Pilar wasn’t released. Apart from this arrest, she had no criminal history, according to DHS records. She also had a pending asylum case.
Still, ICE put a detainer on her and jail officials turned her over.

A few years earlier, Kent County Sheriff Michelle Lajoye-Young said a handoff like this wouldn’t happen.
In 2019, she announced that deputies would stop automatically honoring detainers and instead require warrants signed by a federal judge or magistrate. The move came after a U.S. citizen — a Marine combat veteran — was transferred from her jail into ICE custody.
“There needed to be a judicial oversight inserted into that process to give us the assurance that somebody wasn’t erroneously detained without due process,” Lajoye-Young said around that time.
Trump called Kent a “sanctuary jurisdiction.” The label haunted the county, which in the 2016 election voted for Trump. A national think tank that aims to reduce immigration put Kent County on its list of sanctuary communities, while Republican state lawmakers tried to compel its cooperation with federal authorities.
Yet it’s unclear whether Lajoye-Young ever delivered on her promise. ProPublica requested copies of all department policies, procedures, memos and instructions on how it handles ICE detainers since 2018. None said a judicial warrant was needed. ProPublica also asked for copies of judicial warrants for Pilar and Leya. The county said no such records exist.
Lajoye-Young, who retired last week, declined interview requests. Sgt. Scott Dietrich, a spokesperson for the sheriff’s office, didn’t directly answer questions about whether the policy was ever implemented. But in a statement he said that detainers are “handled under applicable law and established policy, consistent with our commitment to public safety, due process, and fair and impartial enforcement.”
Gema Lowe, an organizer with the local chapter of an immigrant rights group, said the sheriff had backtracked on her promise and wasn’t being forthright. “I don’t understand why they’re being secretive,” she said.
The shift deepened the mistrust among immigrants in a county with one of the state’s fastest-growing immigrant populations. Lowe, an immigrant herself from Mexico, said she advises victims to think twice before reporting domestic violence to the police because of the risk of arrest and deportation, while pointing them to other local resources like shelters.
She and others said the stakes are especially high now. ICE arrests have skyrocketed under Trump. Nobody is off limits, including immigrants with pending asylum claims and no criminal records.
And more local authorities are helping ICE make arrests. In January 2025, fewer than 150 state and local law enforcement agencies had signed 287(g) agreements with DHS to help carry out the president’s deportation agenda. That number has ballooned to more than 2,600 today.
“Partnerships with law enforcement are critical to having the resources we need to arrest criminal illegal aliens across the country,” a DHS spokesperson said. “We have had tremendous success when local law enforcement works together with us.”
Kent County doesn’t have a 287(g) agreement. Still, the jail hands over the vast majority of people with detainers to ICE, records show. Dozens of people who were turned over to ICE this year had their criminal charges dropped, or, like Pilar and Leya, were never charged in the first place.
Dietrich said the dismissal of a criminal charge “does not, by itself, mean the original arrest lacked probable cause.” The sheriff’s office also doesn’t “determine whether criminal charges are ultimately prosecuted, nor does it determine whether an individual is deported,” he said.
DHS told ProPublica in a statement that both Leya and Pilar “illegally entered the country” in 2022 and that both “will receive due process” in their immigration proceedings.
Kent County Prosecutor Chris Becker said he hadn’t heard of victims getting detained by ICE after calling the police. In his experience, he said, more perpetrators with active cases get deported.
Becker said he tries to get the message out that his team serves all victims, regardless of their immigration status. He’s aware that immigrants are reluctant to seek help. His own staff has told him that victims are afraid to testify or file restraining orders. They don’t want their partners — often the breadwinners and the fathers of their children — to be deported.
“There’s been a chilling impact to women coming forward in domestic violence situations due to what’s going on,” Becker said.

As the months passed at North Lake, Leya watched as women she befriended started to leave.
Some were deported, including at least two Mexican women who were also arrested in Kent County on suspicion of domestic violence. Others were released. New women took their cells. Some told Leya that they, too, had been arrested after 911 calls about domestic violence.
Leya fought for her freedom. She met with volunteers from Kent County, who raised money to hire her lawyers and pay for a required physical exam and fees. Even her ex-boyfriend, the one who she said gave her a black eye, wrote a letter on her behalf to help her case, calling her “a calm person.” He explained that he had called the police after their argument “escalated” and that “problems are situations that can happen in any relationship.”
Leya, he added, “deserves a second opportunity to remain in this country and be close to our daughter, as our baby truly needs her very much.” While Leya was locked up, their little girl celebrated her first birthday, got her first teeth and took her first steps.
At virtual hearings, Leya sat with her arms crossed, her dark, wavy hair neatly braided in cornrows and wearing an oversized coat over her red uniform. She tried to follow the discussion of people who seemed to have her life in their hands.
In late August, a judge granted Leya bond. While her immigration case played out, she could be free.
It was a profound relief. At the same time, it felt awful to leave behind her friends. It seemed like some of them were never getting out. Pilar was approaching a year in detention.
Four months after her arrest, Leya walked out of the old prison. She thought about how she would live on her own now and support her daughter.
She promised herself she wouldn’t go back to the man who hurt her.
The post These Women Were Trying to Escape Domestic Abuse. ICE Detained Them Instead. appeared first on ProPublica.
Investigators stormed 40 locations in Texas and seized 187 laptops used by North Korean IT workers to hide their location.
The post US Arrests Two in Crackdown on North Korean IT Worker Laptop Farms appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Last December, New Mexico officials celebrated publication of a plan to address climate change, designed to dramatically reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. A few months later, just across the state line in Texas, El Paso city officials adopted their own such plan with a similar ambition.
Each report cost millions of dollars to draft, but neither one took into account how the construction of data centers could upend climate goals in both places.
Work is underway in Doña Ana County in southern New Mexico on one of the largest data center developments in the country: Project Jupiter, built by Austin-based Oracle. Twenty miles away in El Paso, construction is underway on another massive data center, this one built by Meta Platforms.
A third, larger data center project is planned less than a 30-minute drive from the Meta site, on the Fort Bliss Army post in east El Paso.
The data centers are “going to undo a lot of the very expensive and very meaningful work a lot of people are doing,” New Mexico state climatologist Dave DuBois told El Paso Matters.
The sites are among a wave of data centers under construction across the country, driven by the rapidly escalating demand for artificial intelligence services like Claude and ChatGPT. Such projects have drawn intense scrutiny in recent months, as residents and elected officials have questioned their impact on communities’ water supplies, household electric bills and air quality. Texas alone has 596 data centers that are either in operation or planned across Texas as of early September, according to research by The Texas Tribune.
But the projects located in this population center of 1.2 million, which encompasses El Paso and parts of southern New Mexico, are particularly notable because of their combined scope. When fully built out, the three data centers, each with its own power plant, will emit millions of tons of greenhouse gas emissions, equivalent to the planet-warming emissions released by more than two million cars in a year.
They will also release air pollutants like particulate matter and nitrogen oxides, which directly affect local air quality and human health. The Meta and Project Jupiter data centers are expected to release these kinds of pollutants at relatively low levels, according to paperwork submitted to state regulators. But even a small increase in air pollution can still negatively impact communities close to and downwind of the data center sites, said Shaolei Ren, a professor of electrical and computer engineering at University of California, Riverside.
“The health impacts can be significant for local communities,” Ren said.
Because Project Jupiter, Meta and the Fort Bliss data centers are in two different states, and because there is no single federal regulation governing climate change or emissions, regulators have largely considered the projects’ impacts separately.
“We’ve never had a national climate law passed by Congress,” said Ari Peskoe, director of the Electricity Law Initiative at Harvard Law School. “And so what we’ve had in this country are primarily state and local efforts.”
The result is that officials in one state have little say over a project happening minutes away from them.
Texas and New Mexico also take different approaches to dealing with climate change. New Mexico has codified greenhouse gas reduction targets into state law; Texas has not.

New Mexico state Rep. Sarah Silva, a Democrat, represents the community of Chaparral, directly across the state line from Meta’s data center site in northeast El Paso. Her state has the power to regulate air quality and impose noise requirements, but only in New Mexico, not at a Texas construction site, even if it’s only a few hundred yards away.
Likewise, residents living in west El Paso across the state line from Project Jupiter have no say in the project despite sharing an aquifer that crosses the state boundary. Emissions do not remain within the state where they originate, Silva said.
“This is why we need federal regulation,” said Silva. “How do we knit something together that makes sense for our region when actually this is the job of the federal government?”
Though they profess a desire to mitigate the impacts of climate change, local governments in El Paso and Doña Ana counties green-lit these projects in a part of the country seeing rapidly rising temperatures. The counties offered Meta and Project Jupiter tax incentives in exchange for corporate investment in their communities, job creation and, hopefully, the ability to attract more technology companies to the region.
State officials have also provided incentives. More than a decade ago, Texas legislators approved a data center sales tax break, which exempts the facilities from paying sales tax on equipment they purchase, a decision that could now cost the state $3.2 billion in revenue over the next two years, according to The Texas Tribune.
New Mexico lawmakers declined to advance a bill creating a similar tax break for data centers in 2021. But in 2025, they passed an unrelated law allowing large facilities such as Project Jupiter to generate their own electricity using natural gas. The law exempts these private power systems, known as microgrids, from renewable energy requirements, even as New Mexico requires electric utilities to source 50% of the power they sell from clean energy by 2030.
The power plants that keep data centers running typically produce large amounts of emissions like carbon dioxide and methane that drive global climate change over time. Combined, the plants proposed for Project Jupiter and Meta’s data center could emit up to 10 million tons of planet-warming emissions annually. Comparatively, the region spanning El Paso County and neighboring Hudspeth County released 8.4 million tons of greenhouse gases in 2019. (The Army has shared scant information about the Fort Bliss data center, so it’s not clear what level of emissions the facility will produce.)
“This does add to our greenhouse gas emissions in a massive way,” said Gunnar Schade, an associate professor of atmospheric sciences at Texas A&M University. “This is a huge source.”


Silva, the New Mexico representative, was initially supportive of Project Jupiter, in part seeing it as an opportunity to create long-term jobs. Last year, she voted in favor of a bill that included an amendment — tacked on by state Sen. Michael Padilla, a Democrat from Albuquerque — that allows facilities like Project Jupiter, which aren’t connected to the local power grid, a 20-year exemption from clean energy laws, allowing them to generate all their electricity with fossil fuels.
“We worked this bill pretty much the entire session, but it did not quite get done. So, we found a piece of legislation that was very similar,” Padilla said in an interview last year. “That’s the legislative process. You have to be very creative to get your work done.”
But Silva soon soured on the project out of concern that it won’t employ enough local workers and because it won’t rely on zero-emission renewable energy. Oracle has said the data center will have 750 full-time employees when it’s up and running. The company told Doña Ana County officials in early September that nearly 3,700 people had worked at the site during construction up to that point.
Silva and other state lawmakers have said they voted for Padilla’s bill without realizing the broader implications for a data center project in the southern part of the state.
“State regulators, state legislators, I think, were so caught off guard at the speed at which these hyperscale data centers showed up in all of our communities almost simultaneously,” Silva said. “I would support a moratorium.”

The amount of energy Project Jupiter needs is unprecedented in the region: The data center will receive electricity from an on-site power plant made up of fuel cells built by a company called Bloom Energy. Bloom has said the plant will have the ability to produce up to 2.45 gigawatts of electricity — enough to power around 1.5 million homes and more than El Paso Electric has ever supplied to its 465,000 residential and commercial customers at one time, according to the utility’s corporate reports.
New Mexico Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham, a Democrat, has specifically lauded Oracle’s promise to use fuel cells for electricity instead of natural gas turbines, which would have used more water and produced more air pollution. However, an air permit — a state-granted license that authorizes industrial facilities to emit a predetermined amount of pollution — would allow the fuel cells to produce up to 8.8 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions per year. Lujan Grisham didn’t address questions from El Paso Matters about the impact of these additional climate emissions.
The Meta power plant in El Paso could release up to 1.3 million tons of climate emissions every year, according to an estimate calculated by El Paso Matters based on El Paso Electric regulatory filings and the Environmental Protection Agency’s emissions factors. Nancy L. Seidman, a senior adviser with the Regulatory Assistance Project, a nonpartisan nonprofit focused on energy policy, confirmed the emissions estimate is sound.
“Regulators should weigh all emissions and other impacts like water usage, noise and local air pollution, which can affect public health, when they make decisions about data center projects,” Seidman wrote in an email to El Paso Matters. “This is particularly important when projects are phased over time, so that an accurate account can be made of the total, holistic impacts.”
The data center planned for Fort Bliss is expected to use 3 gigawatts of electricity that would likely be supplied by natural gas turbines, according to officials with the Department of Defense, who shared details with reporters during a briefing in April. The Army has issued few other details about the project because it is still in “exclusive negotiations” with the developer, Carlyle Group, a large publicly traded private equity firm.
Carlyle Group did not respond to a request for comment.
“These are cities in terms of their electricity consumption,” Peskoe, of Harvard Law School, said of AI hyperscale data center campuses such as Oracle’s and Meta’s. The facilities are cropping up so fast that “the pace of this and the scale of this — I think there’s no real parallel, at least for 50, 60, 70 years, but probably ever for the U.S. power industry.”
Facilities in New Mexico seeking a state air permit are required by law to disclose estimated amounts of air pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions the project will release. And the state Environment Department has spent months evaluating Project Jupiter’s air permit application, which was submitted in April. A spokesperson for the environmental department didn’t respond to emailed questions.
By contrast, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality only requires project developers to disclose information about pollutants that affect local air quality, and not about greenhouse gas emissions, which are what contribute to climate change.
So when El Paso Electric sought an air permit last fall for the Meta data center’s natural gas power plant, the utility didn’t have to share estimated greenhouse gas emissions. The Texas commission approved the permit 20 days after it was filed, following an expedited review.
Meta directed questions about its data center’s power plant to El Paso Electric. The electric company declined to share estimates of the plant’s greenhouse gas emissions but said in a statement that the Texas environmental commission had reviewed and authorized the Meta power plant “under a standard permit, which is specifically for projects with limited and well-controlled emissions.” The statement said the facility will “operate in compliance with state and federal standards.”
A spokesperson for the agency said, “All Standard Permits have gone through formal notice and comment procedures and have been adopted by the Commission in a public meeting.”
These plants will be releasing large amounts of greenhouse gases even as climate change has become increasingly evident in the El Paso metro area, which sits where Texas’ westernmost boundary meets New Mexico and northern Mexico. El Paso’s temperatures have risen faster than those of almost any other city in the U.S. since 1970, according to Climate Central, a nonprofit that quantifies climate shifts throughout the United States. Drought driven by climate change has amplified the impact of wind storms that fill the air in El Paso with hazardous dust in the spring and summertime.
This year has been the hottest on record in El Paso through the first nine months of 2026, according to the National Weather Service. Similar records have been set across the state line in New Mexico.
“If we started to do these kinds of things — having big data centers with natural-gas-fired turbines — it’s kind of like bringing back a lot of the retired plants that were more dirty, like coal,” said DuBois, the New Mexico state climatologist.
Fernando Berjano, El Paso’s climate coordinator, wouldn’t comment specifically on effects resulting from the data centers in the region, but he said the kinds of power plants tied to them produce greenhouse gases that will make it harder for the city to meet its climate goals, as well as produce air pollutants.
If emissions increase in the El Paso area, “that has an impact on air quality, that has an impact on pollution,” Berjano said, “which is something that we all know is not good.”

Although construction is already underway on the Project Jupiter and Meta data centers, regulatory hurdles remain for both facilities. The public hearing on the Project Jupiter air permit was scheduled to begin Sept. 14, but the New Mexico Supreme Court delayed it when opponents filed lawsuits challenging the state’s approval process and the facility’s use of groundwater.
The state Supreme Court last month lifted the stay. New Mexico more recently appointed an examiner to preside over the hearing that would authorize the facility’s emissions. Other legal challenges are making their way through the court system.
In Texas, El Paso Electric is still waiting for the state’s Public Utility Commission to approve construction of the power plant planned next to Meta’s data center, a decision that could come later this year.
Officials with both Project Jupiter and Meta have said they are taking steps to help mitigate the climate effects of their projects and plan to develop clean energy projects elsewhere to create new electricity sources and offset the greenhouse gases their data center power plants will release. Oracle also maintains that its emissions will be lower than what it sought in its air permit application and that it plans to get to net zero greenhouse emissions by 2031.
“Oracle is committed to building Project Jupiter responsibly and incorporating community feedback into our planning,” the company said in a statement.

The road ahead for data centers is unclear. Even once-supportive officials have softened or changed course: Last year, Lujan Grisham, New Mexico’s governor, said Project Jupiter “reaffirms New Mexico’s leadership in global trade, advanced manufacturing, and digital infrastructure.” In Texas, Gov. Greg Abbott at one point called his state “the epicenter of AI development.”
Now, amid growing opposition to Project Jupiter, Lujan Grisham recently said she takes seriously residents’ concerns about the data center “and expects any data center operating in New Mexico to meet the state’s rigorous environmental standards and use water responsibly.” This summer, Abbott called on the Texas Public Utility Commission to ensure the projects pay for their own infrastructure and don’t lead to higher electricity costs for residents. He also recommended the state Legislature pass a number of regulations related to data centers next year, many concerning water and electricity usage, and recently told the Texas Water Development Board to penalize data centers that do not report their water usage.
Abbott’s new edicts do not address air pollution or climate change, nor the effects that a data center project in one state can have on another.
Texas Democratic state Rep. Joe Moody, whose district includes much of west and northeast El Paso, near two of the data center projects, said Abbott’s proposals will likely shape the Texas Legislature’s debate over data-center-related policies next year but called them just a starting point.
“In the governor’s directives, we’re not talking about local control and local autonomy to make decisions on these projects,” he said. “And I do think that that’s a whole other lane of conversation that we’re going to get into next session.”
The post New Mexico and El Paso Spent Millions on Climate Plans. Three New Data Centers Could Undo Them. appeared first on ProPublica.
Immagine in evidenza rielaborata con l’intelligenza artificiale
Il 7 ottobre 2026, l’Agenzia Nazionale per la Cybersicurezza (ACN) ha adottato la Politica nazionale di divulgazione coordinata delle vulnerabilità (CVD: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure) e ha invitato la comunità digitale italiana a segnalare tutte le vulnerabilità zero-day, quindi ancora sconosciute, scoperte su sistemi di soggetti pubblici e privati.
Un passo in avanti, senza dubbio. Peccato che il passo in avanti fosse già previsto per legge dall’articolo 12 della Direttiva NIS2 (la normativa europea che punta rafforzare la sicurezza informatica di aziende, enti pubblici e servizi considerati critici), pubblicata in Gazzetta Ufficiale dell’Unione Europea nel dicembre 2022. Quattro anni di attesa per adempiere a un obbligo già scritto nero su bianco. È probabilmente il ritmo fisiologico della macchina pubblica italiana quando si tratta di tecnologia: la direttiva arriva, viene recepita con il decreto legislativo nel 2024, poi si aspetta un altro anno prima che qualcuno adotti gli strumenti operativi che quella norma richiedeva. Nel frattempo, però, le vulnerabilità informatiche esistono lo stesso.
La politica in sé ha una struttura ragionevole: il ricercatore segnala una vulnerabilità al CSIRT Italia (Computer Security Incident Response Team: la squadra nazionale che si occupa di gestire e coordinare la risposta agli incidenti informatici), il CSIRT si coordina con il fabbricante o il gestore del sistema vulnerabile, si trova una patch, poi si divulga.
È possibile segnalare anche in forma anonima tramite una piattaforma dedicata sul sito ACN, che però al momento non risulta ancora essere attiva. Il messaggio pubblico di ACN è persino entusiasta: la community è invitata a collaborare, gli hacker etici sono benvenuti, insieme si costruisce un ecosistema digitale più sicuro. I problemi, come spesso avviene, sono nella nota in calce, quella che nessuno commenta nei comunicati ufficiali.
La Politica CVD di ACN contiene infatti una clausola che vale la pena citare quasi alla lettera: le attività di ricerca delle vulnerabilità vanno condotte nel rispetto della legge e non devono integrare fattispecie di reato. Traduzione: segnalateci pure tutto quello che trovate, ma non aspettarti protezione se hai violato la legge.
Il punto è che in Italia la legge in questione è l’articolo 615-ter del Codice Penale, che punisce chiunque acceda abusivamente a un sistema informatico protetto da misure di sicurezza. La norma non distingue tra chi entra per rubare dati e chi entra per trovare una falla e segnalarla. I motivi del ricercatore sono, sul piano tecnico-giuridico, sostanzialmente irrilevanti: lo ha chiarito la Cassazione a Sezioni Unite nel 2012, che ha spostato il focus sulla qualità dell’accesso rispetto all’autorizzazione ricevuta. Chi accede a un sistema informatico protetto senza autorizzazione rischia di commettere un reato, indipendentemente dalle sue intenzioni.
ACN non è un’autorità giudiziaria e non può quindi garantire immunità penale a nessuno. Al massimo può impegnarsi a non sporgere querela come soggetto offeso, ma il Pubblico Ministero può comunque procedere d’ufficio. E se il sistema vulnerabile appartiene a un ente terzo, ACN non ha alcun potere su quel soggetto. L’anonimato garantito dalla piattaforma protegge l’identità del segnalante durante il processo, ma non sana retroattivamente l’accesso abusivo che ha permesso di trovare la vulnerabilità. L’unico modo per fare security research su sistemi altrui senza rischiare un procedimento penale resta quello di sempre: farsi dare l’autorizzazione. Che è un penetration test. Non una CVD.
Il Belgio ha risolto il problema nel 2022 con una norma specifica e nel 2024 l’ha consolidata nella propria legge di recepimento NIS2: chi rispetta le condizioni del safe harbor – ovvero nessun intento fraudolento, azioni proporzionate, segnalazione tempestiva al CCB (l’autorità belga competente per la cybersicurezza) e al titolare del sistema – non risponde penalmente dei reati informatici commessi nel corso della ricerca. È un’esenzione espressa, scritta nella legge, non una promessa procedurale di qualche autorità. I Paesi Bassi ci sono arrivati in modo diverso, più pragmatico: dal 2013 esiste una direttiva della Procura che orienta l’esercizio dell’azione penale verso la non-perseguibilità dei ricercatori in buona fede. Non è un’immunità formale, ma crea un livello di prevedibilità che in Italia non esiste nemmeno in forma embrionale.
La Germania nel 2024 aveva elaborato una bozza di riforma del paragrafo 202a del Codice Penale – il loro equivalente del nostro 615-ter – per escludere dalla fattispecie le attività di ricerca finalizzate alla segnalazione. La bozza è decaduta con la crisi della coalizione. Il contratto di governo CDU/CSU-SPD del 2025 l’ha ripresa con un impegno esplicito a creare certezza giuridica per la ricerca in sicurezza informatica. Non è ancora legge, ma è in agenda. La Francia ha invece una protezione debole e solo procedurale, ma almeno esiste: l’ANSSI (agenzia per la cybersicurezza francese) non è obbligata a denunciare chi segnala in buona fede. L’Italia, con la sua nuova Politica CVD, si colloca nell’unica categoria rimasta: quella dei Paesi che hanno un canale di segnalazione e nessuna tutela sostanziale.
Mentre il Belgio costruiva un safe harbor e la Germania ci provava, l’Italia approvava la Legge 90/2024 sulla cybersicurezza nazionale. Non è una legge che protegge i ricercatori: è una legge che alza le pene. Per i sistemi di interesse pubblico – sanitario, militare, di ordine pubblico, infrastrutture critiche – le pene per accesso abusivo sono passate da un massimo di cinque anni a un massimo di dieci, con aggravanti che arrivano a dodici. In questi casi, inoltre, si procede d’ufficio, senza che sia necessaria una querela. Il legislatore ha quindi deciso, nell’anno in cui si recepiva NIS2, di rendere più pericoloso fare security research proprio sui sistemi più critici: quelli dove le vulnerabilità hanno le conseguenze più gravi.
Oggi ACN invita la community a segnalare zero-day sui sistemi informatici della pubblica amministrazione o di interesse pubblico. La normativa vigente, però, continua a esporre chi individua queste vulnerabilità attraverso accessi non autorizzati al rischio di procedimenti penali, con pene che, nei casi più gravi, possono arrivare fino a dodici anni. Non c’è nessun safe harbor, nessuna proposta di legge in discussione in Parlamento, nessun indirizzo del Ministero della Giustizia che riduca anche solo l’incertezza. C’è un DDL presentato in Senato nell’aprile 2025 dal senatore Lorenzo Basso che contiene una delega generica per un safe harbor, che però non è mai stato esaminato in commissione.
La Politica CVD di ACN è un passo necessario, ma tardivo. Crea un canale, introduce l’anonimato, formalizza un processo che prima non esisteva. Per chi trova vulnerabilità senza accedere a sistemi altrui – analisi passiva, firmware acquistato, software proprio – è uno strumento utile. Per chi fa ricerca sul campo, su sistemi in produzione, nell’unico modo in cui certi bug si trovano davvero, il quadro giuridico è identico a quello di ieri: un accesso non autorizzato è un accesso non autorizzato, indipendentemente da cosa si fa dopo.
A Malta, nel 2022, quattro ricercatori hanno trovato una falla critica in un’app, l’hanno segnalata responsabilmente, e si sono ritrovati imputati. Tre anni di processo, poi la grazia presidenziale. Il premier maltese ha detto che lo Stato deve assumersi la responsabilità quando le leggi non riflettono la realtà tecnologica. In Italia stiamo ancora aspettando che qualcuno arrivi a quella conclusione. Nel frattempo, se trovate qualcosa, la domanda non è se segnalarlo. La domanda è se potete permettervi di averlo trovato.
CSIRT è l’acronimo di Computer Security Incident Response Team, ovvero una squadra specializzata nella prevenzione e nella gestione degli incidenti informatici. In Italia, il CSIRT nazionale opera all’interno dell’Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale (ACN).
Il suo compito è monitorare le minacce informatiche, individuare possibili rischi, raccogliere le segnalazioni degli attacchi e assistere le organizzazioni colpite nella gestione delle emergenze. Il CSIRT diffonde inoltre allerte e informazioni sulle vulnerabilità individuate allo scopo di prevenire nuovi incidenti.
Collabora con le autorità e con gli organismi analoghi degli altri Paesi, soprattutto europei, per condividere informazioni e coordinare le risposte alle minacce.
Con la nuova politica nazionale di divulgazione coordinata delle vulnerabilità (CVD), il CSIRT Italia svolge anche il ruolo di intermediario tra chi scopre una falla informatica e chi è responsabile del sistema vulnerabile, facilitando la segnalazione e la successiva correzione.
L'articolo L’Italia non protegge gli hacker etici proviene da Guerre di Rete.
La Cina ha lanciato una sfida tecnologica senza precedenti a Starlink, il progetto di Elon Musk per una rete internet satellitare globale. L’obiettivo? Stabilire una videochiamata tra i due poli terrestri: l’Artico e l’Antartide. Un traguardo che dimostra come Pechino stia superando i limiti delle connessioni tradizionali, entrando in diretta competizione con SpaceX.
In questo articolo analizziamo come la Cina sia riuscita a raggiungere questo risultato, il ruolo di Starlink nella sfida e le possibili implicazioni geopolitiche e tecnologiche di questa mossa strategica.
La Cina non è nuova a progetti ambiziosi nel settore delle telecomunicazioni. Con il lancio del satellite Guowang, Pechino mirava a colmare il divario con Starlink, che già contava migliaia di satelliti in orbita.
Ma quali sono gli obiettivi di questa sfida? Da un lato, la Cina vuole ridurre la dipendenza dalle tecnologie occidentali. Dall’altro, punta a garantire connessioni stabili anche nelle regioni più remote, come i poli. Una strategia che potrebbe ridefinire gli equilibri nel settore delle telecomunicazioni a livello mondiale.
Il sistema Guowang si basa su una costellazione di satelliti in orbita bassa (LEO), simili a quelli di Starlink. Tuttavia, la Cina ha adottato un approccio diverso: invece di concentrarsi esclusivamente sulla copertura globale, ha sviluppato tecnologie per assicurare connessioni a bassa latenza anche in condizioni estreme. Per questo la videochiamata tra Artico e Antartide rappresenta un test fondamentale. Nonostante le difficoltà legate al clima e alla distanza, i ricercatori cinesi sono riusciti a stabilire una connessione stabile, confermando la validità del sistema.
Starlink, già operativo in numerose aree del pianeta come la foresta amazzonica, continua a espandere la sua rete con l’obiettivo di fornire internet a banda larga anche nelle zone più isolate.
Quali sono i suoi vantaggi competitivi? Innanzitutto, la rete di SpaceX è già attiva e offre servizi commerciali. Inoltre, l’azienda di Elon Musk vanta una capacità di lancio eccezionale, con centinaia di satelliti messi in orbita in tempi record.
Tuttavia, la Cina non sta a guardare. Grazie a investimenti massicci e una pianificazione strategica, Pechino potrebbe presto colmare il divario, soprattutto nei settori della difesa e delle telecomunicazioni strategiche.
La competizione tra Cina e Starlink va oltre la tecnologia: è una questione di potere. Chi controllerà le comunicazioni satellitari avrà un vantaggio strategico in termini di informazione, sicurezza ed economia globale.
La Cina, con il progetto Guowang, ha già ridotto la dipendenza dagli Stati Uniti e dai loro alleati, creando un’alternativa alle tecnologie occidentali. Questo scenario potrebbe portare a una frammentazione del mercato delle telecomunicazioni, con conseguenze imprevedibili.
D’altra parte, Starlink rappresenta per l’Occidente un’arma strategica per contrastare l’influenza cinese. Una rete internet globale sotto il controllo di un’azienda privata americana potrebbe avere implicazioni anche in termini di sicurezza nazionale.
Il confronto tra Cina e Starlink è solo all’inizio. Nei prossimi anni assisteremo a una corsa tecnologica senza precedenti, con investimenti miliardari e innovazioni costanti.
Ma chi vincerà? Dipenderà da diversi fattori: la capacità di innovazione, la velocità di sviluppo e, soprattutto, l’adattamento alle esigenze globali. Una cosa è certa: il futuro delle telecomunicazioni sarà sempre più legato allo spazio.
L'articolo Cina sfida Starlink con una videochiamata tra i poli terrestri proviene da sicurezza.net.
Mozilla has introduced Firefox Enterprise for organizations with strict compliance, governance, and security requirements.
The post Chrome, Firefox Updates Patch 114 Flaws as Mozilla Unveils Firefox Enterprise appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Critical-severity flaws could lead to authentication bypass, code execution, and sensitive authentication information leaks.
The post Citrix, Fortinet, Ivanti Patch 29 Vulnerabilities Across Their Products appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The most important is CVE-2026-96951, a security feature bypass flaw in Windows that has been exploited in the wild.
The post Microsoft Patches Record 1,413 Vulnerabilities, Including Exploited Windows Zero-Day appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The bugs could allow attackers to invoke internal operations and execute code, completely compromising the system.
The post SAP Patches Critical NetWeaver, S/4HANA Vulnerabilities appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Microsoft today issued updates to fix more than 1,400 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and other software. Today’s epic patch batch dwarfs September’s record of nearly 1,000 fixes, which was already about ten times the normal monthly patch load from Redmond.

Just one of the weaknesses patched this week is considered a “zero day,” or already exploited in the wild. CVE-2026-96951 is a security feature bypass in the Windows Shell that affects Windows 10 and 11 systems, as well as some Server versions.
Windows 10 users might be wondering if they can still expect security updates after this month. Microsoft had been slated to stop shipping updates for Windows 10 systems in October 2025, but ended up adding another year of free updates after considerable pushback. A few months ago, Microsoft quietly extended that support for another year (until October 2027).
At least 78 of the flaws fixed this month are rated “critical,” meaning they could be exploited with little or no action by the user, and most of those critical bugs allow an attacker to execute code of their choice on the vulnerable system.
While Microsoft said there are no signs anyone is exploiting it yet, a security feature bypass in the .NET Framework (CVE-2026-108398) was publicly disclosed prior to today, potentially giving attackers advance time to work out how to exploit the bug.
Satnam Narang at Tenable said the number of flaws fixed this month far surpasses the previous record-setting year 2020, when Microsoft patched 1,261 CVEs.
“We’ve now crossed the 4,000 CVE mark with two months left to go,” he said.
Microsoft credits large language models for the high volume of bug discovery, and presumably AI gets credit for many of the patches used to fix these flaw. Meanwhile, security experts have been warning that these unusually large patch volleys from Microsoft are placing extra strain on corporate security teams, which often have to test individual updates before deploying them across a network to ensure the fixes don’t cause problems for other software.
Tyler Reguly, associate director of security research and development at Fortra, notes that just 26 Microsoft vulnerabilities appeared in the “Known Exploited Vulnerabilities” (KEV) catalog maintained by the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) so far this year, and security teams would do well to prioritize patching those 26 vulnerabilities first.
“Security leaders should focus on exploitable risk, and ask whether their teams have the clarity, capacity and support to act,” Reguly said.
Which vulnerabilities deserve the most scrutiny in your organization? The folks at Cisco Talos have a useful roundup of the more noteworthy flaws that Microsoft fixed today, and of course the SANS Internet Storm Center has a reliable roundup that indexes vulnerabilities by severity, CVE number and affected software.
Saudi national Abdulrahman Alfozan was arrested Friday and terminated by OpenAI.
The post Employee Arrested After Listening Device Found in OpenAI Conference Room, FBI and the Company Say appeared first on SecurityWeek.